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ABSTRACT 
 
 
This thesis enquires into the making of European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) from 
the perspective of the actors endorsing and contesting the policy. By identifying the political 
milieu of the policy, it seeks to problematise the established depiction of ESDP and delineate 
the framing involved in designing and implementing the policy. I thus advance the argument 
about the all-pervading character of the political and I stipulate the value of micropolitical 
analysis for unpacking broad political arrangements.  
In order to trace security practices enacted through the policy, I explore in depth two 
instances of ESDP operations and a case of strengthening the UNIFIL forces to Lebanon via 
an EU initiative. I conclude that the ESDP has proven transformative both within the EU 
internal system of governance and vis-à-vis the EU’s international positioning. The former 
involves the rise of domestic politics engendered by the interplay of institutional identities 
and conceptions of achieving EU security. The latter exposes the shift in the international role 
assignments wherein the EU becomes a deputy of the US and a saviour of the UN’s 
reputation.  
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INTRODUCTION   
 
There have been many controversies over the emergence of European Security and Defence 
Policy (ESDP), including its contested viability and the uproar over the policy’s alleged 
demolishing of the civilian character of the EU. Others, conversely, agree with Hedley Bull 
that Europe should have independent defence capabilities (1982), and are thus of the opinion 
that ESDP is a positive development. Michael Merlingen and Rasa Ostrauskaite, for example, 
consider the policy an international mission for humanity (2006). Certainly, viewed against 
the backdrop of the EU project at large, the Union’s success in expanding into the security 
and defence field since 1999 clearly disrupts the received wisdom about the protracted and 
reactive nature of the EU enterprise in this area. The neat picture of the EU as an economic 
giant but a political dwarf and a military worm1 has thus lost its eloquent appeal.  
Correspondingly, debates over whether the EU has grown out of the clothing of a 
‘civilian power’ and put on armour, or whether recent attempts to achieve greater visibility in 
international security are merely fleeting, have burgeoned (Smith, K. 2000; Stavridis 2001a, 
2001b; Martinsen 2003; Treacher 2004; Whitman 2006). These works nonetheless suffer from 
a distinct malady: despite the robust record of ESDP, they fail to engage in a problematisation 
of the policy, remaining instead content with a review of secondary sources on the subject. 
Three interconnected problems beset most of the literature on the subject and the research 
community involved. First, evading thorough empirical engagement, academic works write 
their own story and impose their own interpretations, thus effectively ignoring the reality of 
the policy and its context. Second, enclosed in this self-supported paradigm, research on 
ESDP remains within the realm of ‘problem-solving theory’. It takes the policy world as it 
finds it, ‘with the prevailing social and power relationships and the institutions into which 
they are organised, as the given framework for action’, and so sees as its general aim ‘to make 
those relationships and institutions work smoothly by dealing effectively with particular 
sources of trouble’ (Cox 1986: 128-9). What we obtain thereby is but a re-classification of 
certain aspects of the conventional CFSP/ESDP story. On the policy analysis side, criticism of 
poor effectiveness and glaring inter-pillar incoherence brings similarly modest understanding 
of ESDP making. A few exceptions aside (Merlingen and Ostraukaite 2005a, 2005b, 2006), 
empirical research in the field represents a digest of reports from a handful of well-trodden 
                                                 
 
1 The expression was coined by a former foreign minister of Belgium, Mark Eyskens, who thereby summed up 
the extent of European failure in the Balkans.  
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paths, a kind of chronological inventory of decisions made, declarations adopted and 
allegedly never implemented.  
Third, what thus receives little attention is the politics behind ESDP as a political 
project, i.e. as a socially mediated quest to instil particular understandings of what EU 
security is about. Narrowly interpreted, politics refers to an explicit, conscious formulation of 
decisions in a context of choice. Here politics is about deciding practices in a situation where 
one is at a loss, and about dealing with contingencies for which there are no clear points of 
reference or patterns of behaviour (Wæver 1993). This is a time-honoured way of thinking 
about politics, for as March and Olsen (1989: 47) observe, “a conception of politics as 
decision making and resource allocation is at least as old as Plato and Aristotle.” Conversely, 
however, one might conceive of politics more broadly as strategies constituting the social 
world (Wæver 1993). According to this reading, and as March and Olsen keenly warn as well 
(1989: 47), not all politics can be reduced to competition over material resources; indeed 
much of it concerns the struggle over collective identity, including often deadly contests over 
the meaning of symbols signifying this identity. Following the lines of this argument, I 
consider politics as being about contentious claims about what is good and true, and building 
alliances around them in the quest to impose a particular definition of a situation. This quest 
consolidates the institutional identities involved and marks them out as keen to endorse their 
designation of the situation. Policy in this context is a discursive battlefield with power 
relations and strategic interaction constituting the framework for action.  
The literature on ESDP strangely veils this ‘discursive battlefield’ behind the policy. 
By passing over the language and strategic games that underpin the policy, the practices and 
power relations that mediate the policy remain unexplored or, more worryingly, naturalised. 
Unsurprisingly enough in the light of the initial scorn towards the policy, ESDP is now 
perceived as an innate extension of the EU integration. As such, it is no more a ‘securitising 
move’ within which certain notions are presented in pursuit of approval; rather, many ESDP 
propositions have already been well accepted by varying audiences. In effect, both performers 
and spectators of ESDP operate within narrow framings of the policy, regardless of whether 
they subscribe to their message or regard them as simply instrumental rhetoric. Taking the 
policy at face value, they accept the given order as a natural arrangement—this despite the 
fact that, as some jokingly note, there are now more researchers keeping themselves busy with 
ESDP than there are policy makers involved in designing the policy and practitioners actively 
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implementing it.2 Indeed, researchers form part of the effectively swayed audience: occupied 
with raging criticism pertaining to the modalities of the ESDP functioning, they have none the 
less embraced the project as an element of the EU reality, with issues of democratic 
accountability (Bono 2002; Wagner 2004, 2006) challenging only the policy outfit. 
ESDP thus represents a practical discursive achievement on the part of its shapers. 
Material produced by the European Union Institute for Security Studies (EUISS), a second 
pillar agenda formally tasked to foster independent research on the Common Foreign and 
Security Policy (CSFP), offers a flavour of the framing techniques employed in the project. 
Here the policy is labelled as one of the Union’s success stories, which profoundly modified 
the image, functioning and approach—i.e. the identity card—of the European construction as 
a whole (Gnesotto 2004:17). Within the same volume, Javier Solana asserts that “the world 
around us cries for a stronger and more self-confident Europe.” The EU is prepared to answer 
these calls because there now exists a common vision of the threats the EU faces, together 
with appropriate responses to them (2004:5). According to this framing, ESDP is not merely 
in constant development, but it has reached a point of irreversibility, and the European 
Security Strategy (ESS) is the EU’s ‘strategic identity card’ that identifies it as a global, 
responsible, and credible security player (Ibid, 6). The EU is global in a sense of being 
vigilant as regards both terrorism and the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction 
(WMD), and more traditional sources of conflict, such as regional conflicts, the break-up of 
states, and large-scale organised crime. It is responsible in that it understands that its security 
and the promotion of its values depend on the achievement of three strategic aims: facing up 
to these various threats, building security in its immediate neighbourhood, and promoting an 
international order based on effective multilateralism. Finally, it is credible since it is more 
active in the management and prevention of conflicts, more determined to develop the 
necessary military, diplomatic and industrial capabilities, and more coherent in implementing 
its various instrument of external action. In contrast to the previous security initiatives, which 
were overly reactive, too long on process and short on substance, ESDP has made a difference 
for Europe itself and in a wider perspective (Ibid, 6-7).  
The portrayal above belongs to the discursive repertoire through which ESDP has been 
politically framed. It represents a particular definition and conceptualisation of the policy by 
its shapers and performers, and as such forms a constitutive part of this political project. The 
                                                 
 
2 Remark by Professor Karen Smith at the first Workshop of the UACES Specialist Group on European Union 
Conflict Prevention and Crisis Management., London School of Economics and Political Sciences, 2nd February 
2006. 
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Rortian notion of ‘contingent vocabulary’ offers a number of insights into how this process 
works. In Contingency, Irony and Solidarity, Rorty writes about ‘a contest between an 
entrenched vocabulary which has become a nuisance and a half-formed new vocabulary 
which vaguely promises great things (1989: 9).’ He further suggests that for there to be a 
change, this entrenched vocabulary has to begin to seem like a nuisance, an irritant, or a 
saboteur, in order for something new and transformative to happen. It is as though one is 
frustrated into experimentation, even though the old entrenched vocabulary makes some new 
things sound baffling or implausible. I construe the inception of ESDP as inspired by just such 
a nuisance experience with the entrenched civilian power vocabulary and its limits; this 
experience prompted the EU into experimentation of which ESDP is an instance. Perhaps it 
was unfeasible to reach an aim that mattered with the vocabulary available; it was certainly 
impossible to construct a particular EU international role with purely civilian power verbiage. 
Yet, this old vocabulary had to exist in order to induce such a feeling of frustration. It 
pestered the actors with what it could not do for them and made them attend to something. In 
this sense, the old vocabulary provided for inspiration through resistance. 
The nuisance experience, then, underpins the framing of ESDP as a ‘grand project’ 
and as the inspiration for new scenarios. It is through the search for an endorsement of new 
definitions of the political situation that a policy emerges. This definition of the word ‘policy’ 
significantly expands and deepens the conventional conception of it as being constituted by 
the rhetoric of political speeches, the written documents produced by authorised agencies, the 
institutional mechanisms of decision-making and what people experience in their interaction 
with actors implementing the policy (Shore and Wright 1997, Introduction). In this thesis, I 
view ESDP as an instance of policy framing and political struggle that is itself productive of 
particular governance practices in the EU system, with governance here conceived both as 
institutional arrangement and ideological imposition. In this sense, I consider framing to be a 
process of selective control over the perception of the meanings attributed to certain 
phenomena. Its aim is to permit certain interpretations and rule out others. Framing, when it is 
successful, thus ensures that specific issues come to be considered as crucial, and, just as 
importantly, come to be viewed in certain ways rather than others. As such, framing should be 
seen as an adjunct to the political process of agenda setting. In the case at hand, the point of 
framing is to make specific conceptions of European security commonsensical and mould the 
proceedings accordingly. This proceeds by endorsing certain representations of European 
security which include a diagnosis (what is the problem, where is it located and what/who 
causes this problem?), connected to a prognosis (how should the problem be resolved, what 
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ends and what means should be used?), and a rationale or call for action (what courses of 
action are suggested, and who is responsible for this?) (Snow and Benford 1988).  
In order to track how this framing process developed in relation to ESDP, I focus on 
the various actors in the domain and on their intersecting agendas, together with their 
relationships through which contextual power operates. While contestability is inherent to this 
process, I seek to illustrate how certain predominant ways of defining problems became 
authoritative and cautiously protected. Here, ESDP symbolises a narrative of long overdue 
revival that serves to justify a change. Consequently, it becomes a discursive formation that 
empowers certain actors while silencing others. Crucially, however, the policy remains a 
political feat executed through contextually woven purposeful action, and is, as such, the 
embodiment of politics. It thus calls for a people-centred approach through which constitutive 
interpretations can be reconstructed.  
 To understand the development of the policy and its implications, I centre my inquiry 
around three research questions: how the ESDP security claim has been enacted, what 
concrete security practices have emerged along this process and whether this has contributed 
to shifting the security role of the in international politics. In order to identify the lines of 
contest between the ‘old’ and the ‘new vocabulary’, I trace the policy-related discourse back 
to the late 1990s, and in some instances earlier, to provide the historical background. To 
examine this contest at work, I look into the domestic sources of ESDP making through the 
analysis of two cases of ESDP operations, introducing examples from other operations to 
substantiate the argument. While I contend that ESDP missions have become a major vehicle 
for the realisation of EU security policy, I also argue that they serve the broader aim of 
positioning the EU on the international stage. In an attempt to gauge the latter, I analyse 
ESDP against the backdrop of the EU’s interaction with other international actors until to the 
end of 2006 and beginning of 2007. 
The thesis proceeds from a consideration of the conventional picture of ESDP, through 
an explication of the research procedure used here, to empirical analysis, and from there to 
some broader conclusions reached. Accordingly, Chapter I maps out the conventional ESDP 
narrative. It thereby brings in a kind of encyclopaedic acquaintance with the field before data 
collection and analysis commence. I also pick up on a number of threads in broader literature 
in order to locate the research within the discipline and critically speak to the sources that 
contribute to building the conceptual scaffolding of the thesis. To conclude, I elaborate on the 
puzzle structuring the research. Chapter II presents the theoretical considerations and 
premises that guide the research, together with the analytical framework that organises the 
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examination of empirical material. I seek here to justify the approach adopted and give 
reasons for the particular methodology applied. Following on from that, I spell out the 
research questions and justify the case studies.  
Chapters III-V consist of empirical analysis and are structured according to the 
research questions. Chapter III deals with the framing of the security claim as it is made 
through ESDP, and seeks to unravel the discursive logic behind the particular argument it puts 
forward. Here, I investigate the history of ESDP discourse in order to note both the 
transformative moments of the argument, and its current form. The aim of this enterprise is to 
track how what is legitimate and ‘rational’ to say, and what strikes as outrageous, 
disadvantageous, or even absurd, has become established in EU security discourse. In so 
doing, I examine the process of constructing a particular political milieu. Specifically, I 
identify the central securitising actor together with the discursive repertoire brought into play 
in the process. Moreover, in order to grasp the rules of this particular local game, I identify 
facilitating actors, major contestants to the project, and important fields of action. Chapter IV 
proceeds to the substance of the puzzle by analysing the case studies that illustrate the social 
mediation and strategic interaction that permeates ESDP making. In particular, the chapter 
looks into the intra-EU ‘discursive battlefield’. It investigates the EU security practices as 
they emerge out of day-to-day EU politics. Two case studies of ESDP operations are 
examined here, together with a non-case and a counterfactual argument. The purpose of the 
latter is to bring to light the constraints surrounding the process of agenda-setting in ESDP.  
Chapter V seeks to grasp what international role for the EU has arisen out of the 
security practices enacted via ESDP. It introduces and substantiates the heuristic potential of 
the EU-US-UN triad for tracing role assignments in contemporary security affairs. Similarly, 
it emphasises the analytical purchase of approaching the notion of world order not as an 
objective concept but rather as a perspective. In the Conclusion, I summarise the argument 
and revisit its theoretical premises. I argue that EU security making violates the traditional 
boundaries of securitisation theory. I then seek to disengage from the particular logic of the 
research presented here in order to discuss alternative explanations of ESDP, which also 
allows a discussion about the possible research paths that might test and enlarge the present 
argument. In particular, I suggest that viewing the particularities of ESDP in line with the 
practice of cultivating an ‘empire in denial’ (Chandler 2006) might represent a fruitful way 
forward for the research. 
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CHAPTER I   PRESENTING THE POLICY 
Discourses […] are sources of power because ruling some meanings in and others out is 
already and fundamentally an exercise in power. (Weldes 2006: 179) 
 
This first chapter paints the conventional picture of ESDP as it has emerged in the literature 
on the subject, with specific reference to the research community devoted to its study. 
Seeking to provide a review of major debates, I locate the research within the discipline and 
speak critically to the sources that contribute to building the conceptual scaffolding of the 
thesis. In so doing, I illustrate how the state of art in the research on ESDP may be misleading 
if what we desire is a understanding of the policy. 
 
ESDP conventional story, or what a visitor picks up at the doorstep 
 
The problem that underpins this research is the phenomenon of ESDP as an example of a 
security project arising from a particular context and specific historical setting. In what 
follows, I review a number of definitions that address the nature of ESDP, and I recount the 
conventional story underpinning the development of ESDP, in addition to the policy 
dilemmas associated with it and highlighted by the research community. By narrating this 
account, I aim to bring to light certain key elements of the ‘assumed knowledge’ about ESDP 
and of the lasting views that are conventionally offered as revealing its major characteristics. 
Acknowledging the absence of any thorough problematisation of the ESDP development, I 
resort to the resources of the conventional vernacular as valuable hints at the discursive 
framing of ESDP. I also point to the curious tenacity that pervades the way of couching the 
ESDP story in the literature and within the research community. The latter has established its 
own set of laws and routinised means of reproducing the foregrounded issues and 
marginalising the backgrounded ones. 
 There is a fairly widespread argument that the literature dealing with the ESDP 
question is heavily undertheorised. As Forberg (2006) puts it, the research that exists is 
mostly diplomatic history based on journalistic accounts of key events. It tends to cite official 
documents about institutional development, together with anecdotal, politically loaded or 
otherwise speculative evidence about the motivational factors behind it. Indeed, most of the 
works merely involve thin policy analysis and a description of the formal chronology of the 
process. The main weakness of this literature is, therefore, firstly a conspicuous neglect of the 
politics behind the ESDP project, and, secondly, an unwillingness to problematise as to how it 
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was possible for ESDP to gain the kind of significance it currently enjoys. The literature 
neglects how the policy has been performed in terms of structural possibilities and political 
action of the actors involved. Despite inherent contestability in the ESDP discourse, which 
reflects the different security visions of the member states, it has become powerful enough to 
operate as a well-entrenched point of reference in the EU security discussions. Reifying 
explanations that seek to show how ESDP was bound to emerge fail, however, to address the 
very process by which the project was established.  
 Three explanations for the emergence of the policy are commonly offered: the natural 
expansion of the integration process, Europe’s wish to balance against the United States, and 
practical needs of crisis management in a changed security environment. These can also be 
seen as grand narratives of European integration. The first is the dominant story about the 
European integration as peace project to prevent another European civil war from occurring, 
the second is a new heroic story of the European Union defending and saving Western values 
from their misrepresentation and abuse by the United States, the third can be linked to the 
story about the EU as a project to manage globalisation (Forsberg 2006).  
 Joylon Howorth posits that most of the European leaders subscribe to the following 
broad definition of ESDP:  
a project to confer upon the EU the ability to take collective decisions relating to the 
regional security and to deploy a range of instruments, including military ones, in 
operations of crisis management, peace-keeping, and, if necessary, peace–enforcement 
(preferably with a legal mandate), as a distinctive European contribution to the overall 
objectives of the Atlantic Alliance and in consultation with both European members of 
the NATO and non-allied accession countries (2003: 221).  
 
 This definition features many themes that constitute the conventional ESDP story. One 
is the notion of autonomy, defined as: 
the European conviction that they must achieve a measure of self-reliance in projecting 
forces capable of operating at the lower and middle levels of the combat scale’ or ‘the 
political and military capability on the part of the EU to take the decisions and to embark 
on initiatives involving the projection of military power with limited or no assistance 
from the US (Brenner 2002:5).  
 
 The dominant narrative thus has it that in the period of the Cold War the European 
Community adopted a posture of self-denial in matters of security and diplomacy. This was a 
result of dependence of the Western European countries on the US involvement in European 
security affairs. It also stemmed from the image of ‘the divided continent’, where the main 
sources of potential insecurity in Europe were easily identifiable, and where there was general 
consensus as regards the principal issues (MacQueen 2004: 395). Following failed attempts at 
establishing the European Defence Community (EDC) and a European Political Community 
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(EPC) in the early 1950s, further efforts to make foreign policy cooperation into the core of 
European integration were abandoned, with NATO becoming the central organisation for 
security and defence in West Europe and the United States the guarantor of European security 
(Sjursen 1998). This later amounted to the conception of the EU as an artefact of NATO, with 
the latter enabling the EU project to proceed peacefully. In a similar vein, Kagan’s argument 
attributes the EU’s ‘Kantian’ state of mind to the US military’s protection during the Cold 
War (Kagan 2004). This situation still affects the current division of labour between the 
entities. Here the quip that the US ‘makes the dinner whereas the EU does the dishes’ (Penks 
and Mason 2003:256) has become an evocative metaphor for the military leadership of the US 
and the auxiliary functions of the EU in security affairs. 
After the end of the Cold War, while Western Europe appeared to be in a less 
threatened security position, it also remained precarious. The baffling speed with which 
bipolarity was dismantled in 1989 and 1990 rendered the Cold War institutions obsolete and 
caught European Community leaders off-guard. Although the threat of a major East-West 
confrontation had seemingly vanished, it was not replaced by peace and harmony on the 
continent many had expected: NATO was unsure as to its future tasks, and the Americans 
themselves had not yet reassessed their own security priorities. The Western European Union 
(WEU), pleasantly located in Paris, had never been taken too seriously despite numerous 
initiatives that proved fateful for the later development of the EU security (e.g. the Petersberg 
tasks). Unsurprisingly, therefore, periodic flurries of interest in the potential revitalisation of 
the WEU as a vehicle for a real European security co-operation did not translate into concrete 
action.   
 The end of the Cold War was thus a notable turning point with regard to Europe’s 
security architecture, and it was by no means natural that an arrangement including ESDP 
would develop. Indeed, Stuart Croft has argued that immediately after the fall of the Berlin 
wall alternative and mutually exclusive ideas about the European security architecture 
surfaced. The French and Belgians advocated a view of a European defence identity that 
would be separate and separable from NATO. The Germans and Czechs supported the 
development of a pan-European collective security arrangement, based on the enhanced 
OSCE. The Russians espoused a concert of powers idea, embodied by a European security 
council. Finally, the American and British insisted on the centrality of NATO (2000: 1-2). 
Some distinct security narratives delineated in the literature of the period included: 
(1)  the rearrangement of NATO so as to give the Europeans ‘a stronger voice’. This 
was reflected in the scheme of the European pillar within NATO that would eventually take 
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shape of the European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI) as developed in 1994. The ESDI 
and the Combined Joint Task Forces, with its central premise of separable but not separate 
forces, sought to head off the emergence of an autonomous European military capability and 
to allow the US to burden-share without renouncing leadership. This option seems to have 
reflected a paradoxical US attitude to the European debate on defence. Continuously urging 
the Europeans to boost their defence capabilities in order to share responsibilities for global 
security, the US invariably voiced the proviso that the European endeavour should stay within 
the confines of NATO and that no decisions should be made without prior consultation with 
themselves. The continued relevance of NATO to European security was strengthened at the 
NATO summit in Berlin in June 1996 where it was decided that the ESDI be developed inside 
the framework of NATO. Some interpreted this event as a momentary victory for the 
Atlanticists in the struggle over the development of security structures in Europe (Duke 1994; 
Cornish 1996).  
(2) the continuation of the revived WEU. The role of the latter was never fully 
articulated, but at the Amsterdam Treaty it stands as a intermediary organisation (a bridge) 
between the EU and NATO which allowed it to enact defence policy on behalf of the EU 
within a separate institution (Manners 2000:220). Article J.4.2. of the Amsterdam Treaty 
reflects competing understandings about the actual role of the WEU: “The Union requests the 
WEU, which is an integral part of the development of the Union, to elaborate and implement 
decisions and actions of the Union which have defence implications”. 
 The Atlanticist discourse on the European security influenced the negotiations in that 
the WEU was not considered part of the EU; it was to remain independent for the foreseeable 
future, which indicated that the EU would still be left without a defence component of its 
own. The more Europeanist agendas affected the negotiations by enabling the insertion of two 
critical elements: firstly, that the WEU is an integral part of the EU development, thereby 
opening the possibility of the merger of the two organisations that would provide the EU with 
a military dimension, and secondly, that the EU decisions can have defence implications of 
any kind. 
(3) the autonomous EU initiative on security and defence. This seemed a radical 
option in the aftermath of the end of the Cold War. Indeed, sceptics argued that:  
there are only few reasons to be optimistic that either the EU’s CFSP or the WEU can 
make a significant contribution to solving conflicts and crises in Europe or beyond. This 
has both to do with the absence of political will and decision-making mechanisms to 
make effective use of the available military assets as well as limited military power which 
West European states are able to deploy (van Ham 1995: 170) 
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Similarly, for Lawrence Freedman and Anand Menon (1997), there was ‘every reason 
to suspect that [West European nations] will continue to prefer NATO over the EU’. In Philip 
Gordon’s view: 
the end of the Cold War, the widening of the Union, the continued differences in EU 
members’ strategic culture, ambitions, values and historical relationships, and the 
lack…of European identity…means that EU foreign policy cooperation will remain 
limited, fragmented and intergovernmentalist in nature’ (1998).  
 
Emil Kirchner (1999), in turn, contended that progress would be less likely given 
NATO’s success in Bosnia. Dmitris N. Chryssochoou et al. (1999) concluded that ‘the 
outcome of the 1997 Intergovernmental Conference shows that Europe will not manage to 
develop an independent capability within the Union [in the realm of security]’. 
Despite the existence of different ideas for the future of European security, the 
preference for ‘situated’ autonomy nevertheless took precedence and made its way into the 
foreground of the EU security discourse. ESDP draws extensively on previous conceptions of 
the WEU, the most vivid example being the so-called ‘Petersberg Tasks’, adopted in 1992, 
that carved out the space in which EU security policy be formulated throughout the 1990s. 
These included humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping, crisis management and 
peacemaking responsibilities. Another example is the ‘Platform on European Security 
Interests’ adopted in 1987,3 which stated that the US interests are at variance with European 
interests. However, the process only commenced formally with the St. Malo declaration of 
December 1998, which effectively shelved the WEU as much as it bypassed the ESDI, and 
with it the possibility of developing European security policy within the Atlantic Alliance. 
The actual abandonment of both the concept of the European pillar within NATO and the 
notion of the WEU as an intermediary institution have thus provided a launch pad for the 
emergence and development of ESDP. While it would not be viable to identify precisely the 
moment when the old options ultimately gave way to ESDP, it is clear that, today, both the 
WEU and the ESDI are arrangements from the distant past. 
 However, the road to ESDP was to proceed through the disappointment with CFSP. 
The 1992 Maastricht Treaty that established CFSP also foresaw “the eventual framing of a 
common defence policy,” which could “in time lead to a common defence” (article J.4 of the 
Treaty). CFSP, however, was soon to demonstrate a lack of any substantial development, and 
that it was need of fundamental boost. The outbreak and perpetuation of the Balkans wars 
                                                 
 
3 ‘WEU Platform on Security Interests’, The Hague, 27 October 1987, 
http://www.weu.int/documents/871027en.pdf , accessed 7 July 2007. 
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highlighted two widely acknowledged truths about the EU at that time. Firstly, they “dealt a 
heavy blow to the very essence of the European project, which is based on democratic values 
that were flouted on its doorstep” and, secondly, they showed that the EU was in no position 
to become a crisis manager in its own neighbourhood. The Balkan wars subsequently became 
a pictogram of European humiliation with a character of Jacques Poos in the foreground. The 
former Luxembourg foreign minister gained widespread publicity in 1991 by announcing that 
the ‘hour of Europe’ had dawned (meaning Europe alone would be able to save Bosnia), an 
announcement followed by several years of under-achievement. Indeed, when the West 
finally faced up to its responsibilities in 1995, it was the United States and NATO in the lead 
roles—through air strikes and the negotiated settlement signed at Dayton, Ohio—rather than 
the EU or the UN. Only a few years later, contemplating the squalid misery in Croatia and 
Bosnia, a former foreign minister of Belgium Mark Eyskens summed up the extent of 
European failure in the Balkans by saying that Europe was ‘an economic giant, a political 
dwarf and a military worm’. Accordingly, the famous catchphrase in the literature, 
‘capabilities-expectation gap’4, coined by Christopher Hill and intended to indicate the 
process by which the EU creates unrealistic expectations it subsequently fails to come up to 
(Hill 1993), found its most illustrative application.  
 The single clearest example of this ‘capabilities-expectations gap’ was the massacre in 
Srebrenica, a symbol of the EU’s impotence that has gained considerable evocative power in 
the years after the event. The EU’s disgrace in the Balkans has subsequently converted into a 
catalyst for developing its own crisis management capabilities. The myth of the Balkans, and 
Europe’s failure there, has indeed become the source of the EU’s long-term commitment to 
the region. Chris Patten, former EU External Relations Commissioner, tellingly conveyed the 
Balkan metaphor entrenched in the ESDP discourse:  
The shattered ruins of Vukovar. The ghastly siege of Sarajevo. The charnel house of 
Srebrenica. The smoking villages of Kosovo. The European Union did not commit these 
crimes. But 200,000 or more fellow Europeans died in Bosnia and Herzegovina alone. As 
Europeans we cannot avoid a heavy share of responsibility for what happened (2004).  
 
Similarly, the NATO bombardments of Kosovo sharply indicated yet another weak 
spot of the EU, namely its military retardedness in comparison with the high-tech capabilities 
of the US army. Supposedly, for Europeans the war in Kosovo was existential, as it put to the 
                                                 
 
4 The phrase has become a much-cherished heuristic for critics of the EU performance in the foreign policy. It 
has however failed to reflect to what extent many of these expectations were created by analysts themselves, 
based on the ‘ideal-type’ behaviour of the nation-state. 
 
 
24
test the continent’s gains of the previous fifty years, and especially of the post Cold War 
1990s. It challenged the assumption that, at last at the end of a terrible century, voluntary 
cooperation has triumphed over Nazi and Communist coercion (Pond 1999: 77). Kosovo, by 
contrast, made it clear that passive Europeans were still too accustomed to letting the US 
superpower make all security decisions for its transatlantic protégé (Ibid). For some this bore 
out the painful truth that there was no substitute for the US leadership, for others, conversely, 
Kosovo marks a moment when the US reoriented its security priorities and the Europeans 
were to produce their own ideas how to safeguard their backyard. Accordingly, the war in 
Kosovo, highlighting in vivid and embarrassing detail Europe’s dependence on the US 
military (Medley 1999: 18), actually goaded European leaders into the decisions taken in 
Cologne in June 1999. 
 Before Cologne materialised, however, there had come about the moment which is 
now acknowledged as a symbolic watershed in the ESDP history. The British-French 
declaration at St. Malo marked an emblematic breakthrough (Deighton 2006: 26), leading to 
the climax of the Helsinki Headline Goal in December 1999. At St. Malo, Britain and France 
announced that:  
The European Union needs to be in a position to play its full role on the international 
stage [...] To this end, the Union must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed 
up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and the readiness to do 
so, in order to respond to international crises (British-French Joint Declaration 1998).  
 
 This ‘Europeanised’ moment in the history of ESDP was also interpreted as the 
coincidence of two distinct national agendas (Howarth 2000). For the UK, ESDP was an 
Alliance project involving European instrumentality. For France, it was a European project 
embracing Alliance capabilities (Ibid). But while the driving power of the UK and France, 
and the different rationale behind the action of each partner, are crucial threads of ESDP 
story, it is important to stress that the chosen vehicle was the EU. 
 The history of the policy has it that in the run up to St. Malo it was exactly the sea 
change of the British government, long the opponent of an independent European defence 
pillar, which catalyzed EU member governments to agree upon a historic change towards 
having a defence policy (Ibid). According to this reading, the conversion in the British 
government in 1997 instigated the ESDP initiative. The motives behind this enterprise were 
the new Labour Government’s urge to demonstrate the UK’s central role in Europe, which 
could also compensate for Britain’s self-chosen exclusion from the European Monetary Union 
(van Ham 2000:215).  
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 This shift in the traditional British line and the ensuing prioritisation of security policy 
in EU circles was accompanied by two parallel developments on the other side of the Atlantic. 
These were the insistence on the ‘three Ds’ that still outline American expectations from 
ESDP to this day: no decoupling of European security from that of America’s; no duplication 
of effort and capabilities; and no discrimination against the allies who are not the EU 
members (Albright 1998), and the continuous reminder that: ‘We do not want to see an ESDI 
that comes into being first within NATO but then grows out of NATO and finally grows away 
from NATO’ (Talbott 1999). Characteristically, most of the Europeans feverishly vouched 
that ESDP was not a competitor to NATO but rather its companion: it was definitely not 
about collective defence but instead primarily about crisis management. In other words, any 
hint from Brussels that ESDP could become a European army were vigorously denied. The 
French, on the other hand, were the least eager to commit to these assurances as they 
traditionally occupied a position tilting towards an autonomous European option. As 
commented by Margaret Thatcher:  
the French and those who think like them have been so insistent on achieving an 
autonomous European defence capability precisely because they see it as constituting a 
vital attribute of a new European superpower which will rival the US (2002:357).  
 
Importantly, after the St. Malo declaration and before the Cologne Conclusions the 
fledgling European security policy was still conceived as a European pillar of NATO and 
addressed as the ESDI. In its Washington communiqué in April 1991, NATO acknowledged 
‘the resolve of the EU to have the capacity for autonomous action ...where the Alliance as a 
whole is not engaged’ (Washington communiqué 1999). Nevertheless, it was highlighted in a 
new Strategic Concept that ‘the ESDI will continue to be developed within NATO’ (Ibid). 
The Europeans by that time, however, had begun referring to the ESDI as ESDP – ‘P’ 
standing for Policy. This subtle change has been attributed to the French acting with an aim to 
conjure up a sense of autonomy since the ESDI had always been referred to as ‘within the 
Alliance’ (Cogan 2001: 111).  
The language of the Cologne EU Summit in June 1999 is highly indicative of the EU’s 
long-cherished ambitions to have a say in security issues. It seems to suggest that NATO and 
the EU would act independently of each other. Whereas in the wording of the Washington 
communiqué the EU had a right to act only where the Alliance was not engaged militarily, the 
Cologne Conclusion asserted the right of autonomous action on the part of the EU, ‘without 
prejudice to actions taken by NATO’ (Cologne Conclusions 1999). The verbiage changed 
once again in the documents produced by the subsequent Summit in Helsinki in December 
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1999. In the lead-up to the Helsinki summit, Washington signalled clearly that it wanted 
NATO to be given a ‘first option’ (or a ‘right to first refusal’) before the EU decided to act on 
its own, with or without the use of NATO assets (Cogan 2001). The US further indicated that 
‘even if Washington decides not to send troops, we will still want to be involved in the 
decision-making process from the beginning’ (Ibid). Consequently, in the Helsinki 
Conclusions, the centrality of NATO was recognised and the EU’s action role was limited to 
those situations in which NATO would not be involved.  
At Cologne, it was decided that CFSP had to be backed by credible operational 
capabilities in order to conduct Petersberg tasks. This was an explicit inauguration of the 
ESDP as a distinctive part of CFSP, with member states formally consenting to absorb the 
functions of the WEU. On 15 November, Javier Solana, former Secretary General of NATO 
and the newly appointed Secretary-General of the EU Council’s General Secretariat and 
‘High Representative’ for foreign and security policy (SG/HR), was ‘double-hatted’ and made 
Secretary-General of the WEU. His name commanded respect and hinted at accomplishment 
while it also signalled an acknowledgement that NATO and the EU would get on well 
together.  
 At Helsinki, however, a different issue drew the bystanders’ attention. At the Summit, 
it was declared what has become known as the ‘Helsinki Headline Goal’. According to its 
provisions, the member states, ‘cooperating voluntarily in EU-led operations, would have to 
be able, by 2003, to deploy within 60 days and sustain for at least a year military forces of up 
to 50,000-60,000 persons capable of the full range of Petersberg tasks’ (Council of the EU 
1999b). New political and military bodies were established within the Council in order “to 
ensure the necessary political guidance and strategic direction to such operations, while 
respecting the single institutional framework” (Ibid). This set in motion a process of setting 
out subsequent goals in terms of capabilities. The next significant one was at Feira in June 
2000 where a first Civilian Headline Goal was put forward. It declared that member states 
should, “cooperating voluntarily, as a final objective by 2003 be able to provide up to 5000 
police officers for international missions across the range of conflict prevention and crisis 
management operations and in response to specific needs at the different stages of these 
operations” (Council of the EU 2000). The priority areas within civilian crisis management 
were identified as police, the strengthening of the rule of law, and the strengthening of 
civilian administration and civil protection (Ibid, Appendix III). By this stage, the tentative 
contours of a particular picture had been sketched where ‘the development of ESDP within 
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the EU is unique in that it has the potential to deliver a fully integrated civil and military crisis 
management capability, internally as well as externally’(UK Non Paper 2002). 
By providing a ‘rude awakening’ to EU leaders (Council of the EU 2001b), the attacks 
on New York and Washington of 11 September 2001 gave the ESDP development a sense of 
urgency. The Laeken European Council in December 2001, although stronger on rhetoric than 
on reality as many critics have emphasised, formally launched an ‘operational’ European 
security and defence capability:  
Through the continuing development of ESDP, the strengthening of its capabilities, both 
civil and military, and the creation of the appropriate EU structures, the EU is now able to 
conduct some crisis-management operations. The Union will be in a position to take on 
progressively more demanding operations, as the assets and capabilities at its disposal 
continue to develop (Ibid).  
 
Not long afterwards, in the beginning of 2003, first missions were deployed, 
significantly in the Balkans. A further weighty test case was the military operation ‘Artemis’, 
where the EU involved itself in peacemaking activities in Congo, with France as a framework 
nation. The mission was a military operation independent from NATO and was declared 
successful. Although limited in scope and time, these engagements heralded the first hands-on 
manifestation of the EU’s security and defence dimension (Missiroli 2003:497). They also 
showed the EU’s willingness to undertake proactively security tasks, and its ability to react to 
ongoing or emerging humanitarian/security crisis and to contribute to peace enforcement, 
reconstruction and stabilisation (Ibid, 500).  
 The European Security Strategy (ESS) of 2003, entitled “A secure Europe in a better 
world”, marks a particular watershed moment in the ESDP story. It celebrated, as many 
officials said, an important step towards creating a defence capability to match Europe’s size 
and wealth - 450m people after the 2004 enlargement and a gross national product that 
accounts for a quarter of the world’s total (Dempsey 2003). The ESS was partly a response to 
the Union’s disarray over Iraq and partly a rejoinder to the assertive US National Security 
Concept of September 2002 with the latter’s emphasis on ‘pre-emptive strikes.’ Maria 
Strömvik (2005) provides an interesting background to this concluding that looking at the 
historical development of CFSP, ‘the political will to cooperate has periodically increased 
when EU members have disagreed with American strategies on international security 
management’. 
The ESS was commissioned by member states in Spring 2003 mainly to help prevent a 
premature death of CFSP in the face of Donald Rumsfeld famous phrase “You’re thinking of 
Europe as Germany and France, I don’t. I think that’s old Europe” and the seemingly 
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irreparable rift between “New Europe” and “Old Europe” that followed over the use of force 
in Iraq. William Wallace conjures up the spirit of the moment:  
Bitter words and public division among European governments over the war in Iraq 
exposed the fragility of their commitment to a common foreign and security policy. The 
presentation by Javier Solana to the Thessaloniki European Council of a document 
outlining a European security strategy was therefore a triumph of hope over experience 
(2003). 
 
 The fissure opened up by the war in Iraq also produced a common awareness among 
Europe’s leaders of the need for strategic thinking in terms of international security issues. 
Europe’s role in the world and CFSP were indeed in a state of unsustainable disarray in the 
Summer of 2003 after the bitter public exchange of insults between France and the UK in the 
UN Security Council, and the French President’s public threat to derail EU enlargement 
unless accession states conformed to his opposition to US policies. Against this background, 
the ESS says that “The European Union is, like it or not, a global actor. It should be ready to 
share in the responsibility for global security.” Yet, characteristically, throughout the 
tempestuous year of 2003—perhaps the most eventful in the ESDP’s history—hardly a 
keynote speech went by without Western leaders stressing that the transatlantic bond is as 
important as ever (Toje 2003).  
 The brisk tempo of ESDP makes the above review already, in 2007, a largely 
historical account. Since then, there have been crucial developments in the form of the 
deployment of numerous missions, the establishment of the European Defence Agency, joint 
European battle groups and a European gendarmerie. The institutional set-up of the policy has 
been significantly entrenched as a result of decisions adopted at Hampton Court Summit, with 
the creation of Civil-Military Cell as a symbol of the ESDP responsiveness to the needs at 
hand. New military and civilian goals have been adopted that should further the process of 
capabilities improvement. In a similar vein, a cross pillar Security Sector Reform (SSR) 
appears to be set to feature as an essential component in the delivery of the EU crisis 
management policies in the coming years (Helly 2006). Instead, therefore, of providing 
chronological inventory of the ESDP’s history, I proceed to a discussion of the major themes 
that organise thinking about the policy in the conventional narrative.  
 A crucial predicament invariably seen as stifling ESDP are insufficient recourses, both 
budgetary, and as regards civilian/military capabilities, despite the oft-repeated imperative of 
providing the necessary capabilities to underpin the EU’s security aspirations (Shepherd 2003, 
2006). The military disappointment demonstrated during the conflict in Kosovo is a recurring 
metaphor employed to urge the procurement of adequate capabilities. What this metaphor 
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effectively perpetrates, however, is an ideal-type modern nation-state repository—specifically 
that of the US—projecting it onto the EU and thereby highlighting the latter’s failure to arrive 
at this state. In doing so, it efficiently neglects the different meaning of particular capabilities 
for the EU crisis management goals. 
 Flawed institutional arrangements are commonly named as another factor worthy of 
blame. In this context, the unrealised promise of the Constitutional Treaty, allegedly 
guaranteeing universal institutional remedy, has become a convenient reference. With the 
potential merging of the offices of EU Commissioner for External Relations and the High 
Representative for CFSP into the post of a foreign minister, together with the possibility of 
enhanced cooperation in security affairs and the significant broadening of the original 
‘Petersberg tasks’, the Constitution was intended to cure some of the major problems of EU 
foreign policy. Connected to this remains the quandary of how to ensure coherence across 
different EU bodies engaged in crisis management, particularly with reference to flaws in 
coordination between the Community tools and the means deployed within the second pillar. 
With ESDP’s effectiveness seen as depending on the interplay between the political will of 
the member states and the structural capabilities in terms of institutional and instruments 
availability, the policy is seriously flawed and, indeed, dysfunctional. What this appears to 
ignore, however, is the problematic character of policy coherence in any system of 
governance due to differing institutional conceptions and interests. Disregarding the inherent 
need to interpret the meaning of legal provisions, it also suggests that neat codification may 
replace politics and give rise to harmonious policy outcomes.  
 Lack of common strategy and problems with defining common interests are similarly 
declared to constitute ESDP weak spots (Biscop 2005b, Flechtner 2006). This includes the 
conviction of a deplorable lack of political will among member states to agree on common 
initiatives within the policy. Dismissing the already achieved common mediation space as 
inadequate, it strangely misunderstands the intrinsically political, i.e. negotiated, character of 
the project. This premise also illustrates the incredible belief in the possibility to delineate 
neatly policy objectives that would lead to its efficient implementation.  
 With the charge of lack of leadership next on the list, an impression arises that the 
ESDP’s critics aim for a totalising regime acting with mechanistic and unrestrained power. 
They argue that there is no evidence of top-down initiatives apart from the European Defence 
Agency (Khol 2005; Biscop 2005a) and the European Security Strategy (Bailes 2005), and no 
institutional or member state leadership. But such a perspective idealises a particular type of 
leadership in the neglect of various forms in which it can be exerted. Reifying its high-profile 
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statesman-like variation, it overlooks different strategies that can be performed to the same 
effect.  
 This conventional ESDP story serves a dual function in the research. First, it pinpoints 
certain narratives and tropes that pervade the discourse surrounding the policy. In so doing, it 
constitutes part of the thesis’s empirical material in that it provides data for investigating the 
process of framing ESDP. There are, however, large areas this account shifts to the 
background or effectively silences. Second, therefore, the conventional narrative sets the 
scene for the thesis argument. The latter seeks critically to engage with what the conventional 
account passes by, i.e. empirically grounded analysis of constitutive politics behind the 
policy.  
 
The state of play in the literature  
In the previous section, I refer to the literature concerned with ESDP as such. Since the 
subject I intend to explore cuts across a number of problem areas, however, I draw on a fairly 
broad scope of academic literature. Any such attempt inevitably touches on a very diverse 
range of works. In brief, I divide them into several fields related to:  
(1) the problem of security as a concept;  
(2) works concerned with the security identity nexus that explore constitutive aspects 
of security in relation to community; 
(3) academic endeavours to pinpoint the elements of the international identity, 
actorness or role of the EU; 
(4) the issue of security narratives that have been present in the works on the European 
integration, including the conception of the ‘civilian power Europe’;  
I examine these areas from the angle of how the present work engages with the 
discussions they feature.  
 
Security! What do you mean?  
Arguably, the notion of ‘security’ belongs to the category of ‘essentially contested concepts’ 
(Buzan 1991). Essentially contested concepts are said to be so value-laden that no amount of 
argument or evidence can ever lead to agreement on a single meaning regarding the ‘correct 
or standard use’ (Gallie 1956:168). Agreeing with the contextual variability of security 
meaning, in the thesis I attempt to trace exactly what security denotes for a particular 
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community. Instead of defining the concept by taxonomy of criteria and their instantiation via 
ESDP, I depart from the Wittgensteinian notion that situates the meaning of the concept in its 
use. Despite numerous contradictions inherent in the usage of any concept, one can point to 
established regularities and constellations wherein a particular concept operates and thereby to 
its meaning (Kratochwil 2007a). In order to contextualise this study analytically, I first 
provide an overview of how the concept has been approached in the discipline.  
 Departing from a dissimilar perspective, David Baldwin made a case against treating 
security as an essentially contested concept in that he attempted a conceptual analysis of 
security (1997) to establish its ‘correct’ usage. Such an enterprise involves several 
assumptions. Significantly, it presumes that there is a shared understanding in academia that, 
because our concepts are vague and ambiguous, as a preparatory step to proper research we 
need to agree on a definition of a given concept in order to pursue any puzzle. In this reading, 
language should be a transparent media and real research is not about language issues but it 
should be empirical with help of clear-cut concepts.  
 One of Baldwin’s explicit assumptions is that security is a ‘thing’, a policy objective 
distinguishable from others, which should be defined as clearly as possible through context-
independent features. A clear specification of the concept facilitates comparing the value of 
security with that of other goals and allows public debate on the subject (Ibid, 24). 
Conversely, I follow an alternative research option, which sees ‘security policy’ as a 
phenomenon, ‘as it actually happens’, without necessarily assuming that it follows from the 
logic in which a collectivity pursues collective aims in a rational manner (Wæver 1995:231). 
In order to produce definitions, we ought to study the actual usage of our concepts and 
understand the setting where this particular usage takes place. In doing so, one may draw on 
different schools that regard language as crucial to political analysis5 in view of the fact that 
doing politics is predominantly constituted by language (Chilton 2004:6). It is specifically the 
use of language or discourse, especially in a repeatable, institutionalised form, that governs 
the way people think, or perhaps rather the meanings that are least purposefully exchanged 
(Ibid, 26).  
The title of the section derives from the title of an article by Jef Huysmans in the 
European Journal of International Relations. He argues there that although the recent debate 
                                                 
 
5 Among them (1) the Cambridge School, in particular Quentin Skinner; (2) German Begriffsgeschichte with its 
focus on how one concept can have several meanings, and with Kosseleck’s focus on how time enters the 
concept and how it gets structured by projections about the future; (3) French discourse analysis with its claim 
that what can be said about the concepts derives from how they are situated. 
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on expanding the security agenda to non-military sectors and non-state referent objects 
launched an interesting discussion about the security studies agenda, it has not really been 
concerned with the meaning of security (Huysmans 1998). Instead, the researchers have rather 
been preoccupied with adding adjectives such as ‘environmental’, ‘societal’, etc. without 
problematising the term itself. Thereby, most literature implies that the change in ‘security’ 
happened by putting in front of it an adjective like ‘collective’ or ‘comprehensive’ whereas 
the term ‘security’ remains stable. In the thesis, I aim at unpacking a particular security. 
Along these lines, security understanding becomes contextualised in order to grasp the 
intersubjective logic of how certain issues in a given society become securitised while other 
lose the status of a threat. In the sections to come I nonetheless engage with literature that 
argues otherwise, because how it goes about defining security is part of what passes for 
knowledge in terms of security, it is a part of security reality. In this sense, the literature 
contributes to framing security questions that in turn influences the perception of policy 
makers. 
 For decades not only did researches neglect the study of security as a concept, but the 
prevailing concept of ‘security’, and how it should be operationalised, also remained narrow, 
fixed and uncontested. Traditionally, security has been identified with the security of the 
state; it was threatened by the military power of other states and defended by the military 
power of the state itself (Multimer 1999:77). Hence, researchers tended not to grapple much 
with the definition of the concept itself, it was perceived to be self-explanatory. Typical here 
was the realist/neo-realist approach predicated on the postulate that in the anarchic 
international structure states continue the quest for power and security to which competition 
and conflict are inherent. Here security is conceived in structural terms as external to the state. 
As Waltz argues:  
in anarchy, security is the highest end. Only if survival is assured can states seek such 
other goals as tranquillity, profit and power. The system encourages them to seek security 
(1979:126).  
 
Only since the late 1980s there has been: 
a sustained challenge to the orthodox view that the theory and practice of security in 
world politics should be synonymous with the trinity of statism (the idea that the 
sovereign state is and should be the highest focus of loyalty and decision-making), 
strategy (the manipulation of military power and force) and stability (the promotion of 
‘order’ in the ‘anarchical society’) (Booth 2004:5).  
 
An early discussion on the theme should prove instructive. After the Second World 
War, Arnold Wolfers introduced the notion of ‘national security’ as an ambiguous symbol. In 
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an objective sense, the concept measures the absence of threats to acquired values, whilst in a 
subjective sense it measures the absence of fear that such values will be attacked (Wolfers 
1952: 485). The definition by Wolfers definitely appears ‘thin’ as it disregards 
contextualisation, i.e. it concentrates on conceptual analysis in that Wolfers attempted 
clarification of an abstract concept. Importantly, the definition takes no notice of the 
processual aspect of how threats become regarded as such in a community.  
The seminal article by Wolfers triggered reflections of two kinds. First, it considers 
security not as an absolute demand, but in relation to other values pursued by a society and 
concludes that security should be measured against those other values. The conclusion 
follows that states differ in their pursuit of security. The question remains whether we can 
convincingly conceptualise security as one of numerous values, or whether it has a particular 
quality. Arguably, when the issue of security enters the milieu, it overshadows everything else 
since it instantiates the dilemma of existence: how can we debate anything else if we are not 
there to exist? In the case of the EU, this mechanical property of security acquires different 
nuances of meaning. Before the recent transformative change through ESDP, the main thread, 
a meta–securitisation within the European security discourse was the preclusion of ‘coming 
back to the European past of power politics’. This ‘inner’ logic of securitisation posits an 
existential threat and a possible point of no return: ‘Europe’ is the referent object, and will be 
lost in a fragmentation scenario (Buzan and Wæver 2003: 356). Currently, the core security 
discourse has shifted towards the outside, i.e. the EU security challenge is no longer its 
precarious fragmentation but the threats coming from the outside communities. The present 
framing attempts to picture the outside as the EU existential threat, thus relying more on 
moulding the other according to the EU own image. It still, however, lacks a degree of 
confrontational urgency. 
 The second important point in relation to Wolfers’s article is that it was one of the few 
written on security before the 1980s, when proposals for ‘broadening’ the scope of security 
started to appear in the literature. Among many at that time, Richard Ulmann questioned the 
utility of military security as conveying ‘a profoundly false image of reality’ in view of the 
fact that ‘it causes states to concentrate on military threats and to ignore other dangers’ 
(1983:129). Jessica Tuchman put forward a strong case for incorporating environmental 
issues (1989) whereas Helga Haftendorn (1991) called for the inclusion of economic, 
ecological and domestic aspects of security, demanding that the field of security studies 
develop a common understanding of security. The Copenhagen School of Security Studies, 
and in particular Barry Buzan, introduced a multisectoral approach to security where 
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particular sectors (military, political, economic, societal and environmental) designate specific 
types of interaction. 
 The attempts of these ‘broadeners’ to encompass non-military issues were criticised 
by Stephen Walt, who claimed that such endeavours endangered the intellectual coherence of 
the field. He further maintained that problems related to migration and the environment could 
not be resolved within a national security mind-set; indeed, bringing them into this realm was 
likely to have negative effects (Walt 1991:211). Walt sought to re-state the neorealist 
understanding of security in that he claimed that ‘the main focus of security studies is easy to 
identify [...] it is the phenomenon of war’ (Ibid, 212). Accordingly, security can be defined as 
‘the study of threat, use and control of military force’ and, similarly, security studies should 
aim to ‘explore the conditions that make the use of force more likely [...] and the specific 
policies that states adopt in order to prepare  for, prevent, or engage in war’ (Ibid). 
 Undeniably, the desire to avoid rendering the concept ‘fuzzy’, alongside the aspiration 
to devise a ‘correct’ (in the sense of corresponding to reality) definition of security, appeared 
a major concern for neorealists. This line of reasoning is sensitive to the criticism, however, 
that if analysts adopt the narrowly military focus they will have little or no analytical purchase 
on many of those factors that create and accentuate conflict situations. More importantly, the 
neorealist venture ignores the extent to which concepts are the building blocks of reality itself. 
In this case, the neorealist framing of security entails the corresponding picture of reality as 
based on structurally determined positioning of like units pursuing undifferentiated goals 
(Waltz 1979). Similarly, concepts do not result from direct access to the world but rather 
reflect an experience of the world that is mediated by language (Davis 2005: 55); they exist in 
our mind and do not reveal themselves directly to the mind-external world (Ibid, 16). They 
often defy clear boundaries as they are characterised by ‘blurred edges’ (Wittgenstein 1958: 
34).  
 Yet another aspect of the security concept made it particularly malleable to the 
neorealist perception of international relations. Traditionally conceived, security is to a large 
extent a conservative concept in that it implies the possession of something and the desire to 
preserve it. It has historically been status quo oriented, involving the flavour of control and 
property rights, reactive in its relation to the world. Interestingly enough, the security concept 
as it is framed in the current EU context instantiates a somewhat different approach. It 
postulates a proactive moulding of the strategic environment in order to avoid future 
disturbances: 
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Neighbours who are engaged in violent conflict, weak states where organised crime 
flourishes, dysfunctional societies [...] all pose problems for Europe. [...] Our task is to 
promote a ring of well governed countries to the East of the EU and on the borders of the 
Mediterranean [...] We need to extend the benefits of economic and political cooperation 
to our neighbours in the East while tackling political problems there (Solana 2003b:8).  
   
 Since the 1980s, the concept of security has been enlarged along many dimensions, 
next to ‘broadening’ another attempt being labelled as ‘deepening’. The latter concerns the 
units of analysis, as Huysmans puts it: “a deepening of the agenda by introducing new 
referent objects, that is, units receiving threats - adding individuals, ecological system, 
community, etc. to the traditional state-centric agenda“(Huysmans 1998: 227). The issue of 
the units of analysis gave rise to a famous debate between the Copenhagen School and Keith 
Booth on the one hand and between the former and Bill McSweeney within the Review of 
International Studies in the late 1990s. The first dispute centred on the question of whether 
the state or the individual should be the referent object of security studies. In his People, 
States and Fear, Buzan argued that the referent object had to be the state for three reasons: 
first, it was the state that had to cope with the sub-state, state, and international security 
problematic; second, the state was the primary agent for the alleviation of insecurity; and 
third, the state was the dominant actor in the international system. As such, Buzan presents 
what may be viewed as a sophisticated neorealist account of security (Smith, S. 2000: 83). 
Booth, in turn, insists that human emancipation should be at the centre of security studies, 
arguing for humans as the ultimate referent (1991: 319). Emma Rothschild presents a similar 
argument, though from a different perspective. She insists that current trends in security 
analysis resemble the claims put forward in the period of Enlightenment and before the First 
World War. Here security is about the relationship between the state and the individual, it is a 
political relationship based on a contract and removing the state form the analysis entails 
abolishing the political (Rothschild 1998). This however represents a rather narrow 
conception of politics and the political. In the thesis, I see the political and the politics in the 
broader sense as strategies constituting the social world. Thereby, everything turns into 
politics because any repetitive and discursive practice contributes to the intersubjective 
(re)constitution of the social (Wæver 1993).  
 In view of its contribution to the renaissance in security studies, a closer look at the 
work of the Copenhagen School appears crucial. The main components introduced to the 
discipline by the School are securitisation theory, the security sectors approach, and regional 
security complexes theory. The most significant among them has been the securitisation 
theory grounded upon speech act theory. It defines the School meta-theoretically and is said 
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to be a ‘radically constructivist regarding security, which ultimately is a specific form of 
social praxis’ (Buzan et al. 1998: 204). All of the theories constituting the School, and 
securitisation theory in particular, have aroused considerable interest within the discipline. 
But they have also been criticised extensively, ranging from mild, seeking to refine the 
theories, to fierce, dismissing their potential analytic value. In this section, I present the major 
lines of criticism as they feature in the literature. In subsequent chapters, I thoroughly deal 
with securitisation theory in order to modify its tenets in the context of the present research. 
 McSweeney’s critique of the Copenhagen School focused on three specific areas 
(Smith, S. 2000: 85). The first criticism was directed at the Copenhagen School’s conception 
of society and identity as objectivist ‘with the same objectivity and ontological status as the 
state’ (McSweeney 1996: 90). The argument concluded that they had misunderstood the 
nature of identity as something imposed and to be discovered by the individual (Ibid). 
Likewise, McSweeney maintained that the argument for identity as the only referent object 
relevant to security analysis was unfounded (Ibid). The core of his argument rested on the 
claim that the Copenhagen School recognised societal identity as a referent object for security 
discourse different than states solely in a Durkheimian fashion, while failing to problematise 
it as process grounded in human practices (McSweeney 1999:117). Identity, however, unlike 
the state, has no empirical referent other than the process of its own construction. It cannot be 
considered a ‘thing’, a social fact in the sense in which Durkheim attributed a sui generic 
objectivity to its close cousin: the collective conscience (Ibid). In other words, the dispute 
revolved around the issue of the objectivist nature of identity that, according to McSweeney, 
had been taken for granted by the Copenhagen School work. The question thrown by Buzan 
and Wæver in reply was: ‘Why can one not think of identities as definitely being constructed 
by people and groups through numerous processes and practices, and that when an identity is 
thus constructed, and becomes socially sedimented, it becomes a possible referent object for 
security?’ (Buzan and Wæver 1997:243). They thereby proposed a pragmatic rather than 
objectivist approach to identity as a referent object in security discourse. Accordingly, identity 
becomes a possible object of securitisation when it holds a social power that makes it efficient 
to invoke it and when it has a form, which makes the security discourse possible. This 
simultaneously denotes that the referent object has become relatively sedimented in social 
practice (Buzan and Wæver 1997: 243).   
Admittedly, there may be a logical contradiction between the sectors of security and 
the logic of securitisation since taking a securitisation approach precludes operating within 
pre-given sectors. The logical contradiction lies in the fact that five sectors of security 
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(military, political, economic, environmental and societal) are posited as part of an analytical 
set up before any findings are made on actual securitisations. However, the sectoral approach 
is only an analytical tool and should not be equated with a claim that there is such a thing as 
economic, etc. security. Exploring the process of securitisation, then, is not a product of the 
sectoral approach but of actors’ own practices. In this context, it is interesting to notice how 
securitisation, desecuritisation and asecurity encompass the dimension of security named 
‘vectoring’ by Ian Manners to emphasise the idea that security is not an objective condition or 
stasis, but a process or dynamic. Security in this context is a movement (Manners 2002:12).  
To conclude, it is useful to identify categories that serve to draw together the disparate 
ways in which the concept of security is being rethought (Multimer 1999:82). The first 
focuses on what should be the referent object of security, i.e. the thing to be secured, and 
whether the agenda should be extended away from the statist view of what constitutes the 
‘correct’ referent object for security discourse. Closely related to this is a second question: 
how is the referent object to be secured since the nature of security, the threats and the 
responses to those threats, will change as the referent object changes. The study of the ESDP 
discourse reveals that how the EU has accomplished well-being up to the present time should 
not be taken for granted, but rather actively secured through projecting the EU values outside. 
This implies a particular understanding of the best means to provide security: the way to 
create a safe environment in which the EU can prosper, at the same time as contributing to the 
betterment of the world, is to mould the unstable/threatening communities according to its 
own image, i.e. to foster good governance through the EU-induced local reform. This is an 
explicit message of the ESS and the driving force behind ESDP.  
 
Writing security = constituting political order 
Poststructuralist literature on security explicitly connects security and identity. It sees 
‘security... [to be] first and foremost a performative discourse constitutive of political order’ 
(Campbell 1992: 253). The way security is conceptualised in a particular community 
influences both the self-perception of the community and how it is perceived by the outside. 
This is because through threat definitions and the means to counter them selves are 
differentiated from others. Crucially, security policies need to ascribe meaning to the situation 
and in doing so they articulate and draw upon specific identities of other communities and 
institutions as well as on the identity of the self (Hansen 2006: 6). In effect, identity formation 
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relies on the construction of the inside/outside realms and self/other distinction and while 
securing their identities entities engage in ‘boundary producing political performances’ 
(Ashley 1989) that are dependent on the discourses of danger and fear (Ibid, 36).  
 In this respect, a security policy happens at the boundary of the community. Enacting 
this boundary through framing involves articulating who this very community is, and thereby 
marking domain of security and strategy as an instrument of security policy (Huysmans 
1996:141). Even if threats are identified as internal security problems and when they are not 
territorially externalised by identifying a responsible agent outside the borders, the game is an 
exogenous one because the enemy (WMD, for instance) is an enemy to the community, 
something the community moves away from (Ibid). Security actors play a crucial role in this 
context as they ‘recognise’ the contingencies outside and play a role in defining threats that 
differentiate selves from others. Within the intersubjective field, they thereby contribute to the 
process of identity construction that relies on differentiation, pointing out differences between 
the community and the outside. Identities are constituted in the process of differentiation 
‘because a thing can only be known by what it is not’ (Rumelili 2004:29) and this entails 
boundary drawing. Difference is constitutive of identity although it does not necessarily 
produce a ‘relationship of othering’ (Rumelili 1998). Along these lines, it can be argued that 
in the EU case the outside is not constructed as enemy and the identity is not founded on the 
fear of ‘others’ but rather on the shared fear of disunity. As Wæver puts it:  
The dominant aspiration is rather to constitute Europe as a pole of attraction with gradual 
membership so that Europe fades out but is not constituted against an external enemy. 
Some of Europe’s mechanisms for stabilising or disciplining eastern Europe rely exactly 
on this non-definition of an eastern border, on an image of an open but heterogeneous 
polity of which some are more members than others, but none are defined as total 
outsiders or opponents (Wæver 1996:122).  
 
This formulation might have lost some of its appeal as the EU has now put on hold 
further enlargement process and is more concerned with creating ‘a ring of well-governed 
states’ in its neighbourhood. It has embarked on a foreign policy aimed at influencing the 
outside as opposed to incorporating it. What remains striking in the EU discourse is the 
painstaking avoidance of appearing antagonistic and the clear preference for dialogue. As 
Petti Joenniemi argues along these lines, there are indeed changes to be traced although the 
movements are neither circular in essence (‘back to geopolitics’ as claimed by Diez 2004), 
nor do they merely unfold along a path of endurance as in the Wæver’s argument in Europe 
successfully struggling in order to leave behind its problematic past (Wæver 1998a). The EU 
now sees security challenges as located in the external environment. This calls for specific 
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security-related actorness, which aims at ‘the enforcement of a variety of quite normative 
preconditions set in order to deal with the transient other’:  
with the EU having experienced success in its core constitutive endeavour of doing away 
with its own power-political past (and having thus internally turned into a community of 
post-security), arguably it is now eligible for projecting itself far more forcefully into the 
sphere of external relations, and to do so rather normatively as a ‘community of values’ 
(Joenniemi 2007: 130).  
 
 In brief, identity formation relies on a differentiation process. This process constitutes 
identity building in that a particular political order is constructed by delineating what the 
inside stands for and what the outside represents. Accordingly, this reading of identity also 
understands it as ‘a set of meanings actors attach to themselves while taking the perspective 
of others’ (Larsen 2002), which denotes that identity only acquires its meaning within a 
particular foreign policy. Crucially, however, this meaning is not deterministic but rather 
permissive in nature. It plays a significant role in drawing the range of tools accessible in a 
particular context for a particular actor. Identity thus does not cause action but instead it 
makes some action legitimate and intelligible and others not so (Barnett 1998:10).  
 This process of differentiation can also be pictured in terms of roles and expectations. 
Roles are determined by both an actor’s own conception about the appropriate behaviour and 
by the expectations, or role prescriptions, of other actors (March and Olsen 1989). According 
to this logic, actors behave in the way they believe is expected from them in a particular 
situation or context. Hence, actors cannot independently decide what role to play: the role-
taking is combined with role-constituting (Wendt 1999:227-8). In the actual context of the 
EU, Europe is constituted security-wise not as yet another state or nation; it is not ‘we 
Europeans unified in our state’ that has to be defended, but possibly a specific ‘European’ 
idea is emerging that legitimises security action (Wæver 1996:123). In other words, it is the 
idea of Europe that should be defended.  
 
The world is the stage 
The identity of the EU in international politics has been conventionally conceptualised by 
means of the ‘civilian power’ notion. The salience of this concept has pervaded the academic 
picture of the EU as an actor and I deal with it comprehensively in the ensuing section. Here, I 
invoke some more generic conceptions about the EU’s international identity.  
 The title of the section borrows from the paper by Sven Biscop and Rik Coolsaet ‘The 
world is the stage – a global security strategy for the European Union’. It implies that at 
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present the EU has become a fully global actor. Rather than challenging the notion itself, the 
nature of the EU as an international actor should be thus explored. In a similar vein, whereas 
much attention was traditionally paid to the question whether there is something like a 
European foreign policy, now analysis tends to ask what characterises this European foreign 
policy (Sjursen 2006: 169). 
 Interestingly in this regard, as a policy maker directly involved in forging the EU 
actorness asserts, for the post-modern state as for the individual, identity is a matter of choice 
(Cooper 2003: 45). Accordingly, the post-modern state defines itself by its security policy and 
it does so as a matter of political choice (Ibid, 50). Still, identity formation is hardly an 
isolated and self-contained exercise. It moulds the relationship with the outside of the entity. 
It is therefore to a great extent a question of representation to the external world and the 
expectations held in that sphere about the self in question. As Ian Manners and Richard 
Whitman put it, ‘the international identity of the EU is an intersubjective experience where its 
“visibility” to other actors is part of co–constituting itself’ (2003:382). How this visibility is 
sought, forged and distinguished by the outside and how it feeds back the self-perception of 
the EU should be incorporated into the picture. The major facet of the argument here is 
thereby that the EU’s international identity is not merely self-defined but is predominantly as 
recognised by other participants of the international game, with this relationship evolving into 
distinctive role conceptions of the protagonists involved.   
 To conceptualise the EU’s role, it is instructive to revisit the argument about EU 
actorness formulated by Charlotte Bretherton and John Vogel (1999, 2006) in their popular 
book on EU external relations. They maintain that the wide-spread assertion that the EU is not 
an effective actor in the foreign policy realm (Bull 1983; Hill 1993; Zielonka 1998) stems 
from the adoption of a state-centric image and a focus on a restricted range of external 
activities comprising exclusively ‘high politics’ (Ibid, 12). They instead rely on the notion of 
the EU as a ‘multiperspectival polity’ (Ruggie 1993:173), which emphasises the complexity 
of the EU’s presence in international politics. They see the EU as an actor ‘under 
construction’ and our understandings about the EU, its roles, responsibilities and limitations 
as part of the intersubjective international structures that provide the ‘action setting’ of global 
politics (Bretherton and Vogel 2006:23). In doing so, they incorporate the Wendtian 
proposition that: 
[...] intersubjective systemic structures consist of shared understandings, expectations and 
social knowledge embedded in international institutions...Intersubjective structures give 
meaning to material ones, and it is in terms of meanings that actors act (Wendt 1994: 
389).   
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Accordingly, they conceptualise the EU’s actorness in terms of opportunity, presence 
and capability. Opportunity denotes factors in the external environment of ideas and events, 
which constrain or enable actorness. Presence conceptualises the ability of the EU, by virtue 
of its existence, to exert influence beyond its borders. Capability conversely refers to the 
internal context of the EU’s external action and concerns the availability of policy instruments 
and understandings about the Union’s ability to utilise these instruments, in response to 
opportunity to capitalise on presence (Bretherton and Vogel 2006: 24). The general thread 
hence indicates the sui generic nature of the EU’s international presence (Ibid 2006: 2). This 
distinctiveness is eagerly embraced both in academic circles and in the policy making 
community, its confirmation being an example of a foreign policy that points in the direction 
of a novel international actor that behaves according to a set of dynamic, yet identifiable 
values, principles, and images of the world (Lucarelli 2006: 2). The many speeches and 
declarations about the Union’s international role similarly delineate an actor that has two 
characteristics rarely assigned to states, namely, a stabilizing effect in contemporary world 
politics that Europe derives from its history and its historically-developed and formed values, 
and principles and external relations inspired by an “ethics of responsibility” towards others 
(Ibid, 8). 
The emphasis on the dynamic nature of the identity building notwithstanding, the 
attempts at conceptualising the EU’s international identity and role remain largely structure 
oriented. This position undervalues the significance of actors involved in forging/defying this 
identity and the importance of the domestic scene as a mediating factor therein. Conversely, I 
seek to highlight the agency side of the process of the EU identity building in that I identify 
the domestic agents at work and the relationships they create on the world stage. 
 
Civilian power Europe: a contradiction in terms?  
François Duchêne’s oft-cited notion of a ‘civilian power Europe’ has dominated the debate on 
Europe’s role in the world for several decades. The CIDEL workshop ‘From civilian power to 
military power: the European Union at a crossroads?’ and the subsequent Special Issue of the 
Journal of European Public Policy (2/2006, edited by Helene Sjursen) illustrate the so-called 
‘renaissance’ of the civilian power idea (Orbie 2006: 123).  
Despite the alleged vagueness of the concept, it features a number of distinct threads 
that influence the ESDP discourse, which draws on and thereby transforms the concept itself. 
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This indicates how discourses are not born in conceptual vacuums, and how they are best 
approached in relational terms, with concepts most easily understood in constellations with 
other concepts that are already at work. Crucially, the usage of concepts is not arbitrary but it 
is guided by certain contextual criteria defined by the rules of the game. These criteria can be 
changed over time and although conceptual revision is not a sufficient condition of political 
change, it is vital for a significant political change (Connolly 1983:203). Adding a military 
dimension to the EU should not blind us automatically into acknowledging that this process 
renders the civilian image obsolete. It should instead hint at a contextual transformation of the 
way the concept is understood and of the practices associated with the concept. 
 Indeed, the process of introducing a military dimension to the EU has been justified 
and promoted with reference to the wider responsibilities a civilian power should pursue. The 
values associated with a civilian power subsequently play a significant role in the ESDP 
discourse. A particular merger can be observed in this respect, referred to as a model of 
‘militarised civilian power’ (Stavridis 2001a, b). Its main characteristics are the civilian 
means of conflict management that remain dominant, but that are joined with a clear 
possibility of recourse to military means with a view to endorse civilian values if necessary. 
These civilian means, however, are defined differently as the focus has shifted from trade and 
purely diplomatic channels to policing and rule of law promotion. Operations and other 
scenarios performed in the ESDP framework illustrate this shift. Here rule of law and policing 
become integrated under the security umbrella unravelling crucial aspects about the ESDP 
securitising agenda.  
 The term ‘civilian power’ was elaborated and first applied to the European Economic 
Community by François Duchêne with the aim of speculating about future scenarios for 
international, and particularly Europe’s, security. He emphasised two main characteristics of a 
civilian power: being long on economic power and relatively short on armed forces, and 
having a force for the international diffusion of civilian and democratic standards (Duchêne 
1973:19–20). Consequently, he saw a role for the EEC in ‘civilising’ international politics. 
The title of this section borrows from a critique of such a stance, an article by Hedley Bull 
from 1972. Bull argues there against views that ‘traditional military/political power’ was 
giving place to ‘civilian power’ since being merely a civilian power is not commensurate with 
the dignity and significance of the European nations (1972:149). The bottom line of this 
argument involves the insistence that Britain and her Western European partners should seek 
greater self-sufficiency in security and defence despite the fact that total independence in 
security matters, as well as the desertion of the US support, is no longer plausible (Ibid, 152). 
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Interestingly in this regard, Bull makes the case that there is a serious divergence of interests 
between the Western Europe and their American protector. Oftentimes raised in the debate 
since, Bull’s analysis quite strikingly reflected the nascent differing approaches to security on 
both side of the Atlantic, with the recent culmination by Kagan that the Americans come from 
Mars and the Europeans from Venus (2004). This line of reasoning operates using neat 
dichotomies where the US functions within an Hobbesian, realist world, seeking quick 
solutions through decisive, mainly military action while the EU embraces Kantian idealist 
notions that it could nurture for decades thanks to the American protectorate. It is worth of 
note, however, that in the end it is always (at least in the mythology) Venus who wins and the 
war-exhausted Mars finds comfort in her arms. 
 Another significant issue Bull highlights is the position that a state of dependence on 
others is degenerating for Europe, while the quest for its own military potential will remove 
the obstacle to Europe’s regeneration (1983:156). A variant of this argument has permeated 
the ESDP discourse from its inception. In the speeches justifying the emergence of the policy, 
Javier Solana, the High Representative/Secretary General for CFSP, passionately formulated 
the necessity to match the EU great weight in global economy with its embarrassingly 
incommensurate standing on the world security matters. The need to rise from her knees and 
tap the available resources has thus become a recurring image in the calls for Europe’s 
revitalization.  
 Theoretical elaboration of the civilian power model is also worth looking at. In one 
particular guise, the argument claims that the way security is conceptualised by any polity 
reflects a broader (self-) perception of a polity’s role, whereby the image and expectations 
‘imposed’ upon an actor guide their behaviour (Kirst and Mull 1996). According to these 
authors, however, the imposed, or ‘alter-part’ component of role formation that relies on 
external imposition of behaviour expectations and behaviour moulded in contrast to ‘the 
other’ have only a partial influence on role formation. Equally important is the “ego-part” 
component that operates at the level of an actor and brings into play such factors as value 
systems, worldview and the self-perception of an actor’s role in an the international system 
(Ibid, 286-287). As a result, the influence of norms on the role formation comprises both 
values and ideals a role bearer feels obliged to pursue, and stable role expectations inflicted 
by the external environment (Ibid, 289). Similarly, the external EU’s role (including security 
issues) cannot be accounted for merely by the desire to fill the ‘capabilities expectation gap’, 
since it also echoes the endogenous dynamic of the European integration. Still, states may 
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resort to various kinds of behaviour conditional upon the situation without challenging the 
overall image (Ibid, 290).  
 The role concept leads the authors to introduce the notion of civilian power as an 
ideal-type, which encompasses a particular self-perception as well as particular aim setting, 
strategies and instruments in the external policy realm (Ibid, 297). They put forward a 
threefold conceptualisation of a civilian power. Firstly, a civilian power might still aspire to 
mould the international system but it regards the strategies employed by classic great powers 
as inappropriate (civilian power as ‘still’ a power). Secondly, a civilian power might be 
described as a role concept aimed at advancing the civilianisation of the international system 
(civilian power as a role). Thirdly, a civilian power is also a means of achieving specific aims, 
a strategy of a foreign policy (civilian power as medium) (Ibid, 297). This conceptualisation 
establishes a set of basic principles a civilian power falls back on: the acceptance of the 
necessity of cooperation with others in the pursuit of international objectives; the 
concentration on non–military means, with military power left as a residual instrument; a 
willingness to develop supranational structures to address critical issues of international 
management (Maull 1990: 92-93). Moreover, a civilian power perceives universal values as 
an intrinsic part of its national interests, including ‘good governance’ in other states. The 
latter should be supported and, if necessary, imposed since the emphasis on democratisation, 
the rule of law and market economy remain on top on the international agenda of a civilian 
power (Kirste and Maull 1996:302). Furthermore, it is not exclusively material interests that 
mark the relations of a civilian power with its partners, they are also affected by emotional 
and normative elements. The threat of the use of force and the actual use of force are 
considered highly problematic and largely counterproductive (Ibid, 303).  
 While the vision of security within ESDP draws heavily on the ‘old’ image of civilian 
power along the dimensions pointed to by Kirste and Maull, it also finds its new contextual 
expression there. Firstly, the EU clearly states its willingness to have a greater bearing on the 
world affairs while rejecting explicit power politics as a means to forward its interests. 
Secondly, the EU sees its role in conflict management and ‘projecting stability’ but the 
understanding of the instruments to advance the mission of civilianising the international 
relations has now changed. The introduction of military means has been launched, but they 
are presented as the last resort, the reactive part of a holistic approach in which civilian means 
go into proactive preventive measures (Martinsen 2003:33). Consequently, neither is the 
concept of civilian power finished, nor can we talk of a simple additive process in which new 
military dimension is being included. Rather, a new picture of the EU as ‘militarised civilian 
 
 
45
power’ emerges in which military and civilian aspects merge in a particular way to produce a 
civilian power capable of resorting to military means with the intention of ‘projecting 
stability’ and defending itself by promoting the values underpinning its very existence. 
 The process of acquiring a military dimension provoked an extensive ‘recycle’ debate 
in the literature on the model of civilian power. Stelios Stavridis offered an interesting re-
interpretation of a civilian power model ‘by default’ (since during the Cold War security and 
defence were matters to be handled within forums other than European Community), to one 
‘by design’. Disagreeing with Karen Smith that the recent militarisation of the EU renders the 
concept of civilian power obsolete (Smith, K. 2000:14), he posits instead that the process 
enables the EU to act as a real civilian power in the world, as a force for the external 
promotion of democratic principles (Stavridis 2001a:43-44). Stavridis draws on the work by 
Juliet Lodge to introduce the phenomenon of ‘a civilisation of security’ and on her conclusion 
that a civilian power concentrates on an effort to limit, not to eliminate, the use of force 
(Lodge 1993:249). This leads Stavridis to claim that civilian power means nothing if it is only 
referring to non-military means and that it is how one uses their means (including military) 
that makes a civilian power (2001b:15). He then argues that the use of military means can be 
of a civilian type if it promotes human rights and democratic principles (Ibid, 17).  
In conclusion, the concept is here to stay in discussions on the EU international 
posture. The task remains, however, to track new vocabulary attached to it and unravel 
meanings it has acquired within the ESDP discourse.  
 
Civilian triumphs over the military – the puzzle 
I conceive of puzzle as providing an interesting point of entry into a complex phenomenon. It 
provides an analytical opportunity to enquire into a particular milieu. Here, it becomes a 
means of contextualising ESDP. I attempt the latter in two steps. 
As stated by the Cologne European Council in June 1999, “the Union must have the 
capacity for an autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide 
to use them, and the readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises without 
prejudice to actions by NATO”. Interestingly, the necessity of ESDP, or rather its presence in 
the European security landscape, although initially seen with a considerable deal of 
controversy, has become almost entirely naturalised. This can be approached as an instance of 
a noteworthy discursive accomplishment where a feature originally foreign to the EU has 
been successfully portrayed as having an indispensable quality. However, the policy 
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sedimentation remains yet another ‘container phenomenon’, with practices of its daily 
creation obscure and unproblematised. I should thus ask how the policy has come into being 
in its present shape and how the latter can be accounted for. In particular, who persuaded 
audiences of many different kinds that ESDP is necessary for the Union to prosper, and how 
was it accomplished? Further, how did the process of negotiating the policy unfold, who were 
the major contestants, and what were the alternative conceptions and important fields of 
political action? 
More contextually, how we should make sense of the upsurge in the civilian ESDP if 
the change brought by the policy is claimed to have been primarily within the military 
domain, i.e. it was introduced in order to build military capabilities for the EU? How would 
then a policy designed around the Petersberg tasks (humanitarian and rescue tasks; peace-
keeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peace-making) 
convert into missions of mainly police and rule-of-law nature? How should we make sense of 
bringing these areas, traditionally covered by the Community (first pillar) methods, into the 
realm of a security and defence policy? 
 Ultimately, the puzzle should allow for the accommodation of the social and political 
dimension of the policy. In particular, my aim is to trace practices and operative categories of 
ESDP making. While I do apply general concepts, e.g. security, I intend to grasp how the 
actors authoring and contesting the policy make sense of these concepts and how they feature 
in their local repertoire. This should furnish the possibility of unpacking the agendas at play 
and the rules of ESDP making, including how these rules mediate the shape of the policy and 
why certain options of the policy development prevail over others.  
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CHAPTER II   RESEARCH APPROACH  
Believing, with Max Weber, that man is an animal suspended in webs of significance he 
himself has spun, I take the analysis of [those webs] to be therefore not an experimental 
science in search of law but an interpretive one in search of meaning. (Geertz 1973: 5) 
 
Chapter II serves two functions. It presents the analytical framework that provides the 
theoretical scaffolding of the thesis, while at the same time locating it more broadly within the 
research paradigm embraced here. I proceed first by spelling out the ontological premises that 
inform the research. Following from that, I introduce the methodology applied, its generic 
considerations and the specific strategies employed. I then clarify the concrete theoretical 
assumptions that inform the structuring of empirical data. With the ensuing step being the 
elucidation of the analytical framework, I conclude the theoretical discussion by arriving at a 
coherent structure for the research. The subsequent sections then outline the research 
questions guiding the project, and deal with selection criteria underlying the choice of case 
studies. In order to justify the selection, I clarify the explanatory potential of the cases in 
relation to the research questions and in terms of the theoretical argument.  
 
Ontological paradigm  
In the sections to follow, I consider the intersubjective character of social reality, the 
importance of language and practice for policy analysis as well as the character of this 
analysis and the kind of research questions that yield the most thorough understanding of the 
policy process. 
I begin by noting that people do not discover reality, but rather generate it in an 
intersubjective process of meaning negotiation and local sense making. In other words, human 
agents do not exist independently from their social environment and its collectively shared 
systems of meaning (Risse 2003: 160). This process of sense making is mediated by language 
and strategic games within a particular social milieu. The former encompass both the 
constitutive role of language as mediating social order and social practices endemic to the 
community, while the latter points to relations of power that constitute the community.   
That social order is an ongoing human production is the main contribution of the 
classic work on social constructivism by Peter Berger and Thomas Luckman (1991). They 
argue that men together produce a human environment, with the totality of its sociological 
and psychological formations (Ibid, 69). In this reading, knowledge is what intersubjectively 
passes for knowledge, and, importantly for the argument presented here, this also applies to 
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‘security knowledge’. This does not mean that this knowledge (reality) is entirely malleable. 
It is, rather, to acknowledge it ‘as a quality appertaining to phenomena that we recognise as 
having a being independent of our own volition’ (Ibid, 13). Correspondingly, as dependent on 
intersubjective understandings, these phenomena cannot be openly manipulated by single 
actors who would operate ‘from outside of the game’. The focus is instead on sociality and 
the embeddedness of an individual in discourse. Likewise, the description from ‘inside the 
mind’ of an individual is dismissed here. Possibilities of action are constructed through 
dominant interpretations of the context rather than deriving from exogenously given interests 
of individual utility maximisers. This is in contrast to the methodological individualism of 
rational choice according to which the elementary unit if social life is the individual human 
action (Elster 1982). 
 As a consequence, I embrace the performative conception of language as opposed to 
the reference notion where the meaning of a term consists in its exact correspondence to an 
object in an ‘outer world’. Wittgenstein’s later work challenged the assumptions that language 
originates either in the mind or is a mirror of an objective reality, arguing instead that 
language use is a form of action that is constitutive of the world (Fierke and Jorgensen 
2001:4). Accordingly, meaningful social practice is constituted mainly through language and 
intersubjective meaning:  
[...] for the purpose of making man a political animal she [nature] has endowed him alone 
of the animals with the power of reasoned speech. Speech is something different from 
voice, which is possessed by other animals also, and used by them to express pain or 
pleasure; [...] Speech [...] serves to indicate what is useful and what is harmful, and also 
what is right and what is wrong. [...] And it is the sharing of the common view that makes 
a household or a city” (Aristotle 1962:28).  
 
Aristotle here invokes the notion that men are more than language-endowed animals, 
that meaning is use, and that communication among a set of people is governed by 
conventions and criteria (Kratochwil 2001:15). Language is not merely a descriptive tool that 
can be analysed apart from its usage and context. Acts done with words not only comment on 
reality but also represent a strategic take on that reality by their users in their quest for power. 
In short, words are not only vehicles for the conduct of politics; they often are politics 
(Wæver 2003: 212).  
If we further elaborate on the Aristotelian argument that language has the function of 
indicating to members of a group what is harmful or useful, the importance of legitimisation 
through language immediately arises. Humans using language politically feel a strong 
pressure to justify their actions or proposals for action in terms of oppositions between right 
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and wrong. Language is a crucial means to get others to ‘share a common view’ about what is 
useful/harmful, good/evil, just/unjust, and the latter constitutes what we call ‘politics’ 
(Chilton 2004:199). The premise of the research, that ‘reality’ is dependent on interpretation 
and ‘there is nothing outside discourse’ (Campbell 1993:3), does not denote that ‘there is only 
language’. It is rather to acknowledge that, since human actors do not understand reality on 
the basis of pure sense data, their knowledge about the world is conditional on language and 
interpretive practice. The latter is encapsulated in Wittgenstein’s notion of language games, 
where language is mainly a practical and social endeavour and linguistic terms arise within a 
social practice that encompass meaning creation (Wittgenstein 1953). Participation in practice 
entails taking part in a professional language game, mastering the rules and being able to use 
them (Nicolini, Gherardi and Yanow 2003: 11). Accordingly, language is not only the 
expression of social relations but it is also the medium for their creation (Czerniawska-
Joerges 1991).  
Practice consists of choosing, of deciding for something concrete against something 
else (Gadamer 1986: 80-1). From this perspective, science is about practice and politics is 
inherently practical since it deals with doing the right thing at the right time in view of the 
particular historical circumstances (Kratochwil 2006a). In the research, I embrace the 
ethnomethodological understanding of practice with its focus on practical action and local 
sense making. This perspective allows for a shift from the ‘language only’ level, to studying 
language as a mediating/framing element constitive of a situated practice, where ‘body-based 
activities’ and the material do play a role. Similarly, the focus on practice alleviates the often 
all-encompassing agent/structure dilemma in that both these components are acknowledged in 
social action, i.e. the object under study is how actors become constrained and empowered by 
discursive/structural resources and how they nevertheless manage to contrive strategic action. 
The practical perspective hence brings to the fore the concept of situated agency and the 
world of everyday politics.  
 The question arises, however, of how to study these practices. It is suggested here that 
the application of an interpretive approach as the most promising methodology. Crucially, I 
share doubts about the dichotomy between the logic of explanation and understanding. I thus 
concur with the argument by Gibbons that any interpretation of intersubjectively constructed 
meaning both understands and explains practices:  
The attempt to understand the intersubjective meanings embedded in social life is at the 
same time an attempt to explain why people act the way they do. An explanation in terms 
of intersubjective meanings leads to greater understanding (Gibbons 1987: 3).  
 
 
 
51
 In order to grasp these meanings, it is vital to explore how they have emerged, become 
attached to various subjects/objects and how they operate in a given social milieu. Crucially 
in this respect, meanings and practices arise out of context-specific interaction. Particular 
interpretive dispositions are constituted which in turn create certain possibilities and preclude 
others. In effect, the search for meanings proceeds thorough problematisation, where 
exogenous and a priori categories are put aside in favour of tracking the endogenously 
developed rules. As a result, the pursuit of meanings does not sit well with the language of 
causality—a language that suggests a monological relationship of cause and effect (Fierke 
2001: 117) and takes as unproblematic the possibility itself that a particular action could 
happen (Doty 1993: 297-9). Predisposed to uncover general laws, ‘why’ questions are equally 
ill-equipped to explore how the understanding of the actors influences their ‘world’. 
Crucially, with the causal arrows running from the ‘world’ to the understanding and not to the 
‘world’ from the actors (Kratochwil 2006a), ‘why’ questions may be unfit to grasp the 
meaning of security, which hardly evokes something with an objective quality, a thing-like 
entity, which must be discovered. Instead, it is a particular social construct embedded in the 
dynamics of social practice permeating a specific spatiotemporal context. The questions 
directed at understanding are then ‘what’ and ‘how’ questions. It should be noted, finally, that 
the usual disclaimer that everything the researcher interprets is already a social interpretation, 
since theories themselves already contain a ‘pre-interpreted’ world of lay meanings, also 
applies here (Giddens 1977: 12).  
 
Research philosophies and methodology – epistemological paradigm  
Given the reductionism of any method of inscription, choice of method reflects the 
researcher’s deeper assumptions about social life and how to understand it. Methodology and 
methods are thereby a means of disclosing to the public what happened in the course of the 
research to shape the researcher’s claims and argument. These considerations shed light on 
the critical moments of the research, disclosing the researcher’s own theoretically informed 
practice (Comaroff and Comaroff 1992: 2). They are thus ways of showing to the public how 
the researcher manages to maintain the integrity of the phenomenon they study. His or her 
ontological assumptions will inevitably guide the way he or she discovers and then formulates 
the puzzle and the way he or she goes about gathering the data. The ‘data’ will then, in turn, 
influence the theoretical framework as it is presented. In this way, a procedure of mutual 
adjustment and ‘educated guessing’ paves the way towards the analytic framework 
 
 
52
(Kratochwil 2007). Theoretical considerations help in this context to ‘examine our own 
lenses’ (Burchill 1996:14) through which we see the world. This brings back the Kantian 
postulate that ‘knowing depends on a priori knowledge’. Humans do not perceive the world 
‘bare’, or as it is, without some pre-established ‘conceptual boxes’ (Kuhn 1970) or categories 
of thought that structure the perception of various physical sensations. In a conceptual sense, 
‘evidence’ is not manifest in the observational world: it is not self-evident. Categories of mind 
are prerequisite to making sense of the phenomenal (empirical) world (Yanow 2006b:10). As 
research is concerned with the formation and maintenance of a particular interpretation, by its 
very nature it provides further interpretations of interpretations.  
The examination of meaning in action is the major focus of interpretive analysis. 
Yanow’s definition elucidates the major features of the approach, and is worthy of quotation 
in full:  
Interpretive modes of policy analysis seek to identify both the specific meanings, 
intended and made, of specific policies and how those meanings are communicated and 
variously interpreted. Several themes are highlighted by such analytic approaches: the 
creation and communication of shared as well as incommensurable meanings; the 
possibility of multiple meanings in policy and organisational actions; the role of tacit 
knowledge in the communication of values, beliefs and feelings; and the understanding of 
public policies as expressive and not only as instrumental solutions to problems (1996: 
224). 
 
An interpretive approach, then, is based on the analysis of particular social realities, 
and requires the exploration of ‘local knowledge’ (Yanow 2000: 5). It focuses on meanings, 
beliefs, languages, discourses and signs, as opposed to laws, correlations between social 
categories or deductive models. Importantly, these beliefs, languages and discourses are ways 
of making sense of the world, and it is thus imperative to remember that when we analyse 
actions or practices as embodiments of these, we interpret interpretations (Bevir and Rhodes 
2006: 1 and 15).  
In order to interpret the ‘local ways of sense making’ and meaning-creation, the 
approach here uses ethnography-informed methods with the intention of comprehending 
social and organisational context from the participants’ perspective (Emerson 1983, Agar 
1996). Ethnography is a useful method for developing a contemporaneous, people-centred 
understanding of societies at the local level as it takes seriously everyday voices and practices 
within a broader discursive milieu (Klotz and Lynch 2007: 57). It is traditionally done by 
observation, collecting field notes and conducting intensive interviews with informants 
(Emerson 1983, Lofland and Lofland 1984), in order to ascertain what practices mean, what 
rules and norms people follow, and what institutions result (Klotz and Lynch 2007:58). 
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Detailed ethnographies utilise data based on familiarity with a social setting or a situation that 
is gained by personal participation, or at least a close approximation of it. In the words of 
Ervin Goffman, getting such data requires:  
[...] subjecting yourself, your own body and your own personality, and your own social 
situation to the set of contingencies that play upon a set of individuals, so that you can 
physically and ecologically penetrate their response to their social situation, to their work 
situation [...], or whatever (1989: 125).  
 
This pertains to the reasoning that places central the idea of face-to-face contact as the 
foundation of entering the experience of others (Blumer 1969). In the absence of this, the 
researcher is likely to merely substitute preformed stereotypes, or ‘typifications’, for personal, 
empirical encounters with a situation or setting (Lofland 1995: 45).  
The present research fails to embrace systematically the ethnographic approach, and it 
cannot therefore feature as the leading methodology. It has nevertheless informed the research 
practices that have produced this project, affecting my activities in the field and the modes of 
data management utilised. This has been combined with another research strategy, namely 
discourse analysis. Data for analysis was thus collected through observation, with varying 
degrees of participation, through extensive and repeated interviewing, including informal 
conversations, and through the close reading of documents pertaining to ESDP, including 
press accounts.  
At an operational level, I have adhered to the definition of discourse as proposed by 
Martin Hajer. He describes discourse as ‘a specific ensemble of ideas, concepts and 
categorisations that is produced, reproduced, and transformed in a particular set of practices 
and through which meaning is given to physical and social realities’ (1995:60). He further 
sketches two criteria, which define discursive sedimentation, a process within which a 
discourse becomes dominant (hegemonic) in a given domain. Firstly, the condition of 
structuration, which is apparent if the credibility of actors in a given domain requires them to 
draw on the ideas, concepts, and categories of a given discourse in their everyday activities. 
Secondly, a discourse is subjected to institutionalisation if it is translated into institutional 
arrangements broadly conceived. This means that the theoretical concepts of security should 
be translated into concrete policies and institutional arrangements (Ibid, 60-61). Accordingly, 
the degree of discursive sedimentation of ESDP is indicated by whether particular ways of 
doing things, security practices, have become instituted and acted upon. This appears to have 
been fulfilled to a considerable extent. It is now essential for the European actors to address 
security in specific terms if their arguments are to be considered valid. Similarly, the policy is 
 
 
54
implemented through a wide range of institutional tools, from the purely civilian to police 
initiatives and military peace operations involving the use of force. Certainly, the power of a 
hegemonic discourse does not determine or totalise a social reality in a given milieu. As the 
empirical analysis illustrates at length, the field is inherently contestable. It represents a 
perpetual political struggle where actors strive to impose their definition of the EU (security) 
and others challenge it. As this language and strategic games unfold, however, some 
protagonists gain an advantageous position in the EU system of governance and they infuse it 
with their ideas about the EU security. As these ideas become converted into concrete deeds, 
they generate proofs of their worthiness that further legitimises their stance.  
Another indication of discursive sedimentation is the justification actors use in case of 
infringement on ESDP, thus demonstrating that they recognise their ‘misbehaviour’. The 
conflicting reactions among EU members to the US invasion in Iraq furnish a number of 
examples thereof. Arguably, the situation demonstrated the absence of EU-wide agreement on 
security and defence. The analytical omission was, however, the degree to which the 
CFSP/ESDP discourse in fact organised the debate. Participants were expected to take a 
stance and define the situation in the CFSP/ESDP terms, adopting the latter as a reference 
point. Further, the lines of arguments in the debate, even if they questioned certain objectives 
of the ESDP project, they did not nevertheless reject them but rather sought to legitimise 
moves that were perceived to be at variance with the policy.  
 Since ESDP is a important security discourse, I suggest applying discourse analysis as 
a particularly suitable way to understand the policy. Discourse analysis can enrich our 
understanding of social reality because it explores how the socially constructed ideas and 
objects that populate the world were crafted in the first place, and how they are maintained 
and held in place over time. Hence, discourse analysis endeavours to uncover the way in 
which particular milieus are produced (Nelson and Hardy 2002: 6). It aims not to apply 
exogenous categories to participants’ talk but rather to identify the ways in which they 
themselves actively construct and employ categories in their talks (Wood and Kroger 2000: 
29-30). Thus, through discourse analysis one may access the strategic game played out in a 
particular milieu, i.e. the web of power relations constituting a given context.  
Analytically, I rely on the Foucauldian approach to discourse. Foucault defines 
discourse as a system that regulates the formation of statements (Foucault 1972). The sets of 
statements are taken to be serious claims to truth by particular communities at different points 
in time. Thus, the question whether actors really mean what they say is irrelevant because 
what it is to be found are the structures and patterns in public statements that regulate political 
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debate so that certain things can be said while other things will be meaningless or less 
powerful or reasonable. Foucault seeks to describe systems of statements produced within a 
historical ‘field of discursivity’. These statements are the products of discursive practices that 
are governed by historically contingent rules of formation, which are not necessarily available 
to those practitioners enunciating them. The approach aims to unearth and describe the rules 
of formation that structure the production of discourse (Foucault 1972: 47). Along these lines, 
the meaning of security is interpreted as a constellation of rules which define enunciations as 
security enunciations. The researcher needs to reconstruct the overall conceptual landscape of 
the epoch and the setting, with its competing and complementing discourses (Wæver 2003:  
201), in order to understand how it was possible for certain political projects to surface and 
why some of them gained significance while others faded in the public debate.  
 A distinctive feature of Foucault’s work is the decentering of the subject by showing 
its dependence on relations and discourses that always precede it. In the research, I seek to 
modify this structural over-determination through introducing the theory of dramaturgical 
action of Ervin Goffman. As a political project, ESDP embodies an outcome of strategic 
manoeuvring within the confines of the discourse. Although actors do not act as autonomous 
subjects but from a ‘subject position’ made available by their discursive context, it is indeed 
actors who impose the meaning. In this respect, Goffman’s approach should offer analytical 
purchase when the positioning of the actors is involved. The theory conceptualises actors as 
constrained by their roles, which are moulded within discourse. It is in this context that the 
mutually constituted nature of social structures and agents comes to the fore (Wendt 1999, ch. 
4). Discourse provides a social structure, which enables action. Agents arise within discourse, 
their identities and interests are discursively constituted, and they act through contextually 
available subject positions. The action, however, is not without strategic flavour. Actors do 
not necessarily internalise (naturalise) the rules that govern behaviour in a given domain and 
they might be inspired to introduce new vocabulary that changes the rules of the local game. 
The actors are nevertheless constrained in their action by what is commonly accepted and, if 
they aim to bring their projects to bear and be viewed as legitimate participants to the game, 
they have to behave in accordance with what is valid with reference to the discourse.  
Combining ethnographic approach with discourse analysis as methodologies 
informing data collection and analysis within one research project requires clarification. 
These two methodologies operate according to dissimilar assumptions. Discourse analysis 
looks into organisations as sites of struggle over meaning, labelling and institutional 
identities, with the major research focus being relations of power and how they are 
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discursively produced, maintained, reproduced, transformed and resisted. Examining 
conditions of possibility of a particular social formation, it tends to prioritize structural 
explanations. Ethnography, conversely, approaches organisations as sites where shared 
meanings are produced and local reality constructed. The focus on local sense making denotes 
that ethnography is thoroughly people-centred in its data collection process. These two 
methodological perspectives can be however mutually supportive in the quest to understand 
policy making and the politics behind it.  
Spencer (1994) has instructively spelled out the mutual relevance of ethnography and 
discourse analysis to one another. As a methodological enterprise, ethnography is intricately 
involved in discourse concerns (Ibid, 268). While the answers to open-ended interview 
questions are usually understood as reflection of the interviewees’ social world, they can also 
be treated as situated interpretations providing material for studying the discursive social 
construction of their world. Accordingly, while ethnographies deal with profound insider-like 
understandings of a particular milieu, the dynamics of discourse allows insights into the 
regularities of a particular social context. Put differently, utilising both discourse analysis and 
ethnography allows the researcher to uncover patterns in the context of close-up depiction. It 
helps track relationships that mark out the nature of a particular setting, the rules enabling its 
emergence and defining its reproduction. It thus becomes possible to proceed from data that is 
commonsensical in some localised milieu to the larger task of overall portrayal of the scene. 
Consequently, the researcher is able to construct narratives rather than a singular story, 
narratives based on arrangements recurring in many stories constituting a particular local 
environment. This broader perspective allows a delineation of occurrences that represent 
possible contradiction and moments of potential transformation. In effect, rather than 
narrating the characteristics of a single setting, it permits the problematisation of the setting in 
relation to a wider framework of reference. 
Ethnography, therefore, provides means for empirical analysis of how discourse is 
reflected in a particular social context. Insights into the features of a given environment bring 
in contextual understanding that makes the bigger picture possible to grasp. Even relatively 
less profound ethnographic understanding can be instructive in gaining entrée to the research 
site, in the sense of mapping out the field and adopting an approach that can potentially yield 
most promising occasions for data collection and selecting a data collection unit (Corsaro 
1982). I resorted to this strategy in the research. The material gathered initially using 
ethnography (in Tbilisi in relation to EUJUST Themis) was employed to contextualise many 
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features of a larger ESDP picture, to decide on the most suitable areas for data collection, and 
to facilitate access to other research sites by relying on previously secured networks.  
Another element of the ethnographic strategies of significant import has been the 
approach to data analysis relying on the principles of emergent analysis, characterised by the 
gradual accumulation of data and the slow inductive analysis of it (Lofland 1995:47). In my 
study, the accumulation of data and observations pertained not only to the settings of ESDP 
missions and the Brussels-located decision-making scenes, but also featured the research 
community concerned with actively studying the policy. As Lofland further points out, the 
process of emergent analysis hinges on the sensitivities and intuition of the researcher, and, as 
a result, it turns into an intensely creative act (Ibid). Paul Atkinson names this process of 
emergent analysis as ‘making it all come together’:   
[...] making it all come together’ ‘[...] is one of the most difficult things of all...Quite part 
from achieving it, it is hard to inject the right mix of (a) faith that it can and will be 
achieved; (b) recognition that it has to be worked at, and is not based on romantic 
inspiration; (c) that it is not like the solution to a puzzle or math problem, but has to be 
created; (d) that you cannot pack everything into one version, and that any project could 
yield several different ways of bringing it together (Atkinson, quoted in Lofland 1995: 
47, italics in the original).  
 
Lastly, I should clarify the place of narrative in discourse analysis as adopted here. I 
follow the definition of narrative as a story that reveals someone’s experience (Manning and 
Cullum-Swan 1994). Fisher claims that ‘all forms of human communication need to be seen 
fundamentally as stories’ (Fisher 1987: xiii). Interpreted as the main form of social life, 
narrative is the main device for making sense of social action (Czerniawska 2004: 11). An 
interpretive researcher studying a particular milieu collects data in the form of stories by 
his/her research subjects. As building blocks of discourses, narratives then supply two kinds 
of data. On the one hand, narratives by individuals situated in an institutional setting afford 
material to reconstruct elements of this institution’s organisational identity. They do so by 
presenting vocabularies and designation of practices (discourse), of itself and as opposed to 
different institutions in the same field. If we are to explore the ways in which practices in a 
given milieu are created, sustained and transformed, “the aim is to see the world as they 
[participants of a given institution] see it, to adapt their vantage point on politics” (Fenno 
1990: 2). The stories people tell and live by in their institutional settings contribute to the 
discursive construction of these settings. I have relied heavily on these insights while putting 
together the institutional identities of ‘the Solana milieu’ and the EC, resorting both to the 
accounts from the settings in Brussels and on the ground of the ESDP deployment.  
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In a broader sense of ideational themes, shifting narratives on the EU’s international 
presence provide hints about the EU’s international identity. The accounts about the EU’s 
(under-)performance on the world stage feature extensively in the ESDP discourse, 
highlighting plots that tell the story of the EU’s transformation from an intimidated Cold War 
quasi-actor to the major international player of today. Combining elements from many 
different domains, these narratives provide actors with a set of symbolic references that 
suggest a common understanding about the EU’s security role. ESDP performers draw on 
them extensively to elucidate and legitimise their positions and particular actions with regard 
to different audiences. To describe a change (in the European security landscape) means here 
to construct a narrative of what happened (Fierke 1998: 53) with an aim to objectify a 
particular representation of events. Security narratives are thus a means through which actors 
legitimise, and thereby enable their political action.  
 To recapitulate, embracing constructivism entails centring research endeavours around 
actors. Agency matters in social life and agents are not simple ‘throughputs’ of some 
structures working behind their backs (Kratochwil forthcoming). Importantly, agents are not 
involved in the individual world-making but they rather embody the community they come 
from. In the research, actors matter as performers of certain political projects enacted with a 
view to impose a specific definition of a situation. Acting on the premise that the human 
world is one of artifice, it follows that the notions actors have about their actions are 
significant (Ibid, 7). They provide for building blocks of a particular social ambience. They 
neither can be left exogenous to the descriptions and explanations of action, nor can they be 
solved by ‘assumption’ (Ibid).  
 This ontological position leads to an adoption of the interpretive approach to doing 
research where two issues loom large. First, we move from a priori logic to contextual logic 
of a given social situation. Second, the way to go about understanding this situation is to 
target meanings that are never treated independently from the people who have created these 
meanings and are busy with reproducing and changing them. In methodological terms, 
interpretive research rarely proceeds from a formalised hypothesis because the researcher 
does not know ahead of time what meanings will be found, expecting them to be generated 
through (participant-)observation and/or conversational interviewing and/or the close reading 
of documents (Yanow 2006a: 71). Instead of formulating them beforehand, one expects the 
explanations to emerge from the data. Along these lines, discovering the connective tissue of 
meaning often comes as much from a flash of insight as it does from following any elaborated 
system of methodological rules (Ibid). As Marta Feldman (1995: 30) emphasises, it would be 
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more accurate to see the analytic device as a tool for stimulating thought than as itself 
producing that thought. Questionable as it may appear, I insist that in this process one must 
easily pass from deliberative thinking to intuitive grasping of connections. Insights that 
eventually put together a structural pattern of the arguments are not something to be literally 
discovered in the field, something waiting to be picked up. They are authored by the 
researcher, or, rather the researcher co-authors them with the research subjects and the 
theories that s/he uses to approach the former.  
 Armed with a warning by Harold D. Laswell that “the world around us is much richer 
in meaning that we consciously see” (1977: 36), we should, however, bear in mind that our 
interpretations, meticulously pieced together though they may appear, are nevertheless merely 
suggestions at possible meanings. This should still not blind us to the acknowledgment that 
‘anything goes’. First, contextual logic relates to the semantic web of a particular social 
milieu. This entails elaborated sets of rules and patterns of possibilities. Second, verification 
of any finding, regardless of the way one has arrived at it, always demands full intellectual 
alertness. The consideration of these caveats makes some research accounts better and some 
less attentive to the social fabric of the research subject.  
 
Theoretical argument 
I approach ESDP as an illustration of the point that security is not something we can define 
analytically or philosophically according to what would be “best” (Wæver 1995:226), and 
then proceed with the analysis whether the way certain political entities pursue security fulfils 
these criteria.  
Etymologically, security pertains to the situation ‘without worry’ (sine cura). Standard 
designation of security in the literature defines it as freedom from threat. Similarly, the 
dictionary definition of security is ‘the condition of being protected from or not exposed to 
danger; […] a feeling of safety or freedom from or absence of danger’.6 This definition fails 
to grasp the peculiar quality of security as the intersubjective agreement on what qualifies as 
threats. In other words, it is a socially constructed concept and has a specific meaning only in 
a particular social context (Lipschutz 1995: 10). As a convention, security is a particular set of 
historical discourses and practices that rest upon institutionally shared meanings (Krause and 
Williams 1996: 243). Accordingly, the designation of ‘threat’ is “an act of interpretation; it 
                                                 
 
6 Oxford English Dictionary.  
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bears no essential, necessary, or unproblematic relation to the action or event from which it is 
said to derive” (Campbell 1998: 2). This interpretation does not occur at the individual level, 
however. A social and thereby a discursive act, it arises within a particular political context 
and it consecutively affects the context from which it has arisen. Correspondingly, as a 
contextual political project, ESDP has not emerged in a vacuum. Its conceptualisation and 
translation into security practices hinge on the previous and concurrent security narratives that 
circulated before and that still engage with ESDP discourse. This illustrates the fact that 
discourses are not as malleable as their critics would like them to be.  
Security narratives are nonetheless subject to change. With regard to the present 
European security discourse, we can trace the introduction of new vocabulary and new 
practices with which novel meanings about security have been set in. Borrowing from 
Quentin Skinner, I illustrate how ESDP discourse has succeeded because it provides a new 
understanding of present policies with new prescriptions for the future that builds on past 
values as it rewrites them (Skinner 1988). Crucially, ‘new vocabularies’ (Rorty 1989) not 
only change existing ideas but they also introduce fresh and alternative truth values (Ibid). In 
this light, ESDP is a political project that through the past connects the present to the future, 
makes sense of the situation at hand and offers new solutions in contrast to the old policy 
paradigm, which is no longer perceived as adequate. The central category in ESDP discourse 
remains the concept of security. It constitutes a central role in the redefinition of the situation 
and serves as a bridge in the process of conceptual change. Being a feature of an old security 
discourse it empowers the actors to speak the language understandable to the audience (both 
internal and external), while also being employed to install new meanings.  
The main body of the argument is that there has been a fundamental change in the 
European security discourse and ESDP represents its instantiation. It shows how security is a 
historically variable condition (Krause and Williams 1998) and, more specifically, that it is a 
practice, a specific way to frame an issue (Wæver 1995: 227). Put differently, the meaning of 
security is in the term’s usage, usage that is constituted through the context and is not 
legitimate over time and space but bounded by certain interpretations. It was in no sense 
obvious in the early 1990s that any substantial changes in the European security architecture 
should take place. This disqualifies the neo-functionalist argument, according to which 
‘integration is in essence a spillover effect, not requiring a pro-European attitude on the part 
of all governments’ (Corbey 1995:255). In such a reading, the emergence of ESDP seems a 
predestined outcome of the EU integration. Instead, I suggest we look into the dynamics that 
 
 
61
set in motion developments that transgress dramatically the evolutionary path of the neo-
functionalist-like line.  
One of the most interesting aspects of ESDP, therefore, is that it symbolises a 
contextualised response to security demands as they are intersubjectively construed within a 
specific community. How that policy comes about, however, is not predetermined but is 
rather contrived by strategically interacting actors. A certain security narrative has been 
endorsed over others and turned into a political project by actors looking for a niche within 
and through the EU. These actors have been contextually empowered to set a particular 
agenda, yet they are simultaneously restrained by the rules of the discourse, which defines 
legitimacy and who the other players are in this political game. Consequently, these actors 
cannot be viewed as utility maximisers seeking to realise their exogenously given interests, 
They are instead Goffman’s players, whose identity is social and their action is ruled by 
contextual expectations.  
 In essence, therefore, the theoretical argument involves the following premises: 
(1) Security is a historically variable condition and ESDP embodies an instance of 
contextualised securitisation. Put differently, the process of security and threat definition that 
has been launched within the EU reveals how securitisation can operate within a particular 
community. 
(2)      Security is a claim on politics. This is to say that advocating a particular reading 
of security involves entering the political contest with actors advancing different conceptions. 
Such involvement implies an endeavour to impose and sustain a favoured definition of the 
political situation in which the preferred security claim can be endorsed.  
(3) Accordingly, a given instance of securitisation represents a specific political 
project. In this sense, it is an illustration of how ‘security can be done’, and how actors may 
seek to securitise certain areas and capture opportunities moulded within the discourse—
although this is not to imply anyhow that security is a malleable substance that can be freely 
shaped. On the contrary, the social nature of the process mediates the particularities of the 
project. 
(4) Security process (securitisation) is unique in that it is performative of identity. 
The process entails designating values that characterise one particular community against 
other communities. Via interaction with other actors, it thereby contributes to identity 
formation. In this manner, it can be argued that security practices that emerges through ESDP 
influence the (self-)perception of the EU in world politics. 
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Analytical framework 
In order to structure the empirical material and draw conclusions from it, I attempt to combine 
two theoretical approaches: firstly, the securitisation theory of the Copenhagen School, 
modified with a number of correctives introduces by Thierry Balzacq, and, secondly, Ervin 
Goffman’s theory of dramaturgical action.  
Securitisation represents the discursive process through which an intersubjective 
understanding is constructed within a political community to treat something as an existential 
threat to a valued referent object, and to enable a call for urgent and exceptional measures to 
deal with the threat (Buzan and Wæver 2003: 491). The Copenhagen School describes the 
securitisation process as enabled by a ‘speech act’ that focuses on the ways in which attaching 
the label ‘security’ to a particular problem gives this problem a certain status and legitimates 
the assumption of special measures in order to deal with it. The major attribute of 
securitisation is then “the move that takes politics beyond the established rules of the game 
and frames the issue as a special kind of politics or as above politics” (Buzan, Wæver and de 
Wilde 1998: 23).7 In other words, the enunciation of security itself creates a new social order 
wherein ‘normal politics’ is bracketed (Balzacq 2005: 171). As Wæver puts it:  
With the help of language theory, we can regard “security” as a speech act. In this usage, 
security is not of interest as a sign that refers to something more real; the utterance itself 
is the act. By saying that something is done (as in betting, a promise, naming a ship) 
...[T]he word security is the act’ (Wæver 1995: 55).  
 
The Copenhagen School reading of securitisation thereby draws on the theory of 
speech acts of John L. Austin, with particular reference to the work done on it by John R. 
Searle. In essence, speech act theory maintains that certain statements do more than simply 
describe and as such cannot be judged as true or false. The triadic characterisation of kinds of 
acts is summed up by Jurgen Habermas as ‘to say something (locutionary), to act in saying 
something (illocutionary), [and] to bring about something through acting in saying something 
(perlocutionary) (emphasis in the original)’ (Habermas 1984: 289).  
 The major criticism towards the reading of security as a speech act is that the speech 
act seeks to establish universal principles of communication, the values of which is to be 
functional whatever the context (Balzacq 2005: 172). Correspondingly, the reading of security 
that emerges from the Copenhagen School writings eventually conceives of security as self-
referential practice, i.e. an illocutionary act, whose validity is subject to certain conditions. 
                                                 
 
7 As no speech act can only be valid if authorised, the securitisation theory already in its major tenet contravenes 
the speech act theory and reveals certain inner contradiction of its position. 
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This in turn contradicts another tenet of the theory, namely the focus on the intersubjective 
dimension (i.e. the audience) and on the notion that security issue is not such in itself but only 
within a certain political context. More specifically, despite its approach to security as a 
speech act, the Copenhagen School highlights the social nature of ‘threats’ where the 
fundamentals of any security policy are not an exogenous given but rather reflect a particular 
political struggle. Still, this social component appears to be underarticulated and in 
contradiction to the universalising features of speech act theory. As Balzacq puts it:  
to claim that security is a speech act ...is to reduce security to an illocutionary act, i.e. a 
conventional procedure: “an act...conforming to a convention” (Austin 1962: 105)’ A 
corrective to the theory in this context is proposed here along which securitisation is 
perceived as a pragmatic (strategic) act (2005).  
 
Balzacq challenges the Copenhagen School position as embodying a high degree of 
formality (Ibid, 172). Instead, he proposes that: 
 
securitisation is a sustained strategic practice aimed at convincing a target audience to 
accept, based on what it knows about the world, the claim that a specific development 
(oral threat or event) is threatening enough to deserve an immediate policy to alleviate 
it...[B]y integrating strategic purposes into the equation (the approach) ensconces it 
(securitisation) in the social context, a field of power struggles in which securitising 
actors align on a security issue to swing to the audience support towards a policy or a 
course of action’(Ibid, 173) (emphasis in the original).  
 
Along these lines, it may be argued that securitisation is more a specific agenda-setting 
process within which some projects are sought to be implemented. Here I concur with the 
criticism by Holger Stritzel that the Copenhagen School reduces a securitization to ‘a static 
event of applying a (fixed) meaning (of security as exceptionality) to an issue rather than 
seeing it as an always (situated and iterative) process of generating meaning, i.e. as a dynamic 
(social and political) sequence of creating a threat text’ (2007:366). Agenda-setting, 
conversely, relies on on-going negotiation and (strategic) endorsement of particular 
understandings, a process along which these very understandings evolve.  
The Copenhagen School theory involves the following elements of the securitisation 
process: 
• The referent object of security, namely an issue subject to securitising; 
• Securitising agents, previously conceived as states; 
• An audience, since securitisation happens only if it has been accepted by the relevant 
audience. Importantly, internal audiences, including institutional ones often have to be 
persuaded at the same time as the external (beyond the community) audience; 
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• Functional actors, i.e. actors other than major securitisers who contribute to the 
process in line endorsed by securitising agents, e.g. media.8  
The theory still maintains that there cannot be any causal determination about what 
makes securitisation process successful and a great degree of political openness must be 
maintained, or, in Bourdieu’s words, ‘social magic’.9 Nevertheless, it highlights some 
facilitating conditions mediating the process: 
• Internal, linguistic logic that informs the structure of the security argument, or, in 
other words, certain rules constitutive of the speech act have to be followed. The argument 
needs to be intersubjectively accepted, or, in other words, it needs to draw on the categories of 
the sedimented security discourse; 
• Social capital in the sense of the position of the securitising actor. This does not mean 
that only agents in a state position can ‘do’ security. A securitising actor still has to be located 
in the system in the way that gives them legitimacy. The latter can be provided by the label of 
a formal position; 
• The nature of the threat at hand, whether it is plausible to securitise an issue in the 
light of the experience and convention in a given community; 
• Another facilitating factor in the security argument could be the proposed means to 
counter the threats. The EU can argue, for instance, that it is better equipped to provide 
security in its neighbourhood as it possesses a wide range of means to do so, including an 
approach that favours comprehensive, non-military measures.10 
 
In order to make the analysis of securitisation more tractable, Balzacq narrowed down 
the number of facilitating conditions to three sets of factors: (1) audience and its frame of 
reference, readiness to be convinced, and ability to grant or deny a formal mandate to 
securitising actors, (2) context, or relevant aspects of the Zeitgeist affecting all parties to the 
process, and (3) securitising actor and its capacity to use appropriate frames in order to win 
the audience for political targets (Balzacq 2005: 192).  
Analytically, securitisation is more a pragmatic act within which acceptance by the 
audience is strategically sought by securitising actors for specific political agendas. This 
aspect of strategically moulding a securitising policy is underdeveloped in the classic 
                                                 
 
8 Comments made by Professor Ole Wæver at the seminar ‘Security Theory - Critical Innovations’, Copenhagen 
University, 29 November  - 3 December 2004. 
9 Ibid. 
10 Ibid. 
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rendering of the Copenhagen School. I hence suggest conceiving of securitisation more as an 
agenda-structuring process. This bestows particular importance on the agency side of the 
process. The agency-centred account does not render the process arbitrary, ad hoc, or easily 
malleable. On the contrary, as a social effect it is deeply rooted in a given context and 
represents the intersubjective articulation of shared expectations (Huysmans 1996:224). 
Essentially, securitisation as agenda-structuring puts emphasis on the means through which 
political actors go about endorsing their political projects. 
 Conceiving of securitisation as a strategic act provides a link with the other part of the 
analytical framework, i.e. Goffman’s theory of strategic interaction. The latter should allow 
analysing the social mediation of securitisation. Goffman’s theory conceptualises actors in 
cultural environment as performers engaged in manipulative presentations of self and in 
framing, but also at the same time as constrained by the script and the consistency 
requirements of their roles. They are involved in a struggle over the definition of the situation 
but the outcome is a result of a negotiation process that is mediated by both the constraints 
and the empowerment of the prevailing discourse. Actors resort to the meanings discourse 
provides to push forward their projects but they are themselves constrained through discourse, 
and thereby not free in their functioning. Goffman points to three social effects that not only 
constrain strategic actions but they also matter in ways that strategic actors neither intend nor 
can fully control (Schimmelfennig 2002: 424). 
Material effects refer to the cultural and normative repertoires that provide the material 
of strategic action on the socially constructed environment: “fabrications...require...the use of 
something already meaningful in terms of primary frameworks shared by the performers’ 
audience” (Goffman 1974: 84). Processual effects refer to the regularity that each 
performance entails a social commitment. The initial projection commits the actor to what he 
is proposing to be and requires him to drop all pretences of being other things. As the 
interaction among the participants progress, additions and modifications in this initial 
informational; state will of course occur, but it is essential that these later developments be 
related without contradiction to, and even built up from, the initial position (Goffman 1959: 
10f). Social-psychological effects refer to the actors’ concern with their image within the 
interaction. Although Goffman does not assume that social actors necessarily internalise the 
rules of their environment, the maintenance of a positive image requires credible 
performances that use the available rules and schemata in a consistent way (Schimmelfennig 
2002: 425). 
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The analytical benefit of this combined framework derives from the differing 
perspectives the two theories represent. Securitisation shows interesting paths for analysis 
from a structuralist angle, focusing on the process and discursive conditions of possibility 
within which an issue can be converted into a security issue. Goffman offers a particular point 
of view on actors who, although engaged in an intentional and strategic act, are nevertheless 
constrained by the rules of legitimate action that discourses involve. The securitisation-
Goffmanian approach thus enables the analyst to move beyond the subjective/objective 
security dichotomy, while introducing situated agency to the discursive process of security 
enunciation. Accordingly, ESDP can be read as a case of contextual securitisation and at the 
same time as a political project, which, through threat articulation within specific complex 
interaction, influences the role of the EU as a security actor.  
In short, I argue that, in theoretical terms, ESDP has been instigated through the 
process of pragmatic securitisation whose major features are twofold. Firstly, its ideational 
enabling conditions, i.e. the meanings attached to certain events, create a particular action 
setting, and a distinct pattern of opportunity and constraint within which agency is displayed. 
Secondly, the entrepreneurship within ESDP brings into play actors who, being to varying 
extent knowledgeable about the setting within which they are located, are potentially able to 
change it through the process of naturalising certain political definitions over others. This 
involves engagement in major political struggles and securitising actors encounter contextual 
resistance to their project. Importantly here, this process activates a social commitment on 
their part to keep the initial promise declared, i.e. the construction of the viable EU security 
option. The struggles similarly consolidate their institutional identities emerging in the course 
of building the conception.  
 
Research questions              
How is the new security claim enacted? 
The first research question explores the conceptual body of ESDP and its enactment. I should 
thereby reconstruct the substance of the EU security claim as such and trace regularities 
pertinent to performing this particular securitisation. In order empirically to deal with this, the 
following sub-questions are important: 
A. What is the constellation of concepts that define the project and what are the 
main categories on which the conceptualisation hinges? Through the old category of security, 
new concepts and ‘new vocabularies’ have been introduced, and these are not considered in 
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isolation from each other. Instead, I focus on how they constitute and enact particular security 
practices.  
B. Which security narratives are evoked in order to legitimise the project? The 
concept of European security takes shape within particular security narratives that feed the 
ESDP story. They are of importance as they provide lines of argumentation that serve to add 
legitimacy to the project.  
C.      What is the (contextual) logic of the security argument? In other words, how 
have the arguments been phrased in order to generate legitimacy and social capital to support 
the policy? How, thereby, is the ‘mission statement’ of the EU as a security player contrived?  
 Several context-specific indicators should facilitate moving farther into the 
comprehensive empirical analysis. These are:  
A. The extent to which the framing of ESDP reflects the role expectations 
attached to the EU. Put differently, how does ESDP serve as a means to match the 
expectations the EU perceives as assigned to it? I tackle this question by exploring whether 
the project is framed as an answer to outside calls for a stronger security role for the EU. 
Close reading of the ESDP’s constitutive texts, the Council of the EU documents and the 
speeches from within the ‘Solana milieu’,11 is a crucial first step, performed in Chapter III. 
The ensuing analytical move follows in Chapter IV where I examine the politics of the policy. 
B. The extent to which ESDP reflects the belief that there is a distinct European 
approach to security. This should be the case if the uniqueness of the EU approach is stressed 
while confronted with other participants to the international interaction and when decisions to 
engage in security activities are being taken. Again, two kinds of measures seem essential. 
Firstly, the exceptional European capability to pacify conflicts and ‘project stability’ should 
recur consistently in the EU’s internal debates about engagement. Secondly, and equally 
important, are concrete routines on the ground of  ESDP engagement, i.e. the EU’s supposed 
exceptionality should convert into beliefs by ESDP executives that their projects represent the 
EU’s unique approach to crisis management. 
C. The extent to which ESDP development is informed by the ‘endogenously 
arisen logic of appropriateness’, i.e. how within the project ‘European values’ are brought into 
play to make sense of the process. This should be the case if external security activities are 
                                                 
 
11 ‘Solana milieu’ is a concept that I have come up with in the course of the empirical analysis and is thus 
elaborated in the following chapters. It points to the entrepreneurial position of a particular environment within 
the ESDP. 
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justified by the necessity to project abroad the values that has made the EU itself a successful 
story. 
D. The extent to which ESDP is moulded in response to mixed signals from the 
US of, on the one hand, expectations about burden-sharing, and, on the other, of the 
submission to the US leadership in security affairs. This formulation derives from the 
literature and reflects the perception that ESDP is subject to the discursive positioning of the 
US. I aim to problematise this theme and explore whether, although ESDP is not discursively 
autonomous, it has nevertheless acquired its own discursive distinctiveness—for instance, the 
latter might have been achieved through gradually obtaining a new role within the interaction 
with the US.  
 
What security practices emerge within the project? 
The second research question seeks to examine both the character and the extent of ESDP 
discursive sedimentation by tracing (security) practices instigated by and through the policy. 
If these practices have become routinised ways of ‘doing’ security, both institutionally within 
the EU and externally in interaction with other actors, they might have contributed to the 
constitution of a new identity. 
The search for ESDP practices is exploratory. However, some organising categories 
should nonetheless structure the analysis. On the premise that practices are performed, 
sustained and transformed by concrete actors within a scope of possibility that is analytically 
identifiable, I specifically look for the following indicators: 
1. Strategic shapers of ESDP. Here, I track the (institutional) instigators and 
moulders of the policy who recognised the window of opportunity for promoting new ideas 
about the European security. I attempt to unearth both conceptual initiatives and concrete 
actors involved in imposing a particular definition of the political situation, offering solutions, 
engaging in lobbying and endorsing negotiated outcomes.  
2. Facilitating actors, i.e. contributors other than the major performers who have 
facilitated the endorsement of the new security project. While they might not necessarily be 
explicitly political agents, they have been well situated for playing an important though 
secondary role.  
3. Contestants to the project. Strategic actors are subject to the social character of 
their activity which entails resistance from other players with differing political ideas and 
institutional identities to safeguard. Within this category, I locate defiance and actors engaged 
in struggling against the domination of ESDP discourse.  
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4. Fields of (inter)action. Connected with the third indicator is the need to identify 
where the contest over ESDP project takes place institutionally, i.e. what areas have become 
the ground of particularly intensive interaction and political struggle. 
5. Rules of the game. To conclude, I reconstruct the rules that have constituted 
ESDP milieu, with the aim of providing insights into the realm of its everyday politics.  
 
 
Does ESDP introduce a new security player onto the world stage? 
The analysis pertaining to research questions 1 and 2 should provide a vantage point for 
tackling the final research question. Research question three explores the extent to which the 
endorsement of ESDP might have contributed to the emergence of the EU’s new security 
identity. Here, I investigate the possible shift in the EU’s role in international politics as an 
indication of its identity change. Again, this investigation is of exploratory nature but I come 
up with an analytical device to assist in the task. Social entities construct their relation to one 
another through a process of interaction so identity is always an identity in a specific social 
world. The analytical key to exploring the EU role is then to identify its significant others to 
whom she most intensively relates in security matters. In Chapter V, I apply a triad of EU-
US-UN in order to capture the patterns of the EU’s assignment as compared with the other 
players. I rely on the following signposts: 
A. What are the EU means and its methods of differentiation within the triad? In 
particular, what themes are employed to bring out the EU distinctiveness through ESDP? To 
what extent has this self-image been recognised by the other players and ploughed back into 
the EU in the form of particular expectations to meet as a security actor? 
B. Whether/how has ESDP brought a change in the EU’s standing within the 
transatlantic relations? Along this line, I examine the possible shift in the US attitude 
towards the EU since the inception of the policy. I follow the fluctuations in the US 
perception and try to establish what the US stance on the EU security assignment is at present. 
In doing so, I also trace the intricacies of the EU-US bond in view of the attempts by the 
former to emancipate itself. 
C. How has ESDP affected relations with the UN? Here, I discuss the possible 
transformation considering the EU’s rise to international stardom in the realm of crisis 
management. The question arises what effect this has had on perceptions of what legally is a 
global security organisation. Whether it encouraged cooperation and pooling resources as the 
most ‘commonsensical’ option, or perhaps it gave rise to a more nuanced relationship.  
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D. How does the international ‘division of labour’ find its expression on the ground? 
Within this question, I seek to gauge whether the possible new division of labour is traceable 
in the field of crisis management as it unfolds in practice. In order to do so, through a case 
study on an international security issue, I try to map out the distinctive negotiated roles of the 
actors in the triad and point to the possible change in this arrangement.  
 
Cases 
In order to approach an answer to these questions, and thus the puzzle outlined above, the 
thesis comprises three case studies. The first two are located within ESDP as such, thereby 
providing an insight into the practices of doing the policy, both in ideational and executive 
terms. They are constructed based on primary empirical material. The third case study deals 
with the impact of ESDP on the world stage. It derives from a close reading of relevant 
documents and speeches. Hence, although the cases differ in character, they represent a 
contextual interpretation that should help grasp the logic underlying the policy. 
 
Why are ESDP operations the representation of the EU security practices? 
It is necessary at this stage to clarify why ESDP operations should be the adequate material to 
assess the EU’s security claim in practice, when other dimensions of the EU activity have also 
been involved in the EU’s security design. Although different ideas incorporated in ESDP 
development had circulated for decades, and might have been embodied in various EU bodies 
and their policies, there is a distinct element of particularity to ESDP. It introduces a new 
image of the EU and it features a strong sustained resolve to act upon it.  
 The cutting edge of ESDP, its most visible and indeed, perhaps, its essence are the 
missions deployed within its framework.12 They have proved the most efficient way of 
boosting ESDP, as they give the policy substance in the form of a tangible presence on the 
ground. Despite the claim that there is a lot of the accidental in the fashion in which the 
missions are put together—that they might represent ‘putting a tool ahead of the analysis’13 as 
‘we make them up as we go’14—the decisions over deployments never come out of thin air. 
Crucially, the process of launching missions reflects the institutional politics and tacit rules of 
                                                 
 
12 Interviews at the EUISS, Paris, July 2005 and at the Secretariat General, Private Office, Brussels, November 
2005.  
13 Focus group at the EUISS, Paris, July 2005. 
14 Interview at the Secretariat General of the Council, Private Office, Brussels, November 2005. 
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proceeding in this policy realm. Equally important, arguments in the debates over 
deployments and their unfolding bring out deeper ideational layers of what is perceived as the 
EU security role and how these conceptions become a tool in political struggles.  
In particular, I see the missions as representative of: 
1. The materialisation and reconstitution of ‘word politics’ (i.e. the EU security claim 
as it is declared rhetorically). Missions are portrayed as proof that the EU can deliver on its 
promises; 
2. The mode of endorsing the EU’s security claim. Missions have shown themselves to 
be the central facet of ESDP, conspicuous to both internal and external audiences. By this 
means, they have facilitated the promotion of a certain claim on domestic/international 
politics; 
3. The reflection of the EU’s search for a niche in the world politics. The decision to 
deploy a particular mission in a given political situation is a meaningful sign. The EU thereby 
acts on the others’ expectations of itself and it acts strategically to present itself in a certain 
manner; 
4. The twofold embodiment of strategic interaction. Internally, the deployment 
decision is a negotiated outcome of discussions among the member states and the institutions 
involved. With regard to international politics, it is illustrative of the EU’s positioning 
towards other significant actors. 
 
Why these particular missions? 
The cases under study here are EUJUST Themis to Georgia (Themis) and EUJUST Lex to 
Iraq (Lex), concerning the practices of ESDP at the EU level, and the case of deploying 
member states troops to Lebanon via the EU level negotiation as regards ESDP’s international 
sedimentation.  
Themis and Lex might be seen as unsuitable cases if considered more generically. 
Firstly, because the recurring ESDP narrative is that it was the Balkans wars and the EU’s 
(non-)performance there that provided the primary raisons d'être behind ESDP. I should then 
perhaps explore the missions deployed to date in the Balkans. Secondly, because the key 
change in EU security policy is said to be within the military domain while the two cases are 
civilian in character. Such a choice requires justification. 
To begin with, it actually appeared vital not to investigate cases that immediately arise 
from the Balkan experience. With the Balkans remaining an intense nucleus in the discourse 
 
 
72
surrounding ESDP, the policy is no longer limited to Balkans-style operations, either 
functionally or geographically. I would therefore risk distorting the logic of the policy’s 
development if I continued researching the Balkans operations only. These are, however, 
present in the analysis, but as a reference point and material for comparison. It may be argued 
that the Balkans has been a springboard for the policy to step up to other regions and a symbol 
for the EU international responsibility. Yet, the Balkans cases would be inconclusive for the 
purposes here, as ESDP operations elsewhere have acquired features that illustrate the present 
political state of play more clearly.  
In terms of opting for civilian missions, the rationale is somewhat more complex. 
First, one may be persuaded by the argument that civilian crisis management is an ambiguous, 
and in that quintessentially a ‘European’, concept.15 The phrase, coined by the EU, has no 
equivalent parallel in the lexicons of the UN, the OSCE, or non-European regional 
organisations (Dawn 2004: 1). It was first introduced in the debate on where and how ESDP 
might be developed in June 1999 when the Council of the EU mandated the incoming Finnish 
presidency to address, as part of its ESDP tasks, non-military crisis management. It would 
therefore seem of interest to explore cases that reflect implementation of a novel approach.  
Crucially, there has been a considerable upsurge in civilian ESDP missions, both in 
quantitative and qualitative terms—despite the fact that the policy activities are primarily 
supposed to equip the EU with military capabilities. Many interviewees maintained that 
civilian missions are a more accessible option of furthering the development of ESDP because 
military operations are difficult to agree on, and since it is quite unlikely that high-end 
military operations will be realised soon. One might speculate at this point that the greater 
dynamism behind the civilian ESDP represents a search for a possible niche for the EU in 
international relations. Simultaneously, ESDP civilian operations represent an innovative 
approach to civilian crisis management as they significantly differ in substance from missions 
deployed within UN, NATO, OSCE, or varied assistance programmes of a technical 
character. They have a distinct political profile, which both adds to the status of the mission, 
and facilitates promoting practices the EU regards as representing its values. Accordingly, the 
argument that the expansion of the civilian ESDP is but mere extension of its ‘civilian power’ 
has little appeal. 
                                                 
 
15 In a famous article at the begging of the ESDP story, Francoise Heisbourg noticed that “a certain studied 
imprecision has also been essential to the progress of ESDP”, with this “constructive ambiguity” being a usual 
feature of European integration (2000:5). 
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Another issue in this context is that civilian crisis management lies at the intersection of 
the institutional competences of the Council of the EU (Council) and the European 
Commission (EC). In line with the treaties, the EC is content with playing second fiddle to the 
Council when a planned ESDP mission has a military component and when security 
conditions on the ground prevent it from taking autonomous action. However, tough 
negotiations between the two institutions are the norm when it comes to the civilian ESDP, 
especially interventions aimed at rule of law reforms and institution building. This is because 
the Commission has had a long tradition of implementing development assistance projects in 
this area. As the civilian Themis and Lex belong to the borderline, they provide fruitful 
material for the analysis of this interface. If a comprehensive picture of ESDP is to be 
obtained, however, it is essential for further research to investigate the military aspect equally 
thoroughly.  
 The manifest similarity between the cases consists in the fact that they were both 
controversial and their launching was far from self-evident (as it might have been the case in 
the Balkans). Their deployment involved a great deal of debate regarding their actual 
materialisation and their contested formulas. Following these debates reveals much in terms 
of the discursive embeddedness of particular conceptions about the EU’s security claim, the 
extent to which it is contested within the EU itself, and the extent to which US security 
concepts influence the EU’s political visions. It is also instructive of the channels of the 
policy endorsement within the EU system of governance. Further, both cases under study are 
autonomous missions, i.e. they involved no straightforward resort to other actors’ resources. 
As autonomous ESDP missions they can reveal features specific to the policy. Analytically, 
since they belong to the same category of rule of law missions, they are comparable. Yet they 
remain radically different in terms of their deployment context, which allows for a good deal 
of variation. They thus exhibit dissimilar channels of reaching a similar aim, i.e. strategically 
promoting the EU as a security player which can contribute to shaping the international 
environment.  
 What constitutes a major difference between these two is their political profile. 
Georgia, an intersection of international interests notwithstanding, never featured as a priority 
on the EU security agenda. The deployment of the mission, regardless of the heated debate it 
entailed, involved much less political sensitivity than Iraq. It was approached as a particular 
window of opportunity and in the long run proved a fleeting interest. Arguably, Themis’s 
conditions of possibility were constituted by the momentary appeal of the Rose Revolution. In 
the case of Iraq, conversely, the political urgency was prominent. Although in both instances 
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there was a conviction that the EU ‘must do something’, this ‘something’ derived from 
fundamentally different premises. In effect, whereas the launching of Themis aimed at 
promoting certain conceptions and the deployment was decided in a serene environment, the 
decision about Lex was dictated by the urgency to ‘do something or the Americans will 
monopolise the whole thing’. The US’s influence being present in both cases, its meaning 
revealed itself in different ways.  
 While the first two cases serve to delve into ESDP making from the intra-EU 
perspective, the third case illustrates the recognition of ESDP in international politics. 
Through this case, I follow the context of the EU-US-UN debate over the EU’s involvement 
in enhancing the UNIFIL troops in Lebanon in order to trace how ESDP might have 
contributed to the EU’s boosted image on the world stage. The case should illustrate the 
position of the EU within the EU-US-UN triangle and thereby examine the EU’s international 
identity from this relational perspective. Aware of the criticism associated with selecting the 
case on the dependent variable and thereby evading the confrontation with negative scenarios, 
I also bring in instances of the EU’s failure to engage, or rather to engage through a fully-
fledged ESDP mission, and examine their contexts.  
 
What do the cases do here? 
The cases are analysed based on the premise that, first, ‘actions make an actor’ and, second, 
security is performative of identity. Accordingly, the analysis of the ESDP performance can 
contribute to the understanding of the EU identity in world politics. More specifically, the 
cases should:  
• contribute to identifying the ideational and discursive sources and channels of the 
ESDP development, including the upsurge in civilian crisis management component; 
• contribute to identifying the political repertoire comprising the argumentation behind 
the missions and the institutional practices establishing ways of ‘doing’ security by the 
EU; 
• by introducing the context of the actual international interaction, they should facilitate 
getting the picture of the current security profile of the EU on the world stage.  
 
 Importantly, the cases are not examined in isolation from other ESDP activities and 
CFSP at large. As Gerring argues, “cases are not immaculately conceived; additional units 
always loom in the background” (2004: 344). He offers a useful distinction between formal 
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and informal units chosen for analysis. The latter are subject to intensive investigation and the 
writer has in-depth knowledge of them. Informal units, conversely, are brought into the 
analysis in a peripheral way. These informal units are often studied only through secondary 
literature as they are always more superficially surveyed than the formal units under study 
(Ibid). Along these lines, the unfolding of the case studies is followed against the background 
of other ESDP activities.  
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CHAPTER III   SECURITISING IN THE EU MODE 
 
The EU is an actor in the sense of the securitisation theory: it securitises by telling stories. 
(Wæver 2000: 278) 
 
In this third chapter, I analyse the ideational underpinning of the EU’s security claim, how it 
has come into being and what salient moments have contributed to its shaping. Equally, I 
introduce the analysis of the EU’s security practices by examining the ESDP’s institutional 
endorsement. I thereby seek to trace the mode of EU securitisation, identifying securitising 
actors and their responses to strategic opportunities to define a specific political situation. 
These actors do not act unconstrained, so the next necessary step is to identify the contestants 
to the ESDP project and the most intense areas of political struggle over it. This is then the 
departure point for the next chapter where I comprehensively examine the actual process of 
ESDP deployment. 
  
Historical vantage point 
ESDP is often presented as a turning point in the EU’s historical journey from an economic 
giant but a political dwarf to a force to be reckoned with in the world. It thus symbolises an 
evolution of the Union from a project focused on making war impossible among its small 
group of members, to a global mission expected to contribute to solving the world’s problems. 
As the protégé of the US, the EU has arguably evolved into an independent, though highly 
cooperative actor, which claims that its very make-up preconditions it to be a substantial and 
unique force in international security. This represents something of the ‘master plot’ of 
ESDP’s development.  
 Interestingly enough, ESDP has been relatively isolated from the overarching EU 
integration project.16 Developing at a rapid pace unparalleled in other EU policy areas, it has 
advanced despite setbacks of various kinds and in spite of the comparative decline in the 
significance of CFSP of which ESDP constitutes a part. The growth of the project has 
similarly been guided by a rationale different from those for other areas. It was 
characteristically performed by different mechanisms, among which the British-French dyad 
is significant when contrasted with the French-German axis noticeable in other areas.17 ESDP 
                                                 
 
16 Interview at the EUISS, Paris, July 2005. 
17 Ibid. 
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has also developed into the driving force for the EU’s recovery after the fiasco of the 
constitutional referendum. In Javier Solana’s words, the policy is a catalyst for the 
mobilisation of public opinion so as ‘to give value to the EU, to recuperate the respect, the 
love to what has been the EU, is the EU, and has to be the EU’ (Solana 2005a). I attempt to 
understand this alleged ESDP exceptionality. I first explore the early framing of the project 
through an examination of the initial motivations and varying positions of the key actors. 
Subsequently, I deal with the distinctive phases in the development of the discourse, in pursuit 
of its underlying logic.  
 
The kick-off – “We are giving ourselves the tools to deliver” 18
The early days of ESDP as a coherent concept make it clear that the EU was to be endowed 
with a new kind of mission. Undisputedly, varied notions of European autonomy in the area 
of its own security had been circulating for decades, even if few of them developed into 
institutionalised form. They nonetheless fell short of converting into significant 
transformative leverage. Yet their continuous presence in the background of the debate made 
it possible to raise certain issues carefully without these ideas becoming instantly rebuffed, 
and it is here that the Rortian idea of the new, half-formed vocabulary created in frustration 
with old entrenched vocabulary is enlightening (1989). 
 In the common retelling of the ESDP’s prehistory, a particularly traumatic moment 
was the refusal by the French parliament to adopt the constitution of the European Defence 
Community in 1954. I leave out a comprehensive catalogue of the previous initiatives in the 
security realm since I perceive the policy as an attempted emancipation from this failure. In 
this sense, it is built around a pragmatically driven urge to overcome the past and thus the past 
features as nuisance. The source of inspiration being this nuisance experience, the new 
vocabulary is constructed in clear opposition to the old verbiage.  
 The ideational landscape at the end of 1990s when ESDP was firstly introduced 
featured a number of post-Cold war assumptions, both ideological and institutional, which are 
markedly different from the environment in which ESDP operates at present. Principally, the 
previously formulated possibilities of a European security option, opened up in mid-1990s, 
were largely confined to thinking within the precincts of the ‘European pillar’ to NATO, i.e. 
the ESDI. At that time, the NATO Washington Communiqué set the trend by stating that: 
                                                 
 
18 Speech by Dr Javier Solana, SG/HR, Foreign Policy Association, New York, 25 January 2000. 
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We welcome the new impetus given to the strengthening of a common European policy 
in security and defence [...] We confirm that a stronger European role will help contribute 
to the vitality of our Alliance [...] which is the foundation for collective defence of its 
members. In this regard, we acknowledge the resolve of the EU to have the capacity for 
autonomous action so that it can take decisions and approve military action where the 
Alliance as a whole is not engaged (emphasis mine) (Washington Communiqué 1999, 
article 9).  
 
Accordingly, many European leaders felt obliged to mention in their speeches that the 
new developments in the EU security were in no way to infringe upon the principle of the 
collective defence within NATO, and that they mean ‘more Europe, not less America’ in 
military cooperation and security (Robertson 1999). In principle, the documents from late 
1990s and the beginning of 2000s reveal the significance of extensive elaborations of what the 
ESDP was not to be. In this respect, ESDP enlargement was not to be identified with 
building a European army, marching under the blue and gold-starred flag (Solana 2000b), nor 
was it to be an enterprise in any way impinging on the effectiveness of NATO (Blair 1998). 
Nor did it signify forcing countries to deploy their armed forces against their will (Solana 
2000a) or was it aimed at ‘militarising’ the EU (Solana 2000d). European leaders went to 
great lengths to argue that ESDP was in fact very much to the advantage of NATO, as Europe 
would be better able to shoulder its fair share of responsibility (Solana 2000c). Thereby, the 
US paradigm of the ‘3Ds’ featured invariably in the ESDP’s repertoire. 
This parade of justification and assurance was triggered by the boldness of the St. 
Malo declaration of December 1998, effectively becoming a symbolic breakthrough in the 
history of ESDP. It was, however, the so-called Helsinki Headline Goal (HHG) of December 
1999 that represents the official inauguration of the ESDP discourse. The declaration set in 
motion the process of incremental capabilities building, together with defining the scope of 
the policy, in order—as it was initially formulated—to intervene in accordance with the 
Petersberg Tasks, i.e. in humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks and tasks of 
combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking. Importantly, the HHG embodied 
certain commitments, which must be lived up to, or ‘the ESDP remains an empty shell.’ If 
met, however, these commitments would offer the EU the means to support the values that lie 
at the heart of the Union. For these reasons, Helsinki can be regarded as an important moment 
in the development of ESDP. Interestingly, no official assertion of having achieved the HHG 
has ever followed. The Laeken declaration announcing ESDP operationability19 could be 
                                                 
 
19 The Laeken European Council in December 2001 formally launched an ‘operational’ European security and 
defence capability: ‘Through the continuing development of the ESDP, the strengthening of its capabilities, both 
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regarded as a signal in this direction, being as it was an enabling carte blanche for setting up 
ESDP operations. Indeed, although often regarded as merely declaratory politics, it 
nevertheless initiated a parade of missions and led to the accumulation of institutional 
experience (Kurowska 2007b). More fundamentally, however, the HHG itself has never been 
applied on the ground in its declared form. It rather represents a rhetorical flash, the flames of 
which illuminated other areas, and empowered initiatives of lesser profile but more substance. 
 Another decision taken at Helsinki pertained to the establishment of new political and 
military structures within the Council Secretariat to ‘ensure the necessary political guidance 
and strategic direction’ (European Council 1999b, article 28). These eventually grew to be the 
Political and Security Committee, Military Committee and Military Staff. Although much was 
made over the emergence of men in military uniforms in the corridors of Kortenberg Avenue, 
it was soon to show that it would rather be the less-publicised non-military crisis management 
mechanisms established within the Council Secretariat at the same European Council that 
played a more immediate role in ESDP’s advancement.  
 Another significant but largely unnoticed event was the assumption by Javier Solana 
of the functions of Secretary General of the Council of the EU and High Representative of the 
EU for CFSP (SG/HR) in October 1999. Initially appointed for five years, in July 2004 his 
mandate was extended for another five-year term. It was also decided at that point that Solana 
would be appointed EU Foreign Minister on the day of entry into force of the Constitutional 
Treaty for Europe. Together with the post, further staff appointments were made within the 
Secretariat General of the Council of the EU (Council Secretariat) in order to facilitate the 
work of the SG/HR, for example, the Private Office of the SG/HR, and the Policy Unit. The 
SG/HR interpreted the creation of this arrangement as evidence of the commitment of the 
member states to developing CFSP (Solana 2000c). Formally his mandate envisages assisting 
the Council in matters falling within the scope of the common foreign and security policy, in 
particular through contributing to the formulation, preparation and implementation of policy 
decisions, and, when appropriate, acting on behalf of the Council at the request of the 
Presidency, through conducting political dialogue with third parties.20 This seemingly 
negligible institutional and coordinating arrangement would yet to prove fateful as the new 
SG/HR immediately engaged in piecing together a tangible and workable scheme under the 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
civil and military, and the creation of the appropriate EU structures, the EU is now able to conduct some crisis-
management operations. The Union will be in a position to take on progressively more demanding operations, as 
the assets and capabilities at its disposal continue to develop’ (European Council 2001). 
20 Article 26 of the Treaty on the EU. 
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label of ESDP. Solana’s view that “What I do was in general not being done before either by 
the Commission or the Council” (Solana 2001c), would seem to lend weight to the argument 
that this point marks the inauguration of a new enterprise. By means of rendering explicit and 
visible the new EU security agenda, the office of Solana commenced upon a quest for piecing 
together the missing link in the EU’s security policy, i.e. a skilful if at first low-profile 
pragmatic leadership, driven by the ‘sense of duty, rather than rights’ (Solana 2001b). The 
latter has gained substantial influence over the following years, steadily but consistently 
contributing to what is now ESDP.   
 Already in remarks to the press after assuming his functions, Solana used an argument 
vaguely present before but reformulated in specific terms, namely that introducing improved 
military capabilities is consistent with Europe’s growing role in the world. According to this 
reading, the overwhelming success of the EU accomplished in so many other fields of 
European integration must translate into the EU becoming a more active and influential global 
power. As he argued, events from the recent past underlined this need, and, in order to stand 
up to these challenges, the EU should have an effective foreign, security and defence policy 
(Solana 1999b). Admittedly, too often in the past the EU has seemed unable to protect and 
enhance the values at the core of European integration (Solana 2004). Steps should thus be 
taken for the sake of credibility in the eyes of the European public and its transatlantic 
partners. Where not the EU’s actual survival but rather the moral stature is at stake, the Union 
must demonstrate that it has the capacity to respond. Here, building an effective ESDP 
reflects the credibility of the member states to themselves (Solana 1999a).  
 As much as a declaratory statement, this formulation marks the beginnings of an 
organised interpretation of EU security policy. Challenged by the differing visions of the 
member states, and their unwillingness or incapability to acts cooperatively at certain times, it 
has nevertheless developed into a kind of constitutive mantra, with ESDP’s emergence 
becoming an enabling moment in this regard. As tellingly asserted by Solana:  
it has been clear for some time that if Europe is to take its rightful place on the world 
stage it needs to have a ESDP [...] First the Bosnia crisis and the Kosovo have made it 
clear that we need more than just declarations of intent. We need to be able to act. And 
that means having military capabilities (Solana 1999a). 
 
 Two important issues thus come to the fore. First, although in a rather oblique manner, 
this would seem to highlight the comparative failure of CFSP. A new policy, even though 
placed within the old one institutionally, had to be launched in order to make the older one, 
CFSP, functional. Interestingly in this context, there has emerged a kind of organisational 
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practice according to which even if ‘ESDP’ is meant, officials strive to use the abbreviation 
CFSP and clothe the ESDP activities as such. Second, the launching of ESDP was explicitly 
designed to equip the EU with a military option, making the EU’s voice heard: “we are 
creating a pool of military resources ready and able to undertake EU-led crisis management 
operations” (Solana 2000a). With the rationale being that for the EU to play its full role on the 
international stage, CFSP must be backed by credible operational capabilities,21 the famous 
expression St. Malo declaration has effectively taken roots. 
 Yet, ESDP is not only about the creation of a rapid reaction force. It is also about the 
Union having access to other tools that might be better suited to maintaining or providing 
security than military force. This is why the Union is devoting particular attention to the 
development of other instruments, such as civilian police, for use in crisis management 
situations (Solana 2000f). Success in creating enhanced civilian capabilities can subsequently 
allow the EU to play a unique role across the full range of humanitarian and peacekeeping 
tasks (Solana 2000c). Tellingly, the civilian dimension seems to have translated into 
numerous tangible policy initiatives while the military option, the raison d'être behind the 
introduction of ESDP, is still lagging behind. 
 An important theme running through the project from its infancy is that the EU needs 
to act immediately as ‘time is pressing’. In a rapidly changing world, ‘we [the EU] cannot 
afford to be left behind (Solana 2000b)’ as ‘the world is not waiting while we get our own 
house in order’ (Solana 2000g). Further, ‘we should be a global actor and therefore we cannot 
just wait to solve our internal problems, because the world is not going to wait for us’ (Solana 
2005a). This air of urgency and insistence that political events should not come to a halt, is 
juxtaposed with the assertion that the partners of the EU around the globe expect the EU to 
have an effective and clear policy on issues of international importance (Solana 2000f). These 
come with an insistence on the pragmatic character of the policy-making which oftentimes 
provides an excuse for unconventional performance. A glimpse at the operational philosophy 
embraced by the Council Secretariat is instructive to grasp the non-codified code of conduct 
in its daily work, offering a valuable insight into the nature of the practices that constitute the 
policy.  
                                                 
 
21 See e.g. European Council Presidency Conclusions, Vienna, 11-12 December; German Presidency paper, 
Bonn, 24 February 1999; Informal meeting of EU foreign ministers, Eltville, 13-14 March 1999, German 
proposal; Declaration of the European Council on strengthening the CFSP, European Council, Cologne, 3-4 June 
1999. 
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 In the official narrative, the decision to develop ESDP was taken because of 
globalisation and increasing interdependence (Solana 2001b), which make the traditional 
global stance on trade liberalisation and development assistance increasingly unviable. The 
necessity to act requires the EU to embrace a wider range of responsibilities and to take on a 
leadership role in security areas (Solana 2001c), with an aim to project stability beyond the 
borders of the EU (Solana 2001d). As the EU can no longer sustain a foreign policy with 
limited access to the full range of capabilities to meet its objectives, the development of ESDP 
is the only credible response to the challenge, providing the EU with the ability to engage 
effectively in crisis management and peace-making operations. This is “crucial if Europe is to 
defend its interests and maintain those values on which it is based” (Ibid). The capacity to use 
military force should then make the EU appear credible to other actors. The credibility theme 
and reputational concerns immediately surface in the course of legitimating ESDP (Solana 
2001b). Similarly, these calls for acting together as the only means of yielding tangible results 
have become louder since, “in today’s world, the molecules are bound to fare better than 
individual atoms” (Solana 2001d). 
 Crucially, CFSP, and, accordingly, ESDP, are framed as essentially pragmatic 
exercises (Ibid). Hence, although principles are necessary, they do not suffice in and of 
themselves, they have to be turned into reality (Solana 2001a). The phrase “giving ourselves 
the tools to deliver” draws this out explicitly. So does the fact that the policy appears to have 
been developed from experience rather than prescriptive action, an important imperative 
being that member states will go with ESDP if it is shown to work (Solana 2001d). That is 
perhaps why so little time is spent on worrying about theory or institutional issues and the 
focus rather is on solving real issues (Ibid). Javier Solana evokes his related experience as the 
former Secretary General of NATO in a telling testimony before the House of Lords in the 
United Kingdom. The following excerpt should provide for meaningful context of the ESDP 
development:  
I am very obsessed with the rhythm in which deployments out there can arrive because I 
have seen this experience. I was Secretary General of NATO when we deployed in late 
1995/early 1996 the first troops to Bosnia and I had to take a decision collectively […]. If 
we had waited to have all the elements until the last letter of the document for the first 
time that NATO was going on to do a peacekeeping operation resolved and understood, it 
probably would be still without finish or without a start. We had to say, “Let’s go, let’s do 
it, we will be able to do it, we have the spirit” and, if we had not gone then, by the time 
we arrived, the catastrophe that we claimed we wanted to stop would have been more 
difficult to stop or would have been unnecessary to stop because they had killed each 
other and the reconstruction would have been more difficult, etc, etc. So, to be right in 
time is very difficult but to be as close as possible right in time for any elements of the 
crisis management, be it money, be it diplomacy, be it civilian aspects or be it military 
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aspects, in my mind is fundamental and really it makes all the difference (House of Lords 
2004).  
 
 
Catharsis – “a secure Europe in a better world” 22  
The ESDP story vividly illustrates how significant symbolic gestures represent the 
endorsement of concrete political projects. It also demonstrates how seemingly merely 
declaratory politics become constant points of reference and thereby tangible instruments 
within a particular political repertoire. The EU Security Strategy (ESS) offers a number of 
examples. Figuratively entitled “A secure Europe in a better world”, it was first drafted in 
June and finally adopted in December 2003 in the midst of a severe internal crisis with 
differing security conceptions coming to the fore. Two esteemed columnists conceived of 
Europe at that time as ‘gripped by self-doubt and traumatised by weeks of recrimination over 
the war in Iraq’ where ‘Iraq-led invasion raised profound questions whether the EU can 
develop its own foreign and security policy and whether the disagreements that opened up 
during the crisis will solidify into permanent divisions’.23 The adoption of the ESS seems to 
have gradually contributed to overcoming this impasse. According to Solana, the ESS is the 
EU’s ‘strategic identity card’ that identifies it as a global, responsible, and credible security 
player (2004: 6). 
 Two aspects deserve attention here. First, while the challenge of the Laeken 
declaration of operationability was to convert intention into deed, the relation between ESDP 
and the ESS is a case of cross-fertilisation. The perceived need to provide conceptual and 
political grounding for missions and to strengthen ESDP at a time when CFSP seemed in 
shambles over the Iraq discord were important reasons behind the formulation of the strategy 
(Mawdsley & Quille 2003). The perceived necessity to operationalize the latter and 
demonstrate its feasibility generated a demand for more missions in line with the goals 
outlined in the strategy. In this sense, the ESS has become a constant point of reference 
providing justification for further action where the expansion of ESDP missions is seen as an 
endorsement of the ESS. Crucially, in the context of the missions, the ESS enabled the 
constraints of the Petersberg Tasks to be overcome, particularly their strictly humanitarian 
approach towards more ambitious, complex and timely solutions. One can argue that, not only 
did the ESS help heal the wounds of the Iraq crisis, but that it also contributed to the 
emergence of new conceptions. These shifted the old vocabularies of the Petersberg Tasks to 
                                                 
 
22 ‘A Secure Europe in a Better World’, The EU Security Strategy, Brussels, 12 December 2003. 
23 Financial Times, 15 April 2003.  
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the background. While the latter remain a label prominent in Treaties formulations, they no 
longer constitute a focal point in the politics of doing ESDP.24 The seemingly fatal injury 
generated by the Iraq hence provided for a cathartic moment in the development of ESDP in 
that it induced the adoption of the ESS and the launching of first ESDP missions.25  
 Second, the ESS may also mark the moment when the EU embarked on a thorough 
self-definition, which it announced worldwide. The formation of this self-definition brings 
into play the EU’s significant others. The ESS became a response to the National Security 
Strategy of the United States of America, issued by the Bush administration in September 
2002, and, in particular, to the introduction of the doctrine of pre-emptive force. This comes 
as no surprise in the light of the conviction that ‘the rest of the world reacts to America, fears 
America, lives under American protection, envies, resents, plots against, depends on America. 
Every country defines its strategy in relation to the US’ (Cooper 2003: 46). Importantly 
however, the ESS represents a fully-fledged attempt to come to terms with US preponderance 
and the EU’s relation to this. Although widely seen as not too dissimilar, the documents 
clearly reveal differences in strategic thinking of the two polities. Paradoxically, it may be 
argued that contrary to the famous Kagan formulation, it is the American instance that 
unravels utopian tendencies, while the EU variation stands on more realistic grounds 
(Berenskoetter 2005). Essentially, however, the ESS amounts to the EU’s deliberative effort 
to arrive at its own defence and security posture. While trying to respond to the American 
conceptualisation and thus engage with it, it simultaneously differentiates itself from many 
concepts adopted there or it strives to bestow different meanings on them. This involves 
subtle variations in vocabularies employed to name similar threats. The notion crops up in this 
context that meanings arise out of the interaction with others through language practices, so 
that the language gives a means by which to negotiate meaning through symbols (Blumer 
1969). 
 A brief account of the content of the ESS and the circumstances of its drafting are in 
order here as they reveal the EU’s declaration on its perceived security situation. In Solana’s 
words, “Europe’s security strategy is built on the concepts of responsibility, prevention, 
capability and partnership”.26 Responsibility has both a regional dimension in that the 
enlargement should not create new dividing lines in Europe and a global one in the face of 
interdependent world with fast moving threats. Preventive engagement is framed to be at the 
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heart of the unique European approach as it takes account of the environment in which threats 
are generated with the motto that ‘a world more fair is a world more secure’. The security 
strategy is made credible by the notion of capability both military and civilian, and by 
Europe’s partnership with the United States which is deemed irreplaceable as it ‘has 
underpinned our progressive integration and our security’ (Ibid). 
The final version characteristically differed from the initial draft. Most tellingly, 
references to pre-emption were excised from the final version. The possible use of first-strike 
military action was mentioned in the first June draft, inspired principally by Robert Cooper, 
former foreign policy adviser to Tony Blair, the British prime minister, and the Director-
General for External and Politico-Military Affairs in the EU General Secretariat. Cooper, 
whose influence exceeds the formalized competencies attached to his office, believes in a 
muscled (EU) foreign policy. An editorial in the Guardian went so far as to state that his 
advocacy, when he was a government official, of force and imperialism was ‘unprecedented 
and inflammatory’.27 A glimpse at a passage from an influential book by Cooper should shed 
some light on his position: 
Common European values have grown out of common historical experience, which, in 
extreme cases, can provide a justification for armed intervention. For a postmodern state 
[which he claims the EU represents – X.K.] there is a difficulty. It needs to get used to the 
idea of double standards. Among themselves, the postmodern states operate on the basis 
of laws and open co-operative security. But when dealing with more old-fashioned kinds 
of state outside of the postmodern limits, Europeans need to revert to the rougher 
methods of an earlier era - force, pre-emptive attack, deception, whatever is necessary for 
those who still live in the 19th century world of every state for itself. In the jungle, one 
must use the laws of the jungle. In this period of peace in Europe, there is a temptation to 
neglect defences, both physical and psychological. This represents a danger for the 
postmodern state (2003: 61-2). 
 
Some member states found the proposition in the initial version ‘pre-emptive 
engagement can avoid more serious problems in the future’ (Solana 2003a), a proposition for 
which Cooper was responsible, highly provocative and hence insisted it be dropped. Instead, 
the term used in the final version is ‘preventive engagement’ and the emphasis of the doctrine 
is on intervention through multilateral institutions.28 Although some commentators concluded 
that this renders the document bland and Europe’s commitment to security obscure,29 France 
and, particularly, Germany, lobbied hard to have the initial proposition removed. “We are not 
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having a security doctrine that reflects the US view or that [suggests] we are doing this 
exercise to please the Americans,” as a German diplomat cited by Guardian stated.30 
Although some claimed that while the Europeans may agree with the US on the nature of 
today’s principal security threats, the policy conclusions highlighted in the ESS are distinctly 
‘European’,31 and the abolition of “pre-emptive engagement” was perhaps inevitable. The 
final December version thus reads:  
We need to be able to act before countries around us deteriorate, when signs of 
proliferation are detected, and before humanitarian emergencies arise. Preventive 
engagement can avoid more serious problems in the future (Solana 2003b).  
 
 
 The introduction of Cooper’s perspective leads neatly on to the mapping out of what I 
refer to here as ‘Solana milieu’, a group of advisers to the HR/SG who have become major 
shapers of the ESDP’s conceptual and operational substance. Among them, Steven Everts sets 
out how Europeans see the international security environment, what Europe’s main interests 
and objectives are, and how the EU will achieve them (Everts 2003).32 In so doing, he brings 
in crucial threads that overarch the perception of the ESS from within. Everts argues that, 
through the Iraq crisis, EU leaders learnt the hard way that without a common analysis of 
threats, a consensus on how to tackle them would prove unattainable. Consequently, the ESS 
demonstrates that the EU can learn from its failures, as the European leaders are now more 
prone to debate strategies and policies rather than seek refuge in more familiar discussions on 
institutions and processes. Fundamentally, the adoption of the strategy contrasts dramatically 
with the situation of the year prior to its adoption, when it would have been impossible to get 
all countries to sign up for a European strategic culture “that fosters early, rapid and, when 
necessary robust intervention [a state to be achieved as set out by the ESS – X.K.]”.  
 Another central theme in Evert’s analysis is the EU’s positioning of itself towards the 
US and the related abandonment of the concept of pre-emption. He characteristically asserts 
that although the US elaborates extensively on promoting democracy in the Middle East, it is 
nevertheless ill-equipped to effect it. The Europeans, conversely, are better placed to 
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accomplish the task but still give an impression of not wanting it badly enough. As for the 
substitution of the notion ‘pre-emptive’ engagement by the less threatening term ‘preventive’ 
engagement, Everts acknowledges that the strategy goes backwards in this respect. He 
mentions the EU’s official explanation that pre-emptive engagement lacks direct translation 
into European language, but admits that the political connotations of the term and its 
prominent position in the US thinking must have realistically been a greater problem. This 
alludes to the still entrenched EU apprehension with the contentious issue of the conditions 
for the use of force. Overall, however, the tone of the document ‘heralds a new assertiveness 
and suggests that the EU is losing its innocence in handling international affairs’. Moreover, 
‘the concept of effective multilateralism, which runs like a scarlet thread through the paper, is 
critical as it acknowledges the need to act tough when countries break international rules’ 
(Ibid).  
Yet another theme in this securitising framing is the shift in the security versus 
development nexus in terms of the EU’s international engagement. Rigid as the dichotomy 
may seem, the security-versus-development debate demonstrates its vigour in the conceptual 
and institutional differentiation between the Council Secretariat and the EC and the respective 
institutional practices reflect these differing understandings.   
 In the Commission’s lexicon, ‘development assistance’ remains of central importance 
(Ferrero-Waldner 2006). The Commission advocates the principle that long-term investments 
in developing democratic practices, introducing the rule of law and boosting the strength of 
civil society in fragile communities, is a key to bringing about security. ESDP interventions 
are therefore often framed as ‘a drop in the ocean’, aimed at acquiring political clout and 
hardly capable of inducing systemic changes.33 Conversely, the ESS explicitly spells out that 
security is a precondition of development as ‘conflict not only destroys infrastructure, 
including social infrastructure; it also encourages criminality, deters investment and makes 
normal economic activity impossible’ (Solana 2003b:2). Although no Council official calls 
for the reduction of development aid, Solana believes that it cannot be distributed and used in 
a productive manner if the security situation is shaky (House of Lords 2004:8-9). In order to 
aid in reconstruction in post-crisis situations, one has to guarantee security first. ‘We have 
several examples of how by not creating the conditions of security lots of money has not 
arrived to where it should arrive and has not been used in the best manner. It does not mean 
that you have to bring to zero the economic help but it is a question of phases [emphasis mine 
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- XK]’ (Ibid.). The latter envisages the process of prioritisation along which the most 
immediate security concerns come first and need to be sorted out before the Commission 
reconstruction projects come in. This insistence on a ‘harder’ security vocation of the EU 
implies not only reconceptualization of the role of the EU in the international arena, but also 
institutional recalibration within the EU. The dominant position of the Commission in 
external action, based on its status as financial development aid provider in chief, is 
challenged by a more assertive Council, which believes that security is prior to development. 
The proliferation of missions is then a channel through which the security conceptions of the 
second pillar security proposition become asserted. As such, it marks the realization of the 
political project advocated by the ‘Solana milieu’ (Kurowska 2007b). 
The receptiveness of the ESS is also instructive in seeking to grasp the contours of the 
‘Solana milieu’. Composed by a few high-level officials in the Council Secretariat, the 
document hardly indicates the bottom-up emergence of the member states’ agreement on the 
EU foreign policy. Rather, the process validates the argument about the entrepreneurial role of 
the ‘Solana milieu’, not only through managerial coordination, but also via conceptual 
engineering, agenda management and practical execution. The distinctive skilfulness of this 
particular agent reveals how it effectually obtained a doctrinal document that reflected its 
interpretation of the EU’s security situation. Particularly, the Council Secretariat succeeded in 
creating a document, which was relatively easily digestible by the major audience it targeted, 
i.e. the EU states. Domestically in terms of the institutional governance, the Commission 
reaction to the adoption of the document is of interest. The official declarations were 
welcoming, and the subsequent international EU activity was described as operationalising 
the strategy.34 However, interviews taken at the Commission expose an alternative posture 
according to which the ESS was at first not recognised in principle, and then resented as yet 
another attempt by the SG/HR to reinforce his position and take over a dominant stand vis-à-
vis the Commission.35 Admittedly, the adoption of the ESS has proven of considerable 
significance as a constant point of reference. The mere existence of the strategy has been 
recurrently presented as a success in itself and evidence of major accomplishments of the EU 
in the realm of security policy. It has become a framing document and as such has provided 
the boost for further discursive sedimentation of ESDP. The concepts elaborated in the 
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strategy legitimately entered the repertoire of SG/HR securitising, and the call for 
operationalising the strategy followed.  
The analysis above provides a sketch of the narrative through which ESDP 
securitisation has been endorsed. It points towards recognising European values or an EU idea 
of democracy, peace and good governance as an organising principle within the referent 
object of European security. In itself, the European project rests on three arguments: firstly, to 
exorcise the demons of Europe’s past (and thereby make conflict between members 
inconceivable); secondly, to extend the zone of peace and prosperity across our continent; 
and, thirdly, to deal with security threats emerging in a borderless and chaotic world.36 
Important implications about the means to provide security follow from this logic. Since the 
EU own historical record makes it particularly appropriate to convert conflict into cooperation 
in antagonised communities, the EU model of good governance should be an archetype in this 
quest. Societies in turmoil would benefit from implementing the EU’s example since it has 
proven unequivocally successful. Fundamentally, although the European foreign policy is 
underpinned by the specific values of the fight for peace, fight for stabilisation, compassion 
with others who suffer, large-scale engagement in crisis management where people are 
suffering,37 it is in the EU’s own interests to mould communities around it in line with its own 
image. Through ‘creating a ring of well-governed states’ around its borders, the EU works 
towards securing its own peaceful existence.  
 
Institutional endorsement – the cast of characters 
In examining the process by which the policy was framed and designed, the previous section 
already mentioned some of the main players in the ESDP game. In the present context, I take 
on this discussion via the issue of the policy’s institutional endorsement. This encompasses 
the institutional relationships between the major securitising actor, its facilitating bodies and 
the contestants to the project, in addition to the chief fields where this interaction is enacted. 
In doing so, I aim to operationalise the widely accepted leitmotif of new institutionalism that 
‘institutions matter’. Crucially, however, while an inventory of the institutions involved in 
ESDP making provides for an important clarification, any isolation of a particular body as an 
independent variable clashes with the actual interdependence among these entities. It is thus 
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important to note that the practices that enact the policy become forged in an ongoing 
interaction across the ESDP machinery.  
 
The setup as the Treaty says  
The Treaty on the European Union (TEU) that entered into force in 1993 commenced the 
formal institutionalisation of CFSP. Its innovations proved largely symbolic at the initial 
stage, and they were to be followed by the practical failure of the nascent CFSP whose shape 
revealed inadequate and urged the launch of ESDP. Since the institutional players in ESDP 
have only appeared relatively recently, the in-depth literature on their role is scarce and often 
limited to one particular actor, rather than providing an examination their interaction (Duke 
and Vanhoonacker 2006: 165). The institutionalisation of the domain has further proven of 
unique character as compared to the overall logic of both EU integration in general, and the 
CFSP establishment in particular. The process of European integration hinges on a series of 
moments when crucial decisions are taken while these decisions are formalised through the 
procedure of treaties. In this regard, the scope for agenda-shaping in the first pillar becomes 
significantly constrained as Community politics remains prescriptive and technocratic. 
Consequent to the formally intergovernmental character of the second pillar, conversely, the 
scope for agenda shaping there largely depends on political entrepreneurship. 
The TEU introduced an institution to support the formulation of CFSP in the form of 
the Directorate-General E for Political and Foreign Affairs within the Secretariat General of 
the Council of the EU. The Treaty set out the objective that the Union should ‘establish its 
identity on the international scene’ (Article 2), and it equipped CFSP with a number of goals 
(Article 12) and policy instruments (Articles 13-15). These provisions remained solely on 
paper until the 1999 Treaty of Amsterdam provided for the position of High Representative 
for CFSP—the position filled by Javier Solana—who got the policy off the ground by 
organising the concept of ESDP. I proceed by reconstructing the institutional setup of CFSP 
according to the letter of the treaties, then identify bodies that have contributed in particular 
fashions to the development of ESDP.  
At the top of the political hierarchy sits the General Affairs and External Relations 
Council (GAERC), which gathers ministers for foreign affairs empowered to commit their 
governments and who are held politically accountable to them. Its agenda is prepared by 
Committee of the Permanent Representatives (COREPER) comprised of member states’ 
permanent representatives at the ambassador level, and it includes items for approval without 
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debate and those that must be debated. The latter body is divided into COREPER II and I, 
with the former being of a higher rank. The Council’s Rules of Procedures stipulate that all 
issues subject to Council decision must to be on the agenda of COREPER.  
The Helsinki European Council of 1999 decided to establish new permanent political 
and military bodies at the service of ESDP: the Political and Security Committee (PSC), the 
EU Military Committee (EUMC), and the EU Military Staff (EUMS). The former two are 
member state representatives’ bodies with the EUMC established within the Council and the 
EUMS being a Council Secretariat department. The PSC monitors the international situation, 
contributes to the formulation of policies by giving the Council opinions, and oversees the 
implementation of the policies that are agreed. In crises, it should play a central role in 
defining the Union’s response in that it will be responsible for the political control and 
strategic direction of all military operations, with the support of the opinions and 
recommendations of the EUMC assisted by the EUMS. In the event of such a crisis, the PSC 
constitutes the key strategic actor leading the formulation and implementation of an ESDP 
operation. According to the EU’s crisis management procedures, all available information 
relating to the ongoing crisis should be forwarded to the PSC which will subsequently be 
convened in order to agree on a Crisis Management Concept. The PSC is also at the core of 
the process leading to the drafting of the relevant Joint Action, Concept of Operations, and 
Operational Plan, which together constitute the key documents guiding the implementation of 
the operation on the ground. Once agreed at the PSC, these documents are forwarded to the 
Council essentially to be rubber-stamped since it is rare that the Council will reopen issues 
that have been already approved by the PSC (Juncos and Reynolds 2007: 136). 
It is important to understand the division of labour between the PSC and COREPER 
II, as the establishment of the former initially generated some institutional rivalry between the 
two (Ibid, 135). In May 1992 an agreement was reached according to which the Political 
Committee (today the PSC) ‘formally has a subordinate role vis-à-vis the Permanent 
Representatives Committee’ (de Zwan 1995: 178). Furthermore, under the agreement, while 
the Political Committee focuses on substantive political analysis, COREPER looks after the 
institutional, legal, financial and Community aspects of the questions on the table, thus 
refraining from altering or editing the opinions of their colleagues (Wessels 1999:81). The 
PSC has currently seen a steady increase in its workload as it is responsible for both military 
and civilian crisis management at the political level.  
 The EUMC is the highest EU military body. Formally composed of the Chiefs of the 
Defence Staff of the member states, it is responsible for the direction of all military activities 
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within the EU framework. The EUMC is the designated ‘forum for consultation and 
cooperation between the member states in the field of conflict prevention and crisis 
management’. The EUMC thus emerges as the key decision-shaping body in crisis 
management situations, drawing up and evaluating strategic military options, overseeing the 
elaboration of an operational plan and monitoring operations throughout the mission 
(Howorth 2007: 74). The EUMS comprises of some 150 senior officers seconded from the 
member states. It provides military expertise and capacity, including during the conduct of 
EU-led military operations. The EUMS works under the political direction of the European 
Council (through the COREPER) and under the military direction of the EUMC. Although the 
EUMS does not act as an operational HQ, it performs the operational functions of early 
warning, situation assessment and strategic planning and provides in-house military expertise 
for the HR/SG (Ibid., 75). 
The EUMC and EUMS, despite their members’ arrival in military uniforms being 
heralded extensively, have, in the event, had less tangible effects on ESDP culture. The 
meagre scope of military operations means that the results of their work have so far mainly 
remained within the walls of the building in Kortenberg Avenue where they are 
headquartered. A body whose operationality has been particularly significant for the shape of 
the ESDP is the Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management (CIVCOM), created 
by the Council decision of 22 May 2000. It is responsible for providing information, making 
recommendations and giving its opinion to the PSC on civilian aspects of crisis management. 
The upsurge of civilian missions reflects to a large degree the present position of the 
CIVCOM in the ESDP’s institutional interaction. Not a Council Secretariat body, the 
CIVCOM comprises national representatives and it reports formally to COREPER although it 
receives guidance from and provides information to the PSC and attempts to coordinate 
Commission and Council contributions. The majority of decisions concerning civilian 
operations are prepared within this body, with the PSC rubber-stamping most of the 
conclusions adopted within the CIVCOM.  
 
Securitiser and its facilitators  
Crucially, the hazy institutional setup and unclear relationships between the different bodies 
involved in the process of ESDP making leaves considerable room for manoeuvre for the 
Council Secretariat leadership. If the latter does not represent a fully-fledged form of political 
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leadership, it does constitute a specific kind of strategic entrepreneurship and proves critical 
in the cases of concrete ESDP involvement.  
 As elaborated above, the office of the SG/HR, or ‘the Solana milieu’, assumed the 
conceptual and political agenda setting within CFSP via practically designing and endorsing 
ESDP. I attempt to grasp the nature of this securitising actor by applying the concept of 
entrepreneurship, or instrumental leadership. This can be defined as ‘an asymmetrical 
relationship of influence in which one actor guides or directs the behaviour of others towards 
a certain goal over a certain period of time’ (Underdal 1994: 178). Fundamentally:  
instrumental leadership is not about imposing one actor’s preferences but it is a matter of 
finding means to achieve common ends [...] one actor’s guidance is accepted by others 
either because they become convinced of the (substantive) merits of the specific diagnosis 
that actor offers or the cure he or she prescribes or because of a more or less diffuse faith 
in the actor’s ability to ‘find the way’ (Ibid, 187). 
 
 By means of rendering explicit and visible the new EU security agenda, Solana’s 
office commenced already in 1999 a quest to put together the missing link of EU security 
policy, namely a skilful if at first low-profile pragmatic leadership. The continuity of this 
leadership contributes to the build-up of an institutional memory of how to do things 
effectively and ensures a strategic agenda management. The Council Secretariat (the Solana 
milieu) does more than set the ESDP agenda. Its influence extends to what Jonas Tallberg 
(2006: 68-70) refers to as ‘agenda structuring’, i.e. the ranking of issues according to salience, 
and, by extension, ‘agenda exclusion’, or the mobilisation off the agenda of certain issues. 
Neil Fligstein describes agenda setting as a strategic social skill and action (1997). In his 
reading, agenda setting requires behind-the-scenes action to convince multiple actors and 
groups that the agenda is in their interest. This effectively determines where the group is 
going and what their collective identity is likely to be.  
In this respect, the Council Secretariat has been busy winning over the member states 
for the endorsement of its project. A primary example is the way in which the Council 
Secretariat has negotiated hard to instigate missions. As the primary objective is to have 
missions, less attention is devoted to the formula of particular operations, the concerted effort 
being instead focused on gathering the member states around a project.38 As a consequence, 
compromises are made that perhaps undermine the potential of a particular operation to make 
a substantial difference on the ground. The immediate stakes are elsewhere, however. They 
consist in bringing the member states together in order to enable an international action in the 
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first instance. This proceeds by ingraining the idea of the EU’s unique capabilities in 
international crisis management, the potential viably to tap them in a particular case and the 
corresponding urge to do so for the sake of the EU credibility. While this purpose is overtly 
stated in the discourse, the means to achieve it is left unexplored in policy analysis.  
In particular, practitioners involved in daily making of ESDP characteristically 
provide a multifaceted picture of policy design.39 There the policy work is seen as a 
continuing process, concerned with the maintenance of relationships as well as the production 
of documents. Practitioners stress a wide range of participants, with diverse agendas and 
values, who are thrown together in various ways to produce ambiguous and provisional 
outcomes. In this situation, and regardless of intrinsic political struggle, the emphasis often is 
on generating cohesion around courses of action, and strengthening the capacity for future 
collaboration. And although policy is predominantly seen as being about choice, it is perhaps 
more about meaning, generating understanding what appropriate concerns are, why they are 
appropriate and what actions are appropriate responses. Put differently, ESDP making is 
concerned with the formation and maintenance of certain interpretations of the policy at 
different levels.  
Against this background, the strategic actions taken by the Solana milieu should not be 
construed as calculated instrumental steps that address problems and identify goals, but 
should instead be problematised as political agency operating within mediating webs of 
interaction. The policy process is best approached here as being problem-finding: defining the 
world in such a way that known (or advocated) practices of governing represent appropriate 
responses. ‘Naming and framing’ (Rein and Schon 1994) is a central element in the 
constitution of the policy. This means that the identification and specification of policy 
concerns involve the interplay of different sets of understandings. As Giandomenico Majone 
(1989) argues, it is less like laboratory science than legal argument: a process of finding good 
reasons for doing things in situations where neither the nature of the problem nor the 
appropriate response is clear and unambiguous. With the participants struggling to get their 
language accepted rather than that of others, this process remains inherently contested (Gill 
and Colebatch 2006).  
In order to unpack the Solana milieu’s political action, I borrow from Neil Fligstein 
(1997) and Steven Lukes (1974). First, agency knowledge relies upon ‘taking what the system 
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gives’, which in turn implies social awareness of the system, the agency position within it and 
the possible channels of manoeuvre. If good fortune, however, offers up unplanned but 
potentially rewarding opportunities, the actors grab them even if uncertain as to the ultimate 
usefulness of the gain. This has been demonstrated by the Council Secretariat’s eager embrace 
of varied possibilities for the launching of missions. Second, we can track intense framing of 
action. As examined at length before, the milieu has organised a distinct interpretation of the 
EU security potentialities and responsibility. Third, within the inner debates among the 
member states, the Council Secretariat profiles itself as a cautious negotiator, creating an 
image of an honest broker. This pops up in the Council Secretariat’s handling of member 
states performance in the policy and its evaluation. While the necessity of acting together in a 
coherent way never leaves the agenda, the Council Secretariat is at pains not to antagonise the 
member states towards one another and towards the Council itself by explicitly attributing 
blame.  
Fourth, the Solana milieu will always ‘ask for more while settling for less’. This 
applies both to the CFSP budget and the member states’ political will. Accordingly, the stakes 
are repeatedly raised and the EU position habitually magnified in an attempt to put together 
what is ultimately a rather modest project. Fifth, and accordingly, the usual take is ‘trying five 
things to get one’, the expectation being that most things will fail but all one needs is a few 
victories to convince others. This must not be confused with reputational risk-taking. ESDP 
has the reputation of waiting for the right crisis to occur for the EU to engage. ESDP 
performers often ‘pick up’ the enemy according to the means at hand in the fear not to spoil 
the EU’s image through outright failure. In this context, trying multiple courses of action 
consists rather in exploring different possibilities within the scope identified as attainable. 
 Sixth, the Council Secretariat needs to engage in aggregating interests, i.e. it must find 
ways to persuade actors with widely different preferences. This aggregation process unfolds 
in the negotiations over various endeavours within ESDP and it usually takes on a life of its 
own as the Council Secretariat can hardly foretell the outcome of this social game. In this 
regard, it is revealing to observe how ESDP performers often admit that, setting off on a 
particular venture, they regularly ‘don’t know how it’s going to end’.40 Despite this humble 
working attitude, the aim of the endeavour is by no means ad hoc. It is instead strategic in the 
sense that it seeks ultimately to establish the EU as a viable security actor of a specific 
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character. In order to accomplish this, the domestic position has to be secured alongside the 
negotiation of an international identity with other players in world politics. Seventh, an 
indispensable quality of a strategically-driven actor is making others think they are in control. 
In this respect, it is crucial to observe how the perception on the part of national capitals that 
on the key issues in the second pillar it is they who are in control has proven instrumental to 
the development of ESDP.41  
The practical emancipation of the Council Secretariat from the member states can 
hardly go unnoticed, however. It is facilitated by the states’ wish to delegate power to the 
Council ‘informally’ on issues that require a degree of engagement and expertise they can ill 
afford. This is not to suggest that member states renounce their prerogatives. They like to 
view ESDP through national lenses and become active in ESDP decision-making when a 
region falling within their interest is on the agenda. Hence, the clichés of France’s dedication 
to Africa and of the preoccupation with post-Soviet space of the Eastern European members 
apply. The Council Secretariat is correspondingly conscious about this differentiation of 
concerns and never fails to acknowledge them, tacitly and behind-the-scenes if necessary or in 
a more conspicuous manner if that suits the situation at hand.  
Accordingly, the broader institutional machinery of ESDP should not be viewed in 
administrative terms only. Quite to the contrary, at the higher echelons of the administration, 
the work of civil servants is often highly political and administrators are more than neutral 
technicians (Duke and Vanhoonacker 2006: 164). Along these lines, the Policy Unit attached 
to the SG/HR, together with the Private Office comprising SG/HR advisors and special 
representatives for particular issues, may be seen as shells where major conceptual trends are 
begun and discursive repertoires elaborated in the pursuit of adequate ‘staging’ for ESDP. The 
SG/HR provides political entrepreneurship and handles generic issues of conceptual and 
operational nature, thereby mobilising the appropriate political capital. The Directorate-
General E in the Council Secretariat (External relations, politico-military affairs), and 
especially DGE 9 (civilian crisis management) and 8 (military crisis management) within the 
latter, shape the agenda in that general schemes are converted into specific operational plans 
and assessments.  
The position of DGE 9 should be stressed in this regard. Despite a modest depiction in 
the ESDP apparatus, its role has increased in connection with the rising number of civilian 
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operations. Within DGE 9, concrete operational and conceptual scenarios are drafted. Not 
only are exploratory and fact-finding missions prepared here but so are concepts of operations 
and operational plans. Since ESDP ‘inherited’ military scenarios from the WEU, in DGE 9 
they had to be converted into civilian schemes which involved a substantial amount of 
interpretive and innovative work. Despite a rather technical task description, then, DGE 9 
proved politically instrumental in the process of launching a number of operations.  
Another crucial dimension related to the positioning of DGE 9 is the in-house 
evaluation of civilian missions. Drafting evaluations and lessons learned constitutes a 
fundamental element of ESDP. By generating certain logics regarding the depiction of 
operations and their practices, together with setting specific means of measuring success, the 
evaluations generate institutional vocabularies and modus operandi that in turn contribute to 
the overall picture of the policy. This has its particular significance due to the fact that DGE 9 
reports are subsequently distributed to the national representative bodies, i.e. the PSC and 
CIVCOM. As the basis for discussion, these become framing reference points, and a 
seemingly merely administrative body thus effectively contributes to the establishment of a 
specific institutional identity.   
 The member states’s counterpart to DGE 9, and a body with similarly increased 
operationability, is CIVCOM, where the political debates take place sensu stricte. The 
intensification of work via the multiplication of missions has contributed to CIVCOM gaining 
considerable significance in ESDP making. As the PSC is overburdened with large quantities 
of decisions in need of being taken, the groundwork concerning civilian missions is 
predominantly performed by CIVCOM. As estimated by a national representative to the body, 
approximately 80% of decisions are de facto taken at the level of CIVCOM, with the PSC 
merely sanctioning the provisions.42 Further, owing to their inundation with activities 
regarding deployments, the states, which have no national expertise in certain areas or hold an 
undecided positions towards some regions, rely on the Council Secretariat (and effectively on 
DGE 9 as regards civilian missions and DGE 8 for military operations), both in terms of 
presenting initiatives and formulating political positions. Incapable of acquiring first-hand 
accounts if they lack dense diplomatic networks in the country of a specific ESDP 
intervention, they further depend on the reports compiled within the Council Secretariat. 
These hinge on the vernacular, which unfolds according to the tacit rules of the milieu and 
thus reveals as much as it conceals. Accordingly, grasping the interactional link between 
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CIVCOM and the DGE 9 appears crucial for understanding how these two co-constitute their 
agendas.  
 While emphasising the knowledgeability and effectiveness of those shaping ESDP, 
one should not lose sight of the enabling conditions that have allowed for the emergence of 
this agency in the first place. Advantageously for the ‘Solana milieu’, the organizational field 
of EU security and crisis management was barely structured. The EU had previously shied 
away from tangible defence initiatives, with the Commission engaged in tasks of a 
development assistance character and, externally, NATO as a defence alliance. Still, initiating 
change proved a competitive activity, better described as ‘warfare’ than a textbook account of 
the policy-making process.  
 
Turfing – the major contestant 
Formally, the Commission representative to CIVCOM is tasked with ensuring coherence 
between pillars I and II, or, more generally, securing coherence of the EU external action at 
large.43 Some, however, have connected the Commission’s position in CIVCOM with the 
assignment to prevent Council encroachment upon Commission competences.  
 ESDP’s deep intrusion into the area of civilian crisis management has caused explicit 
frictions with the Commission, which until not long ago regarded promotion of rule of law 
and institution-building as its exclusive competence. The Commission’s institutional 
resentment of the encroachment of ESDP on its turf is further aggravated by the current trend 
that has seen the Council reclaim political influence it had previously ceded to the 
supranational body. In response, the Commission seeks to be involved at every stage of the 
ESDP policy cycle. This is facilitated by, first, its role as a budget manager and executor of 
civilian ESDP and, second, its mandate to ensure consistency and procedural integrity of EU 
external action at every level of CFSP. In practical terms, the involvement of the Commission 
becomes politically tangible in the course of negotiating the formats of particular civilian 
missions as well as their budgets and adherence to procurement policy rules. Each time a 
civilian mission is planned, negotiations over its format between the Commission and the 
Council begin from scratch as no template of co-operation has been agreed as of yet.44
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In this context, ESDP making in the realm of rule of law is inherently difficult and 
remains contentious. On the part of the Commission, ESDP rule of law missions are a touchy 
subject.45 Whereas border monitoring or police missions are more understandably dealt with 
by member states, rule of law as an area of a systemic change requiring long-term  
engagement, is seen by the Commission as its own realm of activity.46 The pre-launch 
negotiations between it and the Secretariat General on the Border Assistance Mission to 
Ukraine/Moldova (EUBAM) demonstrated, however, that this assertion cannot be 
extrapolated automatically. The conception and launching of EUBAM proceeded in the 
context of intense Council-Commission bargaining over its structure and leadership.47  
The accounts as to the institutional origin of the mission remain characteristically at 
odds with each other. Council sources maintain that the mission was initially conceived as a 
purely ESDP operation,48 while the Commission asserts that the genesis of the mission 
originates in 2003 and that it was a desk officer in Relex that recognised the opportunity to 
build on the momentum created by the Orange Revolution. This was to spark internal debates 
in the EC in Spring 2005, parallel to the Council’s attempts at seizing the opportunity for 
deployment.49  
EUBAM clearly afforded the Commission an important means to engage in a 
substantial significant manner and burnish its institutional image. The Commission thus went 
to great lengths to profile the enterprise and its own aptness for implementing it. In addition to 
the substantial conceptual work on projecting the mission and the intense institutional 
lobbying to secure its ownership, it employed two arguments against the Council, which was 
seeking to take charge of the intervention.50 First, the operation did not foresee a military 
element and, second, the Commission was already heavily engaged in the region, including in 
projects of similar character, and was therefore allegedly better placed to take on the task.  
Ultimately, the Council ascribed its fiasco in taking ownership of EUBAM to a lack of 
funds in the CFSP budget and the mission was launched via the Commission’s Rapid 
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Reaction Mechanism (RRM).51 The necessity to establish and deploy rapidly in order to 
“seize the window of opportunity that may not last long” looms large in all EC documents 
justifying the action.52 Although there were discussions about the Council taking over the 
operation in late 2005, it has now become the EC flagship enterprise in this field,53 an 
exemplar demonstrating that the Commission is equally able to seize the opportunity to 
deploy a highly sensitive crisis management-type mission.54 In this respect, EUBAM is 
emblematic of the identity mêlée between the Commission and the Solana milieu. As a 
significant achievement of the former in upgrading its institutional standing, EUBAM is 
viewed in the Council Secretariat as a fleeting if clever victory by the Commission, exploiting 
the ESDP initial failure to include comprehensive border monitoring concepts in its civilian 
repertoire.55  
A number of member states strongly opposed the idea of the Commission taking 
charge of EUBAM as an unwelcome precedent for first pillar encroachment onto the 
Council’s turf. Consequently, the political formula and organisational structure of the mission 
had to be arranged in such a way as to alleviate these concerns and produce arrangements 
digestible for the hesitant, or openly belligerent member states.56 Functionaries involved in 
preparing the operation accordingly put a lot of effort into solving this predicament. This gave 
rise to an innovative use of the notion of double-hatting at the level of a project, together with 
a multilayered mission structure, obscuring the de-facto Commission ownership of EUBAM 
and procuring an impression of Council supervision over the enterprise.  
To satiate the desire for the Council political oversight, the Head of the Mission 
(HoM) was cast in the role of senior political advisor to the EU Special Representative 
(EUSR) to Moldova and put in charge of an enhanced support team on border monitoring 
assigned to the EUSR. The team comprises three other diplomats, seconded from member 
states, located respectively in Odesa (EUBAM headquarters), and in the EC Delegations in 
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Chisinau and Kyiv. The Joint Action on the mandate of the EUSR was accordingly amended 
in order to accommodate ‘the new tasks of the EUSR for Moldova in relation to the EU 
Border Mission for Moldova-Ukraine [which is designed] to enhance the effectiveness of 
border and customs controls and border surveillance activities in Moldova and Ukraine along 
their common border, with a particular focus on the Transnistrian section, notably through an 
EU Border Mission.’(Council of the EU 2005).  
In practice, however, the EUSR team appear detached from both the daily and 
strategic conduct of EUBAM. Although in accordance with their job description the 
diplomats provide some contextual input, they generally focus on acting as liaisons for 
political issues between the mission and the EUSR and Brussels. Their isolation or exclusion 
from EUBAM decision making processes is further reflected in their concentration on the 5+2 
Transnistria settlement talks.57
In terms of external management, EUBAM is supervised by Relex and the EC 
Delegation to Ukraine and Belarus, located in Kyiv. It is also fair to say that the mission has, 
similar to many ESDP operations, evolved into a somewhat self-sustaining entity with an 
elaborate internal structure. The chain of command has been designed as obscure from the 
beginning. This allows the mission’s management to report directly to Brussels, 
circumventing the EUSR link and satisfying the Commission’s need for control.  
 Fundamentally, it is important to recognise in what ways the realm of civilian crisis 
management offers political opportunities potentially accessible to both the Council and the 
Commission. This induces struggles over the definition of a given political situation and the 
applicability of instruments at the disposal of one actor as opposed to the other. When the 
EUBAM opening emerged, the Commission’s chagrin towards the Council’s endeavours in 
this field was additionally mounting as a result of the clash over the launch of Aceh 
Monitoring Mission (see the discussion below). I further elaborate on two areas depicting this 
political tussle, the channels of financing civilian ESDP operation into which the EC is 
directly involved, and the context of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), the newly 
designed instrument in the EU external repertoire, largely administered by the Commission.  
 
Money talks 
The general rule under Article 28 TEU is that all expenses, administrative and operational, to 
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which the Union’s CFSP activities give rise, are to be charged to the budget of the European 
Communities. However, there are two exceptions to the general rule as it applies to 
operational CFSP costs under Article 28 TEU. First, operational costs arising from operations 
having military and defence implications – OMDIs58 – are not charged to the EC budget. 
Second, the Council, acting unanimously under the first sub-paragraph of Article 28(3) TEU, 
can decide that other operational costs specified by it are not to be charged to the EC budget 
(Scannel 2004: 529). If the latter is the case, the expenditure can either be charged to the 
member states as common costs in accordance with the gross national product scale, or the 
Council, acting unanimously, will decide to charge the expenditure on some other basis. 
Fundamentally, however, it is the Commission that is in charge of the execution of the budget 
if the Council does not decide to finance a civilian operation from other sources. This allows 
the Commission direct involvement in shaping the civilian ESDP and has been often resisted 
by member states who guard the second pillar realm from the EC advances.  
The actual practice of financing the EU’s foreign enterprises is still more nuanced and 
subject to ad hoc political arrangements. The activity of CFSP special representatives 
(EUSRs)—Solana’s envoys to regions under EU (professed) ‘surveillance’—is financed 
through various different means. In principle, they fall under the CFSP’s budgetary chapter 
(as ‘administrative’ expenditure) and the exclusive supervision of the Council, following a 
Council decision of 30 March 2000. In practice, however, they are often financed in a mixed 
and improvised way, combining: a) funds formally earmarked for first-pillar regional 
programmes; b) the Community emergency reserve fund; c) more or less explicit national 
secondments and contributions (Missiroli 2006: 46). Further, exploratory and fact-finding 
mission are mostly financed through the Commission. This is because the funding of any 
operation can only be secured by a Joint Action, approved unanimously by the Council and 
commonly agreed upon when all the groundwork for a particular mission has already been 
completed.  
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This tangled and often confusing fuzzy state of affairs adds to the enhanced role of 
politics proper, i.e. the more or less explicitly political effort to sway negotiations in such a 
way that enables the realisation of the actor’s projects. The ongoing political entanglements 
further engender institutional identities based on differentiating one’s practices as compared 
with the other’s. Two precedents from the institutional mêlée between the Council and the 
Commission are illustrative of this process.  
The launch of the Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM) in the summer of 2005 is a 
particularly prominent example. At the time of the debate over a possible EU deployment, the 
CFSP budgetary chapter had already been almost entirely allocated. The Commission saw this 
as an opportunity to offer its services. The Council and the Commission then initially 
considered the funding of the so-called Initial Monitoring Presence (IMP) in Aceh. 
Controversy erupted over the Commission’s offer to make extra funds available from its 
Rapid Reaction Mechanism (RRM) and its Asia and Latin America Programme and to 
transfer them to a prospective ‘framework’ member state, which would lead the EU’s civilian 
operation in the region. Bitter confrontation between the legal services of the Council and the 
Commission ensued. The Council lawyers objected that there was no legal basis for such 
action. They framed it in political terms as a hostile takeover aimed at setting a dangerous 
precedent which might affect the Council’s political control prerogatives, notably the PSC 
jurisdiction competences over ESDP operations (Missiroli 2006: 47). The outcome was the 
rejection of the Commission’s proposal to re-allocate its funds for the IMP, despite the fact 
that this would have alleviated the challenges stemming from CFSP’s limited budgetary 
resources, on the grounds that it would entail excessive involvement of the Commission in the 
operation.  
 In revenge, not only did the Commission take the Council to court on a related issue 
but in the subsequent case of the operation to Rafah Crossing Point it also decided to refrain 
from offering its funds, although it might have reallocated resources from the fund for the 
Palestinian Authority.59 Since the CFSP budget was already exhausted for that year, the 
member states were compelled to contribute all the money in advance. The urge to lunch the 
mission was such, however, that the UK Presidency declared its willingness to put forward 
the money in order to materialise the enterprise.60 Yet in principle it is currently hardly 
imaginable that the Commission should refuse financing some significant ESDP projects on 
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unfounded pretext. This would raise criticism of institutional obstruction and hindering the 
EU’s rise to international stardom,61 a kind of defiance the Commission cannot afford in the 
light of the Council’s present position in the system. 
The financial realm hence remains a playground of institutional identity building in 
that it requires active and continuous involvement of the actors. The Commission is hardly 
passive in this image management contest. Prudent about its competences, it launches 
initiatives that seek to strengthen its position. In search of becoming a more effective player in 
crisis management, in 2002 the Commission set up a new financial instrument for short-term 
actions, the ‘Rapid Reaction Mechanism’ (RRM), and loosened up the rules for using the 
emergency reserve funds. Some read this move as contributing to a more efficient EU action 
in international politics by facilitating financing varied, also second-pillar, projects in a 
flexible manner. With the institutional competition now well entrenched, this initiative was 
seen by others as an attempt by the Commission to maintain the pace of the development of 
ESDP.62 In January 2007, the RRM mechanism was replaced by the Stability Instrument (SI), 
a new financial mechanism of the Commission. The name itself is clearly reflective of the 
Commission’s vocabulary, and the SI triggered yet another spell of intense discussion over 
whether instead of being ad hoc the mechanism could be more steadily involved in financing 
civilian crisis management within ESDP. It was reported that the response on the Council was 
definitively negative, once again bringing up the apprehension to not allow the EC to affect 
the political control of the second pillar.63
 The financial entanglement between the Council and the Commission finds its 
expression on the ground of ESDP operations through procurement policy provisions ordered 
by the Commission Regulation (EC, EURATOM No 1261/2005 of 20 July 2005). Since 
ESDP operations are mostly short-term ones it is crucial to insure rapid procurement in order 
to have equipment available at the onset of operations. Many missions were nevertheless 
forced to delay considerably their work due to procurement problems.64 In Themis, this 
resulted in the severe hold-up of the mission as the experts had no computers or other 
immediately necessary equipment. This subsequently became a point of resentment towards 
the Commission in general, the latter charged with wittingly hindering the development of the 
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mission as revenge for its deployment.65 While this may not be sustainable, many interpret 
ESDP as potentially threatening for the Commission and thereby secretly earmarked to be 
thwarted, if not in overt institutional confrontation, then by clandestine means.  
 
The Commission turns the table in court and politics 
As early as 1999, the legal service of the Community interpreted the principles of competence 
in the Treaty on the European Union as following first of all the pre-eminence of community 
interests. It thereby considered CFSP to be complementary to first pillar activities: “les 
relations Communauté-PESC au sein de l’Union sont gouvernées par le principe de 
préeminence et de non-parallélisme” (European Commission Legal Service 1999: 5). This has 
become the basis for defending Community competences in lawsuits. In the recent action 
brought against the Council before the EU Court of Justice (ECJ) in February 2005 (Case C-
91/05), the Commission argued that actions taken by the Council to combat the spread of 
small arms infringe on Community competences under article 47 of TEU66 since they affect 
Community powers in the field of developmental aid. Relating to the Council’s contribution 
to the implementation of projects in the framework of the ‘ECOWAS Moratorium on the 
Import, Export and Manufacture of Small Arms and Light Weapons’, the Commission stated 
specifically that the EC’s Cotonou agreement covers actions against the spread of light 
weapons and that a regional programme for supporting West Africa in this aim had already 
been concluded under EC competences. Therefore, the Commission seeks ‘annulment for lack 
of competence’ based on Article 47 TEU, since ‘the impugned CFSP decision […] affects the 
Community powers in the field of development aid’.67  
 The proceedings of this case have not been made public, but the case itself is 
indicative of the Commission’s attempts to roll back the Council’s infringements of its 
competences. Importantly however, development cooperation remains a shared competence 
under the Treaty provisions. Article 177 TEU attributes to the Community a (shared) 
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competence to foster ‘social development of the developing countries.’ It follows that 
member states are thus entitled to act both alone and collectively outside of the Community, 
which may arise to an action taken in the form of an ESDP operation. Conversely, the Council 
may also argue that any security-related issues belong to the second pillar competence area 
and should be dealt with by member states. This litigation illustrates how the struggle over the 
meaning of security/development nexus features at the core of the Council and Commission’s 
institutional identity-building processes, and how this takes the form of battles over 
competences. The case outcome should also be considered crucial in this respect as it will 
present the legal interpretation of this radically ambiguous situation.  
The Commission, meanwhile, has realised that while legal action is significant, it may 
not be the most efficient weapon in the political struggle with the Council as the latter 
operates according to largely un-codified practices. This learning process has resulted in the 
seizure of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) as the embodiment of the 
Commission’s conceptual stance on how best to project order and security to the EU’s 
periphery. A comprehensive attempt to emulate the robust ESDP venture, the ENP is a way 
for the Commission to upgrade its profile in the field of external policy, i.e., it is the 
realisation of a certain political project. The objective of the ENP as articulated by the 
Commission is for the EU to act coherently and efficiently in the world by integrating related 
components from all three pillars. As such, it should also support efforts to realise the goals of 
the ESS (Communication from the Commission 2004: 6). In practice, however, things may 
turn out differently. Rule of law reforms in Georgia illustrate this point. The Council decided 
that after the mandate of Themis expired, CFSP should remain engaged in providing 
assistance to the judicial sector. The office of the EUSR responsible for the Southern 
Caucasus was tasked to monitor, and assist the Georgian government in the implementation of 
the Strategy for Criminal Law Reform, which had been drafted with the help of Themis. The 
European Commission, in turn, helped the government to put together the action plan to meet 
the ENP requirements and thus become eligible for receiving benefits on offer under the 
policy. Yet, once the Strategy was, at the request of Tbilisi, incorporated into the action plan, 
the European Commission representatives on the ground claimed primary responsibility for 
the project and marginalised the role of the EUSR in the process.68 Conventionally attributed 
to incoherence and turf battles, this can alternatively be seen as a consequence of the rise of 
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intra-EU politics in the construction of EU external policy, a politics fuelled by distinct 
institutional identities and different visions of the EU’s role in international security.  
  
ESDP as the EU domestic politics – conclusion  
The chapter has dealt with the question of how the ESDP security claim has been enacted. By 
delineating the political milieu where the policy is framed, mediated and resisted, I identify its 
major actors/contestants, the field of action and the rules of the policy’s game. I conclude that 
a security policy addressed towards the outside of the polity has consolidated the development 
of institutional identities on the internal arena, and thus boosted domestic politics. This might 
illustrate a broader phenomenon where any security policy is more a reflection of a given 
polity’s identity than it is a timely response to the threats of the day. 
Drawing on the traditional narrative of European security, ESDP’s major performers 
have successfully managed to introduce ‘new vocabularies’ to the EU’s security repertoire 
and to establish novel practices of ‘doing’ security by the EU. This ideational ‘takeoff’ about 
the EU’s security role would have never translated into tangible policy initiatives if it had not 
been for skilful agency that, by endowing the EU with a new sense of mission and 
establishing some organising principles of doing ESDP, bestowed meanings on new 
scenarios. Facilitated institutionally by a number of assisting bodies, this political endeavour 
encountered resistance in the EU system of governance. Likewise, internally within the 
second pillar the Council Secretariat constantly engages in the strategic action of promoting 
the ESDP project in the face of the member states’ particular agendas.  
 Fundamentally, I illustrate how the EU mode of securitisation obtains its unique 
features that effectually trespass the tenets of securitisation theory. The latter presumes the 
disappearance of politics the moment security concerns enter the picture. Security being a 
matter of survival, it calls for extraordinary means that deactivate the political. In ESDP 
making, conversely, securitising the EU as a symbol and embodiment of particular values 
gives rise to the reverse phenomenon. Domestically, a distinct political institutional struggle is 
consolidated. In this respect, the policy has produced a common framework within which the 
institutional conflict has been placed in sharper focus. The contest over ESDP mobilises and 
reflects the Community and the CFSP pillars functioning according to differing working 
philosophies. This has to do not only with the fact that the Commission is a supranational 
body while CFSP is an intergovernmental policy, but also with the increasingly diverging 
ideational principles sustaining their institutional identity. The two institutional entities hold 
 
 
108
disparate standpoints on best practices in crisis management. Their policies and channels of 
implementation accordingly reveal contrasting beliefs about the image of the EU as an 
international actor, including dissimilar security conceptions. Although they essentially agree 
on what is to be achieved to make the world a better place – the usual ‘European’ values of 
democracy, rule of law, etc. apply – they nonetheless characteristically diverge on the matter 
of best strategies, means and practices to reach the ideal state.   
 Conceptually, whereas the Commission inhabits the world of ‘civilian power Europe’, 
even if modified in accordance with the changing historical conditions, the Solana milieu has 
ventured to make the EU a ‘militarised civilian power’. Believing such a transformation is the 
proper response to the exigencies of a globalised world, Solana, as the personification of EU 
foreign policy, represents the new trend of the EU’s ‘coming of age’ and its shedding of the 
clothing of a civilian power only. He generally advocates an approach according to which the 
security situation has to be stabilized before major long-term development assistance can be 
initiated. He further favours high-profile political action, which should generate substantial 
even if cursory political capital with immediate impact in a particular environment. Because 
of the large publicity they generate, military and civilian missions have become the cutting 
edge of ESDP, its essence and, simultaneously, a vehicle for implementing ‘militarised 
civilian power’. This notion was codified in the ESS – a manifesto of Solana’s vision of the 
international security role of the EU. In this context, member states constitute an enabling and 
accommodating if at times contending audience to the ESDP enterprise. Despite differing 
positions on security issues and the repeated curbing of the Solana milieu on contentious 
questions, they still exhibit far-reaching reliance on the Council Secretariat and extensive 
willingness to delegate as they approve of its pursuits.  
 A significant contestant to the ESDP venture, the EC seeks emulation through such 
initiatives as the ENP, the result being the consolidation of institutional identities involved. A 
historical background to this institutional struggle is instructive here. It brings out how the 
Solana milieu builds its position via contesting the principles at the heart of the Community 
identity. Cris Shore furnishes an important study of the EC institutional identity, or, in his 
vocabulary, political culture (2000: 132-145). Historically, the EC has grown to cherish 
certain concepts constitutive of its ethos, namely its legalism, the legacy of its supranational 
aspirations and its wide-ranging functions. As Shore argues, they provide the rationale for 
virtually everything it does (Ibid, 132). Profoundly legalistic in its nature, the EC seeks 
legitimacy by always providing a legal basis for its action. It further treasures its much-
acclaimed status of supragovernmetality, seen as symbolising the originality of the EU 
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governance. A potent term in the EC self-definition, supranationality together with aquis 
communautaire seems endowed with special meaning as the embodiment of the EU, which 
the EC represents. The third characteristic in the EC’s identity is the complex array of 
functions it performs. The Treaties give the EC three specific powers and duties: to initiate the 
process and act as a ‘motor’ for European integration, to act as ‘guardian of the Treaties’ and 
‘enforcer of Community law’, and to implement Community policies (Ibid, 142). 
 This basis has granted the EC a powerful position in the EU governance system, 
hardly constrained to a technical function. The development of ESDP instigated by the 
‘Solana milieu’ has dealt a heavy blow to this posture, not only in terms of formal reshuffle 
but also vis-à-vis the EC’s ideals. Vitally, the construction of the policy has only narrowly 
and in the most formal dimension relied on legal means. In contrast to the EC Treaty, which 
endows the Commission with very specific competences confined to what has been delegated 
to it by the member states, the Treaty on the European Union (TEU) regulating the second 
pillar’s competences and broadly sketching CFSP’s objectives (art. 11) hardly circumscribes 
political action. Whereas the Commission is obliged to justify its proceedings by indicating 
the correct, and only exceptionally multiply, legal basis, the CFSP pillar’s only constraint is 
article 47 of TEU, which protects the Commission’s competences. This can be traced back to 
the early days of creating the CFSP’s predecessor bodies, considered as an international law 
tool rather than regular institutions requiring legal demarcation.69 ESDP performers explicitly 
foreground the pragmatic character of their project whose priority they see in its effectiveness, 
not necessarily synonymous with legal purity. The EC, in contrast, seems to underestimate the 
political aspect of this foreign to its character phenomenon. This finds its expression in 
comments amounting to the formulations that until any decision is ratified, it is not valid.70 
Obviously true as this remains, it reveals conspicuous disregard for political dimension. 
Along these lines, the inherent politicisation of the CFSP pillar is viewed with derision by the 
EC as contributing little to furthering the EU project at large. Instead, the ESDP’s 
performance and in particular ESDP operations are seen as ‘toys of the member states’ and 
‘drops in the ocean’ as compared to the EC long-term endeavours.71  
                                                 
 
69 Interview with professor Marise Cremona, Florence, 11 September 2007. 
70 Expressed in jest as a reaction to the PSC decision to prolong and extend the mandate of Lex in April 2006. 
Interview with a desk officer in Relex, EC, Brussels, April 2006. Formally, such a decision needs to be 
stipulated by a Joint Action to enable implementation. Factually, the Lex team certainly began preparations for 
extending its capacities immediately after (and most probably before) the PSC decision. The latter was 
interpreted as confirming the mission success that far and the member states’ trust in building upon its good 
performance. Thus, it added to creating certain picture of Lex quite apart from the Joint Action to follow.  
71 Ibid. 
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 This distinct juxtaposition of the EC legalism versus the CFSP/ESDP politicisation 
looms large in the institutional discourses. Not surprisingly, the two bodies attach different 
meanings to these concepts and see contradictory implications of their application. 
Evocatively, while the EC appreciates its legalistic culture as a licence to rightful action, in 
the second pillar it is associated with hindering and diluting worthy initiatives, on occasion 
deliberately. The ‘Solana milieu’ links this legalism to the technical and administrative nature 
of the EC activity, a conception, which amounts to the denial of the EC political impact in 
third countries, despite its long-term involvement there. In contrast, the political flexibility of 
the second pillar is acclaimed as facilitating swift action and providing for the high political 
profile of the pillar’s undertakings, promptly delivering on what the EC is incapable of. This 
breeds resentment in the Commission that views its projects as inducing systemic changes in 
fragile communities.72 Politicisation is construed here as a major obstacle to the effective EU 
performance on the ground. 
 The meanings attached to supra- versus inter-governmentality further illustrate 
ideational differentiation across pillars. The robust unfolding of ESDP resists the necessity of 
supranationality for an effective design and implementation of an EU policy. In fact, formal 
intergovernmentalty seems to have been a sine qua non condition of the policy, allowing the 
member states a sense of control and thus generating their willingness to engage. With 
ESDP’s portrayal as a success story, one of the constituting blocks of the EC’s institutional 
ethos—the significance of supragovernmetality for furthering the EU project—is brought into 
question. As Shore concludes, “the Commission functionaries see themselves in grand 
political terms as ‘policy makers’,  ‘innovators’, ‘intellectuals’ and ‘architects ’of the new 
European order whom the Treaties had proclaimed ‘custodians of the European interest” 
(2000:145). The label ‘Community’ for designating first pillar activities is distinctive here. 
ESDP’s stardom clearly disrupts this established picture, particularly so as the realm of the 
CFSP is excluded from the EC supervision, common in other areas. Bitterness lingers on in 
the EU system of governance.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
72 Interview with the EC representative to the CIVCOM, Brussels, 24 November 2005. 
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CHAPTER IV   ESDP IN ACTION, OR, WHAT EU SECURITY PRACTICES 
EMERGE  
 
Planners should think of themselves as characters in a larger story that they are helping to 
construct, and they should strive to act in a manner that is consistent with the characters 
invoked by their story. Planning is persuasive storytelling about the future, and competing 
stories abound. (Throgmorton 1996) 
 
In this fourth chapter I map out (security) practices enacted in the process of establishing 
ESDP. The domain itself, largely if loosely institutionalised as it is, is constituted through 
language and strategic games engendering concrete though often un-codified practices. In 
order to uncover these practices, I provide an in-depth story of two ESDP operations and a 
related account of a non-deployment. I examine the material against the background of other 
ESDP missions and activities so as to illustrate the regularities of the policy’s application. 
Before unfolding the substance of concrete narratives, however, I present the heuristic schema 
that structures the analysis.  
 
Setting the stage for the analysis 
The arrangement of the case analysis and the different manner of narrating Themis and Lex 
merit attention, since these cases are both studies tout court and case studies of something 
more general. Consequently, it is constructive if examples chosen are relatively evenly 
structured. This hardly corresponds, however, to the character of the social world whose 
diversity demands that substantial analytical imposition if structural evenness is the ideal. In 
the research, I sought to acknowledge the complexity of social life and had thus to choose 
different ways of narrating the cases. Nevertheless, I attempted to bring out both the 
differentiation across them and their simultaneous reflection of patterns within the 
policymaking. In operational terms, Lex offered more leeway to investigate the Brussels-
based elements of ESDP making, while Themis furnished a fruitful illustration of the ‘on the 
ground’ aspects. These two dimensions taken together afforded a useful reading of the 
institutional discourse over ESDP. 
In order to systematise the analysis, I rely on a schema through which to study the 
missions. Ideationally, in the pre-launch phase of a mission I track how the link between a 
mission and the EU security is portrayed. More specifically, I look into:  
1. the arguments presented in favour and against a mission;  
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2. how it is argued that a particular deployment reflects (or does not reflect) 
security interests of the EU;  
3. if and whether a specific role of the EU in international security is invoked in 
the debates. 
In terms of the institutional dimension, I examine:  
1. where, institutionally-speaking, the idea of a mission emerged and where it was 
honed; 
2. what justification that a mission should (or should not) be launched within 
ESDP is given and what institutional interfaces can be thereby mapped out; 
3. how a particular organisational set-up of a mission is justified concerning its 
broader security aims. 
These should help elicit arguments pertaining to the role of the EU as a security actor. 
In this context, I look for:   
1. if the uniqueness of the EU’s approach to security is evoked and stressed in 
comparison with other participants in the international interaction. This should be the case if 
the unique capabilities in the realm of security are regularly recalled; 
2. if the ‘European values’ and (superior) mode of governance are brought into 
play in order to make sense of the policy. This should be the case if security engagement is 
justified by the necessity to project abroad the European model that made the EU an area of 
peace and wealth;  
3. if the expectations of the outside are brought up so as to support an 
engagement. This should be the case if the activities are portrayed as a means to match the 
expectations that the EU perceives are assigned to it; 
4. how the debates over a mission are influenced by the EU’s positioning towards 
the US. In this case, if security engagement is decided upon in response to the arguments for 
burden-sharing with the US, or, quite to the contrary, if it is backed by the claims that the EU 
should strive towards an autonomous role. This dichotomy being a convention derived from 
the literature, analysing the EU-US positioning I should be able to sketch a more nuanced 
picture of that crucial relationship.  
 
Within the analysis, I place significant emphasis on the pre-launch phase of a mission 
when a formal decision has not yet been made public (neither to internal institutional 
audiences nor to the European international public) but the EU security claim does become 
enacted in that certain ideational resources are drawn and acted upon. Similarly, this phase is 
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particularly indicative of the tacit institutional practices endemic to the policy. How the 
choice of a particular mission is performed, how it is negotiated and finalised draw out the un-
codified ways of doing politics within the particular context of ESDP. Here, the preliminary 
political confrontation takes place when opportunities to engage, theoretically open to varied 
actors, are seized by some and thereby refused to others. In light of the empirical record, it is 
premature to claim that the proliferation of ESDP missions implies a second-pillarization of 
EU crisis management and the unequivocal victory of ESDP performers. Rather, political 
struggles are in full swing with both pillars strategically employing different media and 
channels to affirm their respective institutional distinctiveness in external action. The concept 
of emulation is useful to account for this process. Emulation does not refer here to an attempt 
to imitate or copy but points to a political contest over how to frame reality. Opportunities for 
engagement open to both pillars give rise to battles over the definition of situations and issues 
and, consequently, the choice of appropriate policy instruments.  
 Beyond the pre-launch phase, the implementation stage further shows more clearly the 
contours of the institutional interface as much as it reveals how particular operations acquire 
dynamics on their own. The initial tussle having been decided in terms of formal institutional 
arrangements, the character of the institutional interaction is not yet determined and the 
possibilities of both intense cooperation and enhanced rivalry are equally likely to emerge. 
The moment of closing or transforming an operation brings in the notion of the follow-up 
‘within the EU family’, a concept which aptly conveys the tensions involved.  
 
EUJUST THEMIS – testing the rule of law concept 
Georgia – before and after the spell of the Rose Revolution 
Before the Rose Revolution, Georgia had a corrupt government run by a former Soviet 
foreign minister, Eduard Shevardnadze. He had failed to initiate the fundamental institutional 
reforms necessary for the economic and political modernisation of the country. As a result, it 
was hardly a state at all, as The Economist (2003) put it, but more a loose association of fiefs. 
One of the few positive features of pre-revolutionary Georgia was that unlike the mass media 
in other post-Soviet republics, those of Georgia were relatively free from official censorship. 
In the wake of the Rose Revolution, reforms of the economy and the political system were set 
in motion. Yet the country’s road to stability and good governance remains severely affected 
by the lack of central control over the two separatist republics of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, 
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neither of which is recognized by the international community. These frozen conflicts are at 
the source of Georgia’s difficult relations with Russia. Moscow has been actively boosting the 
secessionist aspirations of the two regions; a policy that many Georgians think is a 
punishment for their distinctly pro-Western inclinations. The situation is further complicated 
by the fact that Georgia is an important link in the energy corridor connecting the Caspian Sea 
to the Mediterranean. Its geo-strategic importance for Western energy security 
notwithstanding, Tbilisi has little voice say in the ‘great game’ played by the major powers 
global and regional) in the conflict-ridden regions of the Caucasus and Central Asia – ‘the 
Balkans of Eurasia’ as Zbigniew Brzeziński (1997: 123-4) aptly calls them. In the same vein, 
James Cohen mapped the intersection of geopolitical interests in the South Caucasus as a 
landscape of inner and outer circles. Within the former, he placed the traditional involvement 
of the Tsar’s Russia, the USSR and at present Russian Federation, together with Iran and 
Turkey; within the latter, the main actors are to be the US and the EU (Cohen 2000: 11). 
 Throughout the 1990s, the EU’s approach to Georgia was the same as its 
approach to other former Soviet countries. Brussels signed a Partnership and Co-operation 
Agreement with Georgia and the European Commission provided technical and financial 
assistance under its TACIS programme. Georgia also participated in other regional EU 
frameworks such as TRACECA – the Europe-Caucasus-Asia transportation corridor – and the 
INOGATE programme designed to support co-operation in the area of oil and gas 
infrastructure. In 1998, the Commission chose Tbilisi as the most suitable location for its 
delegation in the region. Drafted initially in 2001 and then revised in 2003, the European 
Commission Country Strategy paper for Georgia indicated the priority areas of co-operation: 
rule of law and good governance, human rights, poverty reduction, conflict prevention and 
resolution and post-conflict rehabilitation (European Commission 2003). Since April 2001, 
the Commission has been an observer in the Joint Commission overseeing the Russian-led 
peacekeeping operation in South Ossetia. Its overall financial assistance to Georgia amounted 
to no more than 420 million Euros between 1992 and 2004 (European Commission 2005). 
Last but not least, the limited engagement of the European Commission in pre-revolutionary 
Georgia is underlined by its initial refusal to include the country and its neighbours in the 
European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP).73
The footprint of the EU Council in Georgia before 2003 was equally light. The 
Swedish presidency in the first half of 2001 declared the Southern Caucasus one of its 
                                                 
 
73 For comprehensive discussion see Dov Lynch (2003).   
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priorities and produced a paper calling for a major review of extant policy (Lynch 2006: 61). 
External Relations Commissioner Chris Patten and Swedish foreign minister Anna Lindh 
published an article in the Financial Times (2001) insisting that ‘the EU cannot afford to 
neglect the South Caucasus’, and that Brussels should play a more assertive role in the region 
in order to contribute to the settlement of its many territorial conflicts. The EU Council took 
up this call and publicly declared its intention to pay more attention to the Southern Caucasus 
(Council of the EU 2001). The political deliberation that followed culminated in the 
designation of an EUSR for the region. Headquartered in Helsinki (!), the Finnish diplomat 
Heiki Talviti was mandated to increase the Union’s political profile in the area and support 
international efforts to secure regional co-operation and the settlement of the frozen conflicts 
(Council of the EU 2003). Tbilisi was not overwhelmed by the demarche. It soon began to 
criticise the EUSR for his inconspicuous role and his tendency to avoid any decisive action 
(rhetorical or otherwise), especially if it could antagonise Russia.74 Others, however, regarded 
his conduct as being appropriate for an honest broker seeking to resolve an entrenched 
conflict.75 The initial refusal towards the region in the ENP and the subsequent diffident 
enlargement of the EU agenda in the region similarly show the hesitant position of the EU 
towards the South Caucasus. Yet this also reflects the evolving debate on the region within 
EU thinking.76  
 The Rose Revolution in November 2003 provided a genuine political opening in 
Georgia, an opportunity to reshape the fate of the country. Rigged parliamentary elections 
sent thousands of Georgian citizens to the streets of Tbilisi in a protest that lasted for twenty 
days. Under intense domestic and international pressure, Eduard Shevardnadze resigned. New 
presidential and parliamentary elections were held and a pro-Western president – Mikheil 
Saakashvili – came to power. While the West hailed these developments as a victory for the 
Georgian people, official Russia saw the events differently. Moscow spoke of a coup d’état, 
financed and directed by, among others, the American billionaire George Soros. The then 
Russian Foreign Minister, Igor Ivanov, argued in an interview for Konsomolskaya Pravda (4-
6 December 2003) that, ‘Various definitions are now being given to the events that have 
occurred. Some call this democratic bloodless revolution, others a “velvet revolution”. It 
                                                 
 
74 Interviews in Tbilisi, June 2005. See also Kurowska (2006b: 8). 
75 Interview at the Secretariat General of the EU Council, DGE6, Brussels, 14 November 2005. More recently, 
the mandate of the EUSR has been strengthened (Council of the EU 2006), and the Talviti’s sucessor – Peter 
Semneby – has been playing a more active role.  
76  Interview at the EUISS, Paris, July 2005. 
 
 
 
117
seems to me that neither this nor that description is suitable here. Actually what happened – I 
assert this as a witness – was the forced removal of the current lawful president form office’ 
(cited in Lynch 2006: 24). Domestically, the new administration revived enthusiasm for 
reform. It brought to power a team of predominantly young political activists, many educated 
in the USA. Their conspicuous lack of experience notwithstanding, they had big plans for 
cleansing Georgia’s corrupt institutions and for standing up to Russia finally to re-integrate 
the breakaway territories into the motherland. Despite the new government’s first enthusiastic 
and then more cautious (due to the neoconservative stance of the new president and the 
constitutional amendments significantly centralising and strengthening the executive branch) 
reception by the West, the significance of this event for Georgia’s visibility for the 
international community is indisputable. This was also precisely the moment where the roots 
of a future ESDP operation lie.77 The situation was generally perceived as imposing the 
necessity on the EU to proceed with some kind of action.78 Diplomats more concerned with 
the situation saw it in terms of a fundamental chaos, which could be lessened by a broad 
civilian protection and civilian administration ESDP mission.79
 
Pre-launch haggling 
The idea of an ESDP mission to Georgia was first discussed internally by the Estonian 
Permanent Representation to the EU.80 The Estonians envisaged a mission targeting 
Georgia’s general administration services for reform, civilian administration missions being 
one of the four initial categories of the civilian ESDP agreed by the Helsinki and Feira 
European Councils in 1999 and 2000 respectively. Due to some political intricacies, however, 
the proposal for an ESDP rule-of-law mission was introduced to the Committee for the 
Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management (CIVCOM) in February 2004 by the then 
representative of Lithuania – at the time still a candidate country with only observer status in 
the Council machinery. Lithuania promoted a reform strategy for Georgia that mobilized its 
own experience of the mid-1990s when Vilnius designed and successfully implemented a 
comprehensive reform of the justice sector.81 The Lithuanian initiative also benefited from the 
fact that the member states wanted to show to the soon-to-be members that they took them 
                                                 
 
77 Interview with a member state diplomat, Tbilisi, 9 and 15 June 2005. 
78 Interview at the Polish MFA, Warsaw, January 2006. 
79 Interview with a member state diplomat, Tbilisi, 9 and 15 June 2005. 
80 Ibid. 
81 Interview in Tbilisi with a deputy head of Themis, 9 June 2005. 
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seriously and regarded them as co-equals.82 The reputation of the eastern accession countries 
as specialists in the politics of post-Soviet space gave further credibility to the initiative. 
Challenged by some Western European countries, which were concerned about antagonising 
Russia, the proposal was keenly supported by Directorate for civilian crisis management - 
DGE 9. This was no accident. At the time, the DGE 9 was busy finalizing the doctrine for rule 
of law missions. It thus welcomed the opportunity to test its ideas in practice and to get the 
civilian ESDP ‘out of the police box’. As a functionary in the Council Secretariat stated: 
at that time there was a clear moment when in the house (DGE 9) they concentrated and 
tried to promote rule of law civilian crisis management; it can then be said that two 
aspects coincided: getting ready in the house for rule of law missions and the subsequent 
process of gathering experts for this purpose and the political moment in Georgia (Rose 
Revolution).83  
 
Moreover, there was a desire among the existing member states to widen the 
geographical scope of ESDP missions which, until then, had largely been confined to the 
Western Balkans.84 A mission in Georgia was seen as an excellent means to signal that the 
EU was in the process of becoming politically more active in its immediate neighbourhood. 
Importantly, the pro-Western political changes in Georgia were seen as imposing an 
obligation on the EU to enhance its engagement in the country and to assist the new 
government in carrying out its reforms.85 As to the Tbilisi’s acceptance of the idea of an 
ESDP rule of law mission, the government was eager to receive a strong diplomatic signal of 
support from the EU. While the official line in Brussels is that Themis was launched at the 
behest of the Georgian authorities (Solana 2004), the latter were actually lobbying for any 
kind of upgraded political involvement by the Union. Once the Union suggested a rule of law 
mission, the government accepted it.86 An important actor in this regard was without doubt 
the new Georgian foreign affairs minister, Salome Zurabishvili. She had previously been a 
French diplomat, active in the development of ESDP, and at that time a French ambassador to 
Tbilisi. In February 2005, with Themis fully operational, Madame Zurabishvili expressed her 
position rather clearly: 
L’Union a devant elle une occasion formidable de jouer dans cette région troublée un rôle 
constructif et novateur. Bruxelles doit trouver le moyen de proposer, dans le cadre de sa politique de 
voisinage, des solutions qui permettront a ces pays d’être de bons voisins.87
                                                 
 
82 Interview with an EU Institute for Security Studies researcher, Paris, July 2005. 
83 Focus group at the DGE9, Council Secretariat, Brussels, 16 November 2005. 
84 Interview at the EU Institute for Security Studies, Paris, July 2005 
85 Interviews at the Polish MFA, Warsaw, January 2006. 
86 Interviews in Tbilisi, June 2005, at the Council Secretariat, and DGE Relex, EC, Brussels, November 2005.  
87 ‘Pour la cheffe de la diplomatie géorgienne, la Russie souffre d'un complexe de persécution’, Le Temps, 17 
February 2005. 
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The EU’s engagement through ESDP guaranteed a high political profile for the mission 
and thereby constituted a strong political gesture of support and recognition for the reform 
lurch of the new government.88 In this regard, the actual substance of the mission might not 
have been a direct result of prioritising Georgian needs. This is not to denote that the 
provisions of the mandate were fortuitous. Rather, they were trimmed so that to facilitate 
converting Themis into a success story.  
The Council/Commission interface concerning Themis is particularly evocative here. 
There was a feeling that something needed to be done immediately. This added some air of 
haste to the whole endeavour and consecutively had an impact on which executive body 
should be in charge of the mission.89 As to the member states and the Council General 
Secretariat, they insisted from the outset that the mission be organised outside of the 
Commission framework.90 Two major arguments were put forward in support of this view. 
First, an ESDP operation would ensure that the Council remained in control of the 
endeavour.91 Embodying the member states’ preference for intergovernmentalism, this is also 
intimately connected to the lack of operational capabilities on the part of the European 
Commission. The latter does not run its own international projects but instead outsources 
them to third parties, which, in the Council’s view, implies a loss of effective control over 
their implementation. Likewise, the system of expert recruitment differs across the pillars. 
The EC, despite the recent attempts to introduce a double system of independent and national 
experts, typically recruits contractors for their technical projects. These are mainly 
professionals already featuring in the pool of potential outworkers. They do not act upon any 
instructions from their national governments as they are independent, moving from one to 
another job. Some have commented bitterly on this system as mercenary where no proper 
commitment is expected but hauteur and money making abound.92 Within the second pillar, 
on the other hand, the usual way to proceed is a call for contribution to the member states. 
The secondees commonly come from high professional ranks within their national system, 
which is expected to guarantee a considerable level of professionalism. As they are granted a 
paid leave for the period of their secondment, they do not hastily seek for a next appointment 
                                                 
 
88 Interviews in Tbilisi, June 2005, in the Secretariat General and at Relex, November 2005. 
89 Interview at the Polish MFA, Warsaw, January 2006. 
90 Interview with a former national representative to Civcom, Warsaw, January 2006. 
91 Interviews at the Council Secretariat, Brussels, November 2005 and at the Polish MFA, Warsaw, January 
2006.  
92 Follow-up interview with a member of Themis, Rome, November 2005. 
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but they can afford extensive commitment to the task at hand. A practical dilemma that arises 
in this context is that contracted experts are paid considerably more than the seconded staff 
which breeds resentment and disincentive for national professionals. Fundamentally, member 
states do not lose control over their secondees, a condition, which makes them more prone to 
provide high-class professionals. Second, the member states and the Council Secretariat 
argued that an ESDP mission in Georgia would be able to carry out quick-impact measures 
and generate a higher political profile for the EU than any Commission action, inevitably 
more technical than political in character.  
Conscious that the mission to Georgia sets a precedent leading to an unwelcome 
conceptual stretching of the civilian ESDP, the European Commission initially did not 
support the idea of deploying Themis. Originally, civilian missions were envisaged as 
accompanying military operations, notably peacekeeping missions. Themis, however, was to 
be a stand-alone endeavour.93 This concern on the part of the Commission soon proved 
justified. As a functionary at the Council Secretariat admitted, Themis did open certain doors, 
since, thanks to this mission, ESDP operations ‘came out of the police box’ (previously the 
civilian ESDP mainly boiled down to police reform projects) and Themis instigated a parade 
of autonomous rule of law missions.94 Further, the Commission did not regard Georgia as 
being in a crisis or post-crisis situation, and it therefore saw no reason for an ESDP operation. 
Instead, it favoured enhancing the development-oriented activities of its own delegation in 
Tbilisi.95 Third, the international promotion of legal reforms has traditionally been a realm 
occupied by the Commission. Finally, the Commission was already engaged in important rule 
of law reforms in Georgia. In 2004, several projects financed by the Rapid Reaction 
Mechanism (RRM) and the policy advice budget line were implemented. More specifically, 
the European Commission delegation assisted the justice ministry in modernizing the 
prosecutor’s office and the penitentiary system.96 Also, the Commission provided technical 
assistance and policy advice to the interior ministry with regard to its transformation into a 
civilian institution (Helly 2006: 89). These EC projects began to be implemented in 2004 by 
experts co-located in each of the institutions and whose work has been to “link legislation 
adjustment to the implementation processes, including legal advice, planning, management 
                                                 
 
93 Interview with an EC desk officer for Georgia, DGE Relex, EC, Brussels, 18 November 2005.  
94 Focus group in the DGE 9, Secretariat General of the Council of the EU, Brussels, 16 November 2005. 
95 Interview with an EC desk officer for Georgia, DGE Relex, EC, Brussels, 18 November 2005. 
96 The penitentiary reforms supported by the Commission centred on the establishment of a probation service, 
the strengthening of the penitentiary administration and the rehabilitation of penitentiary infrastructure. 
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and organisational measures, good governance and capacity building and training”.97  
In March 2004, the Council sent an exploratory mission to Georgia to identify the 
scope for a possible ESDP action in the Georgian justice system. It concluded that 
international assistance was needed to render the system more coherent and effective. It was 
also decided, however, that the operation should be significantly narrowed from the initially 
planned civil administration one.98 Controversially, the exploratory team further suggested 
including the reform of the penitentiary system in the brief of the mission.99 Soon after the 
Council experts had tabled their report, the Georgian Prime Minister Zurab Zhvania invited 
the EU to assist Georgia in reforming its judiciary. The next step in the launch sequence was 
the deployment of a proper Council fact finding mission to the country (May 2004). Much to 
the chagrin of the European Commission, it included penitentiary experts,100 despite the fact 
that after the opening dispute over launching the mission in principle, the non-duplication of 
the EC penitentiary programme through the mandate of Themis was made a priority.101 
Seemingly a matter of efficiency, the issue proved a bone of contention politically, reflecting 
the broader EC/Council interaction in civilian crisis management. The EC insisted (and 
achieved) that, contrary to the recommendation of the exploratory team, the mission was 
frozen out of the reforms of the penitentiary system, which the Commission saw as its turf. 
The argument often voiced by Themis experts was that as the Georgian strategy of reform 
covered the entire criminal code procedure, from investigation to the penitentiary system, it 
was a disappointment to leave out the penitentiary from the mission mandate.102 In an effort 
to limit the negative consequences of what was clearly a dysfunctional disaggregation of 
Council and Commission reforms, the two EU actors agreed informally that one Themis 
expert would deal with this issue in co-operation with the Commission penitentiary experts.103
Finally, the decision to deploy Themis was taken in a somewhat hasty manner. As the 
situation in Georgia could hardly be classified as a crisis, there would have been ample time 
for the Council and the Commission to discuss all relevant issues, and to hammer out a more 
coherent policy towards Georgia.104 It seems that this did not happen because the Council 
wanted to underscore its comparative advantage vis-à-vis the Commission in terms of the 
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99 Ibid. 
100 Interview with a member state diplomat, Brussels, November 2005. 
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speed with which it can implement international rule of law interventions.105 The result of 
inter-institutional politics in this case was not only a high degree of fragmentation in how the 
Union engaged Georgia but also that Themis ended up with a mandate that did not exactly 
reflect the needs of the country. This is not to argue that the mission was superfluous. Rather, 
the claim is that the process through which the mandate was formulated limited Themis’ 
chance of success (Kurowska 2007a).  
 
On the ground – muddling through  
On 28 June 2004, the EU Council officially decided to launch EUJUST Themis by adopting a 
Joint Action (Council of the EU 2004). It envisaged an ambitious mandate, albeit one limited 
to one year. The mission was tasked to ‘[…] in full coordination with, and in complementarity 
to, EC programmes, as well as other donors' programmes, assist in the development of a 
horizontal governmental strategy guiding the reform process for all relevant stakeholders 
within the criminal justice sector, including the establishment of a mechanism for 
coordination and priority setting for the criminal justice reform, carried out in close 
coordination with the Georgian authorities as well as the Commission and international 
donors’. In other words, in close co-ordination with the Commission and international donors, 
Themis was to assist local authorities in developing an overarching criminal justice reform 
strategy that was to be based on the principle of local ownership, i.e. without imposing certain 
solutions but rather showing a wide range of legal possibilities and their implications.  
The start-up of the mission was difficult due to lukewarm political support from 
Georgian authorities and the constraints of Commission procurement policy. This meant, first, 
that the mission had to struggle to establish its credentials as a serious EU actor vis-à-vis its 
local counterparts and to be granted high-level access to national experts in the institutions in 
which its members were collocated. Second, as the civilian ESDP is financed via the CFSP 
budget which is managed by the European Commission, the head of Themis had to comply 
with the Commission’s cumbersome and slow financial and procurement procedures. As a 
result, the mission did not have computers for the first three months of its deployment. The 
situation was difficult to such an extent that it provoked bitter comments that the problems 
with procurement were out of revenge on the Commission side that the mission was deployed 
in the first place. To these hiccups must to be added more mundane problems, such as the fact 
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that Themis experts initially were not assigned any desks in the institutions in which they 
were collocated.  
The eight senior experts from EU countries106 were collocated in a number of 
Georgian institutions107 in order to provide assistance on a daily basis. They were 
accompanied by national legal assistants who provided language help, the know-how of the 
Georgian criminal code and an in-depth understanding of the local context. Collocation was 
perceived as a concrete application of the national ownership principle. It reportedly allowed 
Themis experts to become embedded in the system and to develop relations of trust with their 
local counterparts. Importantly, collocation also served to distinguish the mission from other 
donors, who tend to transfer ready-made solutions. 
Themis, which was headed by Sylvie Pantz, a French judge with international field 
experience, was made accountable to its Brussels superiors via a benchmarking system that 
was proposed by CIVCOM (2004) so as to ‘enable a systematic evaluation of the mission’. 
The benchmarks were laid out in the mission’s operation plan (OPLAN). It divided activities 
into three consecutive phases: an assessment phase (2 to 4 months), a drafting phase (4 to 6 
months) and an implementation-planning phase (2 to 4 months). Each phase was expected to 
end with the realization of specific objectives – the comprehensive assessment of the 
Georgian criminal justice system by Themis; the drafting of a reform strategy by a high-level 
working group composed of local and Themis experts; and the formulation of a plan for the 
implementation of the reform strategy by a high-level strategy group again made up of local 
and Themis experts.108 However, the initial logistical problems delayed the realisation of the 
consecutive phases of the mission. In particular, they significantly shortened the amount of 
time devoted to planning the help with implementation of the strategy, which effectually 
never took off ground.109 As to the Brussels-Themis link, the head of mission reported to the 
EUSR and frequently appeared before the Political and Security Committee (PSC), which is 
in charge of giving political direction and strategic guidance to ESDP missions. In addition, 
CIVCOM was briefed on a weekly basis by DGE 9. The desk officer for Georgia from DGE 9 
was also periodically dispatched to Georgia to draft three-monthly mission assessment 
reports. 
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In Tbilisi, the high-level working group in charge of putting together the judicial 
reform strategy hardly met. The sub-groups formed at a later date to deal with specific issues 
experienced the same fate. The slow pace of the reform process was largely due to 
developments outside the control of the mission. Themis’ local counterparts were reluctant to 
push ahead with the reform strategy, not least because the new government was busy 
cleansing the state apparatus from the cronies of the old administration. More specifically, the 
mission was handicapped by frequent staff reshuffles in the judicial system and the 
appointment of inexperienced Saakashvili supporters recruited mainly from non-
governmental organizations. Besides hampering the accomplishment of Themis’ mandate, 
these developments also gave rise to concern among its members about the independence of 
the judiciary, especially when a number of judges were dismissed because of alleged 
corruption but often because of the wrong political affiliation. The mission also objected to 
some legislative proposals – for example, plea-bargaining, jury trials and the creation of an 
ombudsman with prosecutor-like prerogatives – their Georgian counterparts considered viable 
options. It regarded these ideas, which stemmed from American influence exerted through 
non-governmental organisations involved in the drafting of the reform strategy, as 
inappropriate for a volatile and corruption-prone justice system. Similarly, the Themis 
criticised the amendment of the constitution which strengthened the executive branch, thus 
exacerbating the existing flaws in system of checks and balances.110
Expected by Brussels to show quick results, Themis tried as best as it could to 
negotiate the political and institutional obstacles it faced.111 Yet all its efforts came to naught 
when in April 2005, despite a clear deadline, the Georgian side failed to do its part in 
finalising the draft strategy. The head of mission informed the EUSR of the situation and 
travelled to Brussels in an attempt to mobilize political support in the EU and to put pressure 
on the Georgian authorities. However, the latter continued to drag their feet. Hence, the 
mission, in a clear violation of the principle of local ownership, decided to draft parts of the 
strategy without Georgian input. Tbilisi accepted the draft, which dealt with police reform.112 
In mid-May 2005, after inviting the Georgian justice minister Konstantine Kemularia to the 
PSC,113 the local authorities finally submitted their contribution to the criminal justice reform 
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strategy. President Saakashvili adopted the revised draft – the National Strategy for Criminal 
Justice Reform – in July 2005 by decree, excluding parliament from the procedure.114
In this context, all parties viewed the possible prolongation of the mandate of the 
mission or a follow-up with some degree of strain. Mission experts, together with the national 
legal assistants and Georgian officials from the non-political ministerial level, asserted that 
Themis had given real impetus to the Georgian rule of law reform that would be lost if no 
proper and full-fleshed follow-up ensued.115 The matter of prolonging the mandate was 
nevertheless convoluted. Already in May 2005, there was an agreement in the Council that 
Brussels should remain engaged in the reform of Georgia’s criminal justice system and assist 
it in implementing the strategy elaborated with the help of Themis. However, the institutional 
form of this engagement was unclear, though there emerged a consensus that it should not 
take the form of a revamped EUJUST Themis. On the one hand, there was little interest in 
such an option in Tbilisi. The Georgian government did not issue a formal request to the EU 
to prolong the mission. On the other hand, few in Brussels wished to see the mission continue 
beyond its original mandate.116 First, it was important for the member states and the Council 
Secretariat to be able to present publicly the first-ever ESDP rule-of-law mission as a success. 
The timely conclusion of Themis would help in this public relations endeavour.117 Second, 
the political mileage to be gained from prolonging the mission was limited. The Council was 
already on the lookout for opportunities for politically more salient ESDP deployments. 
Third, the principle of the local ownership of the judicial reforms, which had been strongly 
emphasized in the mandate, seemed to make it inopportune to prolong Themis.118
In view of these considerations, the idea of a bridging measure between the end of 
Themis and the EC delegation taking over the implementation endeavour in connection with 
the ENP was more appealing. Two proposals on the possible follow-up to Themis circulated. 
The first was to reinforce the EUSR office with rule of law experts, although not necessarily 
Themis members, and to make them responsible for monitoring and guiding the formulation 
of an implementation plan for the criminal justice reforms. The second proposal was to make 
a clean break with the ESDP operation and to hand over the task of pushing forward the 
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implementation of the reform strategy to the European Commission delegations in Tbilisi. In 
the end, it was decided to place two former Themis experts in the office of the EUSR. 
Working in Tbilisi from 1 September 2005 to the end of February 2006, they were tasked to 
monitor and assist in the work of the Steering Committee set up by local authorities to draft 
the implementation plan for the criminal law reforms. This plan, in turn, was to be included in 
the Georgian Action Plan of the ENP. The European Commission delegation was expected to 
provide advice on the financial implication of the plan.119 On paper, this arrangement looked 
like a formula for creating synergy between the different EU players on the ground. The 
practice proved more nuanced and contingency-dependent.   
Placed within the enhanced border monitoring team of the EUSR, the rule of law 
experts were somehow left to their own devices both in terms of the substance and method of 
their work.120 The operating assumption in the EUSR office and in Brussels seems to have 
been that they should rely on the experience and political capital accumulated during their 
time with Themis. As Brussels provided no formal terms of reference as to how its assistance 
should be effected, the experts came up with their own terms based on the third phase of the 
Themis operational plan. As to the European Commission delegation, its lack of support for 
the two Council experts was conspicuous. This was partly due to unfortunate circumstances. 
The Commission encountered problems in recruiting experts for strengthening its extended 
rule of law tasks. The ensuing delay meant that the Commission delegation only became 
involved in mid-December.121 While this did not automatically denote that an opportunity for 
co-operation was lost, it still set unfavourable starting conditions. Yet institutional rivalry 
played a role too. The Commission delegation, in charge of negotiating the ENP Action Plan 
with the Georgian government, took it upon itself to assume the lead in the formulation of the 
implementation plan for the reform of the criminal justice system. This, in turn, soured the 
relationship between the Council experts and the Commission delegation and led both sides to 
be reluctant to share information and co-ordinate their actions.122 As to the Georgian 
government, the difficulties hampering the CFSP follow-up project to Themis further 
reinforced its impression that the whole thing was a case of symbolic politics.123
Thorough evaluation of the mission in terms of tangible results achieved within the 
Georgian criminal justice system proves ambiguous. Arguably, the mandate laid down 
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objectives which were too ambitious for a one-year mandate, not to mention for mission 
operating in a volatile post-revolutionary environment. The initial logistical difficulties faced 
by the mission did not help either. Moreover, Themis enjoyed at best a shaky political support 
of Tbilisi. While it benefited from the backing of prime minister Zurab Zhvania and his 
successor Zurab Noghaideli, both of whom issued crucial decrees to get the mission 
started,124 it was only in October 2004 that president Saakashvili gave his formal stamp of 
approval to the mission by issuing a decree creating the high-level working group tasked with 
developing the reform strategy.125 However, as noted earlier, the working group and its 
subgroups rarely met. Hence, the strategy was finalised belatedly. Moreover, instead of being 
the product of a genuine team effort, it reflected rather the input of Themis and those of a few 
enthusiastic Georgian counterparts. As far as its content is concerned, mission experts voiced 
doubts about certain elements, say, relations between the courts and the prosecution and the 
development of the bar.126 Yet these problems pale in comparison with Themis’ main failure. 
The mission made little progress towards the objective of the third and final phase of 
activities as foreseen in the OPLAN – the planning of the implementation of the criminal 
justice reform strategy. What nevertheless gives the story a happy ending is the fact that the 
implementation of the strategy was included in the Georgian Action Plan of the ENP. Based 
on a Georgian initiative, this move is likely to ensure that at least some parts of the strategy 
will actually be implemented.  
 In examining Brussels’s performance, it is worth quoting an interviewee, who claimed 
that Themis was also planned as an exercise in synergy between pillars I and II before the 
doomed constitutional treaty comes to force. As such, it was noted, the exercise largely 
failed.127 The part played by the experts is equally informative for a thorough understanding 
of the project.128 Insisting on the substantially limited possibilities of a one-year mission 
combined with the initial logistical delays, they see the measure of success in three aspects. 
First, a reform strategy was drafted as stipulated by the OPLAN and from this emerges the 
moral obligation on the government side to implement it. Second, the mission managed, in 
line with one of the premises of the mandate, to bring together the different local stakeholders 
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of the fragmented criminal justice system and to entice them to co-operate on the reform 
plans. Third, its shortfalls notwithstanding, the strategy for the reform of the Georgian 
criminal justice system does represent a blueprint for the country to conform more closely to 
European standards.129
The limited impact of Themis and the follow-up CFSP project aside, the Council 
engagement proved important for the EU. The policies reflected the strategic entrepreneurship 
of the Council Secretariat – the ‘Solana milieu’. It would appear to be constantly alert to the 
possibility for ESDP deployments. A twofold aim underpins this activism. The Council would 
like to raise the Union’s profile as a security actor on the world stage and accumulate relevant 
operational experience that can be translated into political capital in intra-EU political 
struggles over the EU’s external policy (Kurowska 2007b). Georgia was seen as just such an 
opportunity, enabling the Council to demonstrate that ESDP is a ‘global’ project rather than 
one confined to the Western Balkans. 
 Themis further strengthened the practice of collocation, i.e. inserting the European 
experts into the local institutions on a daily basis to mentor and assist, as the principal tool of 
the civilian ESDP. This proved to be the most acclaimed organising rule of the mission, a 
kind of byword of the European way of providing international assistance, a genuine exercise 
in ‘Europeanness’, which bears repeating in other contexts.130 The importance of human 
capital was emphasised here and mentoring instead of imposing solutions was put to the fore. 
In practical terms, this boiled down to discussing the implications of adopted solutions, i.e. if 
the Georgian authorities decided to introduce a certain provision, experts provided possible 
legal consequences as emerging from varied European experiences. The idea of collocation 
was appraised as giving access to the realities of the day-to-day law making, an opportunity to 
become embedded in the context and thereby empowered to forge trustful relationships with 
the Georgian colleagues. Collocated in different institutions across the system, the experts 
similarly had a more comprehensive picture of the situation. Importantly enough, within the 
mission there formed a belief that this approach is the right thing to do, and, as Themis 
substantially operationalised this practice, it turned to be a source of professional pride. In this 
context, Themis grew to be considered a very concrete illustration of European values at 
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work.131
The concept of collocation is instructive for grasping the emergent EU conception of 
fostering good governance in fragile communities. Celebrated as the EU’s unique way of 
providing international assistance with the respect to local ownership of its projects—
although compromised on occasion as the empirical record shows—collocation may, 
conversely, be seen as fostering internalisation of social control, an aspect of the civilian 
ESDP observed by Michael Merlingen and Rasa Ostrauskaitė (2005b, 2006). Examining the 
EU Police Mission to Bosnia and drawing on the Foucauldian framework (Foucault 1991), 
they categorise collocation as ‘remaking indigenous police officers’ (2005b: 306). A principal 
political technology in the repertoire of the civilian ESDP, collocation instils practices 
relating to officers’ ‘souls,’ know-how, and conduct (Ibid). An extensive quote illustrates this 
notion:  
At the heart of collocation is a disciplinary regime centred on visibility. Any such regime 
brings into play three elements: hierarchical observations, normalizing judgments, and 
corrections. Penetrating observations, which are organized around certain notions of 
normality typically defined by experts, constitute individuals as cases whose behaviour 
and characteristic features can be documented in detail. […] the disciplinary gaze gives 
way to a judgment: Do those who have been brought under a certain description measure 
up to the established norms or deviate from them? Deviants are made the target of 
repetitive normative corrections. […] The vision-centred technique of domination 
employed by collocation is supplemented by another technique: mentoring. It articulates a 
pedagogical project of disseminating professional knowhow to a moralizing project of 
self-improvement. To begin with, mentoring places trainees under the obligation to learn 
the things that experts know. […] Yet mentoring is not only concerned with the transfer 
of technical know-how. It is also about character building. Mentors morally cultivate their 
charges in an effort to programme their standards of appropriateness in line with the 
ideologies of the profession into which they are conscripted (Ibid, 306-307). 
 
 As Gramsci (1971) asserted long ago, the most effective way to ensure political 
control is to make one’s conception of the world hegemonic, i.e. to set the political and 
intellectual agenda in such a way that ideology appears as common sense or ‘natural’, and 
therefore beyond the domain of political debate. Accordingly, the art of government hinges on 
a form of power that has induced ‘self-regulation’ within the individual, Foucauldian 
‘techniques of the self’. Through the embedded presence of the EU experts, collocation 
effectively depends on moulding foreign professionals and reconfiguring their system of 
governance so that it concurs with EU notions.   
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 This paints a picture in many ways illustrative of the EU as building a ‘creeping 
empire’: a nascent form of ‘neo-colonialism’. Within the latter, one side appears set to 
endorse what it conceives as best practices with a view to spreading its own values to feel at 
ease in the world. The other, persuaded into the belief there is no better way to improve its 
well-being, takes the propositions on board while feeling (perceivably duly) inferior and 
dragged through the conditionality exercise. There is thus an element of curious but politically 
understandable inconsistency here when the EU embraces the principle of local ownership but 
induces changes according to its own model and with the aim to shape the world it feels 
comfortable in.  
 
Turning down the invitation  
Exploring the circumstances of an ESDP non-deployment, in particular a case connected to 
the context of Themis, should illustrate the ambiguities and contingent character of the EU’s 
role making. In this context, an analysis of the decision not to launch a full-fledged ESDP 
Border Monitoring Operation (BMO) on the Russian-Georgian border is illustrative.  
From 15 December 1999, the OSCE implemented the BMO along the Chechnya, 
Ingushetia and Dagestan sectors of the Georgia-Russia border. Monitoring the Chechen sector 
began after Russia had voiced its accusations that armed Chechen fighters were crossing back 
and forth. It was extended in 2001 to the Ingush sector and in 2002 to the Daghestani sector. 
The operation was tasked with observing and reporting on movements across these parts of 
the Georgian-Russian border in order to prevent a spillover of the Chechnya conflict as well 
as to enhance contacts between border guards. It was launched against the backdrop of 
Russian charges towards Tbilisi that the latter allows Chechen rebels on its territory, in 
particular in the Pankisi Gorge, who later use its territory for incursions into Chechnya. The 
BMO subsequently confirmed Georgian statements that rebels did not make use of its 
territory for illegal border crossings, but it also backed up Georgian claims that Russian 
aircraft were regularly violating Georgian airspace (Bloed 2005: 100).  
 The BMO mandate expired on 31 December 2004 and Russia vetoed its extension in 
prior discussions. According to the Russian stance, the BMO was not effectively monitoring 
the frontier as militants wishing to cross the border with the North Caucasus could easily do 
so without being noticed (Lynch 2006: 47). Consequently, the Russian argument was that ‘the 
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replacement of one monitoring mission by another is unlikely to be productive’.132 A 
contesting view construes this move as being more a part of a wider Russian agenda to reform 
the OSCE in order to discard what Moscow has called ‘inbalances’ and ‘double 
standards’(Ibid, 50). In the run-up to the closure of the OSCE mission, Georgia turned to 
Brussels to request an ESDP operation that would serve a primarily political deterrent 
function vis-à-vis Russia (International Crisis Group Europe Report 2006: 24). The latter was 
interpreted along the lines of a broader Georgian plan to force the EU into siding with 
Georgia against Russia. Some member states vigorously advocated this possibility, 
specifically the UK133 and the new member states with Lithuania demonstrating a strong 
position on the issue.134 This position reflected the robust agenda of the Baltic states on the 
post-Soviet space which might have been enhanced through the newly acquired self-
confidence in the process of instigating Themis. This proactive approach can be interpreted as 
looking for a niche in the crowded EU foreign policy scene and as a part of a wider schema of 
building up a new stance towards Russia. The Baltic States, with the support of the new 
Eastern European members and the UK, seek to overcome the entrenched standpoint of many 
old member states towards Russia where no decision potentially irritating Russia can ever be 
pushed through. The momentum for a replacement ESDP operation was accordingly so 
considerable that the new member states were ready to set up a “coalition of the willing” 
outside the ESDP framework135 in order to mobilise the political capital towards materialising 
the ESDP project. These efforts came to nought, however, as the notion of risk aversion 
towards Russia was still too ingrained in the political imagination of some member states, 
with France as the leader of the group.136  
 The discussions over a potential ESDP operation came out in January-February 2005 
as some equivalent of BMO was necessary due to the history of uncontrolled raiding on both 
sides. As mentioned, member states failed to reach a compromise on the issue, despite an 
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explicit appeal for it from Georgia. Salome Zurabishvili expressed this most clearly by 
saying: 
We have been requesting it [an ESDP operation], we’ve been looking at all options 
possible to replace the BMO mission of the OSCE after the Russians vetoed it. And, of 
course, we looked in the first place to an organisation where Russians do not have the 
right of veto and which is not an organisation that will be looked at as a confrontational 
organisation in any sense. The EU, for that, is a perfect organisation.137
 
She then bitterly articulated her disappointment with the [West] Europeans’ stance, 
described as hesitation between indifference and fear to engage while the largest countries—
Germany, France, and Britain—failed to provide the driving force.138 After months of 
haggling, a decision was finally adopted at the meeting in Luxembourg on April 15-16. It 
rejected three more radical options: taking over the full-scale monitoring operation from the 
OSCE; a proposed renounciation of the EU’s monitoring operation and the creation in its 
stead of a group of willing countries; and the formation of an EU training mission for 
Georgian border guards, similar to the OSCE’s small-scale and predominantly symbolic 
training mission in place since 18 April 2005.139  
Interestingly, although the statement that the Georgian authorities independently 
offered an invitation to the EU to launch an ESDP rule of law mission to Georgia can easily 
be challenged, the Georgian request to deploy a BMO is undeniable.140 Georgian officials 
described the subsequent breakdown in swaying the EU into launching a BMO as a “big blow 
to expectations”.141 In the words of a senior official in the Georgian government interviewed 
by Dov Lynch: “Georgia was literally begging for the EU to take over from the OSCE” and 
the refusal to assume responsibility for a follow-on mission led to “deep, deep 
disappointment” in Tbilisi (Lynch 2006: 14). The discontent stemmed from the perception 
that not only was the EU failing to follow through on the shared values supposedly 
underpinning its foreign policy, but it was also flinching before Russian pressure at the 
expense of Georgia’s and Europe’s policy (Ibid). Perhaps it was still too early to expect the 
EU to launch autonomously a quasi-military politically high-profile operation on the perilous 
Russian border of the kind favoured by Tbilisi. It does not feature in the repertoire of the EU 
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as a security actor to take up such an unambiguous enterprise. The model of the ESDP Border 
Assistance Mission to Rafah deployed in the sensitive region of the Middle East seems to 
confirm this point. Its mandate task is to provide a ‘Third Party presence [emphasis mine - 
XK] at the Rafah Crossing Point in order to contribute to its opening and to build up 
confidence between the Government of Israel and the Palestinian Authority’ (Council Joint 
Action 2005/889/CFSP)’. It is difficult to imagine any scenario that would allow critics to 
describe this operation as an outright failure.   
 The US stance on the BMO is of fundamental analytical value here. The US. 
Ambassador to the OSCE, Stephan M. Minikes, asserted in a statement to the OSCE 
Permanent Council in Vienna on 19 January 2005 that, 
we [the US] believe that the closure of the BMO would remove a key source of peaceful 
relations and of objective reporting on events at the sensitive border and increase the 
likelihood of heightened Russia-Georgia tensions. 
 
Trying to retain a low profile, and allowing some room for manoeuvre without openly 
antagonising Russia, the US emphasised the importance of the OSCE’s BMO while 
simultaneously lobbying for direct engagement in the issue on the part of the EU.142 Along 
these lines, senator Lugar initiated a campaign that resulted in a Senate resolution naming the 
OSCE BMO as “the sole source of objective reporting on border crossings along the border 
between Georgia and with the Russian republics of Chechnya, Dagestan, and Ingushetia” and 
urging that the US should: 
in cooperation with its European allies, maintain strong diplomatic pressure to permit the 
OSCE BMO to continue and, if the BMO ceases to exist, seek, in cooperation with its 
European allies, an international presence to monitor objectively border crossings along 
the border between Georgia and the Russian republics of Chechnya, Dagestan, and 
Ingushetia.143  
 
 This campaign points towards a particular view the US diplomacy holds of the EU 
international actorness and the corresponding expectations towards the EU. It sees the EU as 
fit to become involved in some issues where the US engagement would prove an irritant while 
the EU’s seemingly neutral approach is acceptable for a third party and secure for the US.  
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Half-delivering in the European way 
Despite this indecision, the EU seeks to leave the door half-open for future possibilities in 
Georgia.144 The tension between some member states’ insistence on launching a BMO and 
some others’ concern with the Russian reaction were soothed through a craftily constructed 
compromise. No full-fledged operation was launched but an Enhanced Support Team was 
sent to the EUSR for the South Caucasus in September 2005. It conveniently embraced two 
rule of law experts from the follow-up to Themis, while accommodating a twenty-member 
team (13 international experts and 7 Georgians) of border guards. The group has been 
headquartered in Tbilisi, with some of the members collocated in Georgian institutions with 
regular visits to border spots. The team was tasked with assisting to draft a comprehensive 
border security strategy for Georgia and it already produced a comprehensive assessment of 
the needs in the area by November 2005.  
Crucially, this assignment remains situated within the mandate of the EUSR to the 
South Caucasus. On the 28th of July 2005, the mandate of the EUSR was extended in order to 
accommodate the enhanced team’s task.145 This was further systematised in the new mandate 
of the EUSR in February 2006. It now includes reporting and continued assessment of the 
border situation, facilitating confidence building between Georgia and Russia and assisting 
the Georgian government with preparing a comprehensive reform strategy for its border 
guards, as well working with the Georgian authorities to increase communication between 
Tbilisi and the border, including mentoring. Importantly, however, the mandate still explicitly 
excludes Abkhazia and South Ossetia.146 The substance of the work of the enhanced team 
corresponds to the possible mandate of an ESDP operation but is labelled differently so as to 
remain a low profile enterprise, which does not antagonise Russia (Kurowska 2006b). As 
expressed by one of the team’s experts, through such an arrangement the EU aimed to 
respond to Georgia’s security concerns and lay a role in improving Georgian-Russian 
relations without being seen as defending Georgia against Russia.147 In other words, this setup 
avoids the perils of a separate ESDP operation while still being able to provide Georgian 
authorities with EU expertise and best practices.  
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Interesting regularities emerge against the backdrop of Georgian diplomatic efforts to 
engage the EU more extensively and the latter’s pains to shy away from radical positioning. 
The top priority in the realm of foreign policy in 2006 was for the Georgian government to 
consolidate the support of the international community in restoring Georgia’s territorial 
integrity, including peaceful resolutions to the conflicts in the country and implementation of 
the peaceful initiatives of 2004-2005.148 Tbilisi was keen to incorporate more concrete 
propositions regarding border management into its ENP Action Plan (AP)149 and it suggested 
the ‘peaceful resolution of internal conflicts’ as its first priority in its AP.150 Claiming that 
“the security of Georgia’s borders is linked to the security of the EU”, it sought “concrete EU 
assistance...for border management issues”.151 The Georgian authorities are further striving to 
‘EU-ise’ their attempts at resolving their conflicts with the breakaway republics (Abkhazia 
and South Ossetia), in particular as regards South Ossetia. In his letter to Javier Solana of 18 
January 2006, Georgian Prime Minister Zurab Noghaideli asked for broad EU backing and 
involvement in the South Ossetian conflict, as well as for a brief mission to assess 
demilitarisation of the conflict zone:  
I think that recent developments demonstrate very well that any attempt of the Georgian 
government to internationalise the conflict results...in a counterattempt of the Russian 
Federation to eliminate whatever limited international participation we have in the 
negotiation process or in the peacekeeping operation and we believe that this is an 
extremely troubling tendency.152  
 
Georgia’s ambassador to the EU, Salome Samadashvili, summarised the position of 
her government by saying: 
We believe that the EU can do much more to get involved in the conflict resolution 
process. We basically asked him [Javier Solana] to consider expanding the mandate of the 
EUSR to get him more involved in the conflict-resolution attempts.153
 
The new mandate adopted by the Council on 20 February 2006 does not incorporate 
the aspects brought up by the Georgian side. Further, the debate preceding the adoption of the 
new mandate and nomination of the new EUSR to the South Caucasus was rather indicative 
of the EU’s blurred position on the issue in that the contents of the letter were not even taken 
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into account as revealed by some member states diplomats.154 Although decisions regarding 
the border monitoring setup were formally systematised in the new mandate, the conflict 
resolution aspect remains confined to the clause that the EU should contribute, in accordance 
with existing mechanisms (emphasis mine), to preventing conflicts in the region and to the 
peaceful settlement of conflicts, including through the promotion the return of refugees and 
internally displaced persons.155
  
Practices the non-deployment enacts  
The non-deployment of a full ESDP BMO operation illustrates recurring patterns in ESDP. 
The process of deployment proves politically sensitive and contentious. It is dependent on 
reputational concerns and political realignment both internally, among the ESDP bodies, the 
member states and the EC, and externally, with regard to upholding the EU’s international 
image. The missions finally deployed are carefully selected, vague enough not to invite 
failure and trimmed in the course of multi-level political contest. Despite the political 
malleability of the process, symbolised by such assertions as: ‘we make them [ESDP 
operations] up as we go’156 and ‘we are frequently unsure how a particular negotiation over a 
possible mission might end up’,157 within the Solana milieu the stakes are definitively if 
tacitly defined. Accordingly, although operations are formally responses to crises on the 
ground, in practice they are products of strategic fishing for suitable opportunities to convey a 
message of the militarised civilian power. Whereas ‘the intervening variable’ remains 
political opportunities and constraints,158 these become framed in accordance with a specific 
agenda and only brought into political play as such.  
 In this regard, the non-deployment of BMO vividly illustrates the means of endorsing 
ESDP. The SG/HR did not see sufficient institutional or ideational interest to lobby the BMO 
in an energetic manner. The issue was too controversial among the member states, perceived 
as too risky diplomatically considering its possible pay-off and potentially too antagonising in 
view of the highly pragmatic agenda.   
Reflecting on the possible conditions that might have enabled an ESDP BMO 
operation, three hypothetical scenarios present themselves: the materialisation of a ‘coalition 
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of the willing’, either within the policy as an instance of ‘strengthened cooperation’ or outside 
its framework; a trimmed formula mediated by a committed lobbyist; and an emergency 
solution forced by a major crisis on the ground. I thus examine these counterfactual scenarios, 
and consider the peculiarities of ESDP making and the role of the Solana milieu therein. 
 The conception of the coalition of the willing outside of the ESDP framework is 
perhaps best interpreted as an attempt to gain an advantageous bargaining position within the 
policy itself. Importantly, such an enterprise would not only have had little legitimacy inside 
the EU but it would have brought internationally protests on the part of Russia. A coalition of 
the willing would have caused turmoil among the member states, consciously avoided in the 
post-Iraq-clash period marked by a tacit consensus that displays of divergence should be 
prevented. The disarray over the Iraqi invasion and the failure of the constitutional treaty have 
been decisive in this respect. They effectively mobilised the Solana milieu and induced the 
insistence that foreign policy activities be converted into a catalyst for “mobilising our public 
opinion so that to give value to the EU, to recuperate the respect, the love to what has been 
the EU, is the EU, and has to be the EU” (Solana 2005b). They also marshalled the member 
states into paying more careful attention to the EU’s international image, which typically 
suffers under any hint of disagreement inside the EU. Consequently, although internal dispute 
is often fierce, they are more disciplined in presenting their positions to outside audiences. 
While an autonomous coalition of the willing would have been unlikely, a case of 
‘strengthened cooperation’ may have however materialised. 
This brings us to the second scenario, including either a consensus on a muscled 
commitment towards the post-Soviet space or, more plausibly, the emergence of some kind of 
division of labour among the member states in terms of foreign policy specialisation. While 
the former is hardly in view at the present time, the latter has already made its mark. Foreign 
policy specialisation would denote that some group of states is more involved in drafting 
concrete initiatives towards specific regions, while others do not aggressively breach on this 
implicit rule. In the case of BMO, the already active Baltic states with keen UK backing in the 
South Caucasus might have been empowered enough to realise the project by bringing into 
play enough discursive resources for the BMO to materialise. In such a case, the commitment 
of small states could have been supported by the UK’s present policy on the post-Soviet 
space, set on advocating a decisive posture toward the Russia of Putin.159  
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 Another hypothetical setting could involve a particularly contingent scenario. One of 
the defining features of ESDP operations being their political malleability, they can be 
moulded in accordance with emerging political needs. With only a few formally established 
templates and the dominance of un-codified practices, the policy would appear a convenient 
tool for tackling political emergencies. The successful story of ESDP thus hinges largely upon 
seizing fitting opportunities of contingencies in international politics, framing them in line 
with the policy vocabulary (i.e. the necessity to act vis-à-vis the EU global role and the 
expectations of both its citizens and the world at large), and later portraying the results as 
triumph over adverse conditions. In the BMO case, the most possible scenario would involve 
a political moment significant enough to trigger substantial alert. This could have been a 
major incident on the border or a humanitarian disaster in the border zone extensively covered 
by media. The latter might have added significant visibility to the Georgian case in the eyes of 
the international community, and, consequently, evoked the feeling (as it was in the case of 
Themis and Lex) that ‘something needs to be done’. Acting on political contingency, both in 
terms of a crisis on the ground and grabbing the possibility to further the policy, has proved to 
be a factor in ESDP making. Skilful political lobbying would have been necessary to paint the 
picture fitting with what the internal institutional and member states audiences act upon. With 
a mandate trimmed to the ESDP capabilities, the EU could have then depicted itself as a 
neutral party, furnishing the Georgian border system with the best European practices, and 
fostering home-grown solutions along with the best European tradition of respect for the local 
context. Interpretation of the event pushed hard enough, Russia would have but been 
compelled to agree to some kind of international involvement and the EU would have been 
the lesser evil.  
 More broadly, launching a politically sensitive operation, with seemingly no 
immediate payoff for the EU position but with considerable reputational risks involved, 
would mark a route towards making an unambiguous foreign policy choice, a move hardly in 
the EU’s repertoire to date. This is not to raise criticism towards the EU’s overcautious 
positioning. Rather, with the EU system of governance, one should avoid the conventional 
(and imaginary) presupposition that such an unambiguous choice is indeed possible and it 
reflects the entity interests. The means of crafting the EU’s international role become highly 
mediated domestically. What emerges on the world stage is an outcome of intense political 
contest to be again contingent on international interaction. With these two processes operating 
simultaneously and mutually constitutively, the EU’s performance is obscure yet hardly 
impenetrable.  
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EUJUST LEX – how to manage and outgrow reconciliation 
Lex has a different background to Themis, thus requiring altered narration. Less than the 
actual state of play in wartime and post-war Iraq, Lex was shaped by debates within the EU 
and its positioning towards the US. Here, the recurring theme is the concern with how the EU 
should react to the US’s militarism and the discordant response to the latter from within its 
own body. Whereas Themis proved an important if fleeting fancy on the wave of the 
international appeal of the Rose Revolution, Iraq appears an instance of ‘high politics’ in the 
making. In this context, the shapers of Lex found themselves under continuous pressure to 
frame the picture of the operation in line with the intersecting agendas of different actors 
involved. The mission hence offers an example of image management in a precarious political 
contest over the viability of the EU’s international involvement. With the divisions over Iraq 
allegedly yet another illustration that, when put to the test, national perspectives prevail and 
CFSP is no more than declaratory politics, Lex served the purpose of proving otherwise, 
particularly towards the EU internal audience. While Themis remains an exercise in EU 
institutional build-up in serene conditions, Lex was delivered amongst substantial turmoil. 
The Iraqi operation thus relates to the EU’s major catharsis in international politics, a test of 
ESDP/CFSP which the EU passed in its own manner, i.e. going to great lengths persuading 
that it has indeed done well and being trusted on that in a long run.  
 
Framing scope for action  
Similar to the Georgian case, that of Iraqi induced the belief that some kind of EU 
involvement was necessary. This conviction stemmed from different sources, however. 
Themis materialised on the EU’s confidence that it matters as an international actor and a 
model of governance. Accordingly, its support for reform in a fragile community has a 
significant bearing on the reform process. With regard to Iraq, the EU reacted to being 
challenged as an international player per se, and as a compound polity. Lex correspondingly 
aimed at reconciliation between the member states after the clash over Iraq. Against this 
backdrop, a civilian mission could and has manifested the possibility to come up with a 
common schema.160 Lex being primarily a training intervention, some assert likewise that the 
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actual substance of the mission is fairly accidental. It reflects what was possible to agree on at 
the time of decision taking,161 with a broader domestically oriented aim behind the enterprise.  
 The birth process of the mission featured concerns of political and security nature. 
Initially, with the notion of a possible mission already instilled, there was little idea of what 
such an operation may involve. After a short visit in August 2004 aimed at instituting a 
political dialogue, an exploratory and preparatory mission was despatched in November 2004 
to establish whether there was a scope for an ESDP involvement. This visit concluded that 
there existed room for an ESDP rule of law mission, with an important caveat that more 
research needed to be done in advance.162 In this regard, one should emphasise the 
importance of exploratory visits to a potential field of deployment before a formal fact-
finding mission takes place. While they might set the terms of future debate about an 
operation, they function within certain political boundaries, producing conclusions highly 
mediated by imported political imperatives. Their terms of reference are thus contingent on 
the agenda of the sending institution, i.e. the Council Secretariat functionaries in case of 
informal exploratory missions and member states’ seconded experts accompanied by Council 
Secretariat functionaries in case of officially despatched fact-finding missions. The 
exploratory mission to Iraq included Javier Solana’s deputy, an important political figure in 
the ESDP milieu. It is further striking that rule of law was chosen as a deployment area, rather 
than civilian protection or civilian administration. It may appear that in a fundamentally 
conflict-ridden society, the immediate needs revolve around basic protection and 
administration issues. These two areas are little exercised in ESDP’s civilian repertoire so the 
policy performers were glad to accept and advocate an initiative with a rule of law label.  
 The rule of law conclusions of the preparatory mission consequently determined the 
way in which the fact-finding mission would be constituted. The mission took place in 
December 2004-January 2005 and, due to security conditions, it conducted its investigation in 
various countries in the region rather than in Iraq itself. In the process, about 150 people were 
interviewed, both Iraqi judges and other functionaries and international advisors.163 The 
research team finished their work in January and only commenced drafting CONOPS 
(Concept of the Operation) and OPLAN (Operational Plan) in March. Accordingly, February 
2005 saw the most intense political debate with the commitment by the EU Council to launch 
the mission on 21 of February.  
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 The PSC received the report and the proposal of integrated training mission aiming at 
eradicating the mistrust between judges and police officers and thereby bringing about more 
coordination in the justice system at the beginning of the month. The actual formula of the 
mission was still negotiated, in particular regarding whether the training could take place in 
Iraq or should rather be conducted in other countries in the region or solely in the EU. France 
was fundamentally against a major EU involvement on the ground as a symbolic 
representation of its opposition towards the military operation in the first instance. The 
compromise reached concluded that the training of high level judges, police officers and 
prison governors takes place outside of Iraq, with only a small liaison office in Baghdad 
located in the British embassy. The Baghdad Liaison Office (BLO) was to comprise five 
people, a police expert, a penitentiary expert, and a judge with two general coordinators staff. 
The Brussels Coordinating Office (BCO) includes the HoM, his deputy a judge, a political 
advisor of the mission who is a Council Secretary functionary and a number of expert course 
coordinators. In February 2005, it was also decided that an EC representative should join the 
Lex team on the ground, and the individual duly assumed the position of one of the general 
coordinators. She was ‘double-hatted’, in that half of her duties were to be concerned with the 
daily activities of the mission and half were to comprise the preparation of the future EC 
programmes on the ground. The roots of this particular arrangement have been construed in 
various ways. This was a common sense move on the part of the Commission as the 
Community had had vast experience in civilian training and it had operated in Iraq through its 
Iraqi section in the Amman EC Delegation.164 Conversely, the inclusion of an EC 
representative into an ESDP operation might have served as a ‘gesture of good will’ towards 
the Commission practically sidelined in the process of constructing ESDP. Yet another 
reading saw it as a ‘smuggling’ of the Commission into the project.165
 The Joint Action adopted on 7 March stated that the EU is committed to a secure, 
stable, unified, prosperous and democratic Iraq.166 The initial mandate of Lex covers four 
major areas. First, the mission shall address the urgent needs of the Iraqi criminal justice 
system through providing training for high and mid-level officials in senior management and 
criminal investigation. Second, the mission should promote closer collaboration between the 
different actors across the Iraqi criminal justice system and strengthen the management 
capacity of the officials and improve skills and procedures in criminal investigation in full 
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respect for the rule of law and human rights. Third, an effective strategic and technical 
partnership should be developed throughout the mission. Finally, Lex should complement and 
coordinate with efforts of the other international interventions. In the words of the HoM, the 
overarching principle of Lex is its integrated (cross-sector) approach, which aims to address 
not just police reform, prisons reform or judicial reform individually, but to tackle all these 
areas simultaneously by forging relations of trust between these areas. The idea is therefore to 
bring senior professionals from these areas together to engage in joint learning and dialogue at 
strategic level, developing mutual understanding by presenting best practices in Europe.167  
 In order to cover the mandate, two courses were designed, on senior management and 
on management of investigation with the goal to train 770 people. The explicit 
implementation of the principles established in the mandate was the notion that professionals 
from all these area should attend the courses together. At the same time, three principles of 
the operations were framed, an attempt to cater for the member states’ concerns and reflect 
the spirit of ESDP. These are: security of the member states personnel is paramount; Iraqi 
involvement at every stage (which denotes that the new government must be involved); and 
flexibility and responsiveness to Iraqi needs (which denotes that the mandate must allow 
flexibility to respond to the Iraqi requests, conditions on the ground and member states 
participation).168 With the European Council decision, the planning phase of the mission 
began during which, at the end of May 2005, the HoM managed to obtain a formal invitation 
for the mission from the Iraqi authorities as required by the Joint action 2005/190/CFSP.169 
The mission was assigned a budget of 10 million euros from the EU budget whereas member 
states would contribute training courses and trainers. 
The position of the Commission in the pre-launch negotiations was different from that 
in Themis. With training traditionally its competence domain, the EC has yet no means to 
operate in a non-benign environment. The only way to be engaged in Iraq, then, was in 
cooperation with an ESDP operation.170 Next to the security situation, the mission’s activity 
does not fit with the Community’s established approach. In line with the institutional 
differentiation between these two entities, an EC functionary emphasised that the Community 
method hinges on funding projects defined by the local government or, optionally, it assists 
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the local government in drafting such projects. However, at the time of launching Lex there 
was not even a local government in place.171  
 
Uncomfortable realities of the mission  
The operation phase of the mission started on 1 July 2005 with an initial twelve-month 
mandate. In order to paint a clear picture of the operation, I elaborate on several of its key 
elements. First, I look into the establishment of the mission on the ground together with its 
reported perception by the local authorities. Second, I explore the engagement of the EC in 
connection with the ESDP mission. Third, I discuss the practical implementation of the 
courses. Finally, I examine the self-perception of the mission at its crucial threshold when the 
decision to prolong and extend its mandate was taken.  
Reports pertaining to the first operational period of the mission (from July to October 
2005) maintained that it had established strong and trusting working relationships with the 
relevant Iraqi authorities, in particular with the ministry of justice and the chief justice, and it 
had been thoroughly supported by the local authorities.172 One of the major operation 
principles as formulated by the HoM, namely that the Iraqi involvement needs to be secured 
at every stage so as to provide for lasting solutions, was particularly highlighted. The attempt 
to apply local ownership signifies a qualitative difference in comparison with earlier 
initiatives.173 This is juxtaposed with the alleged EC failure to involve Iraqis, the illustration 
of which was International Donors’ Conference in January and April 2005 in Amman 
organised by the Iraqi section of the EC Delegation in Amman: there, Iraqis were practically 
absent.174 Again, the insistence that the EU should foster home-grown solutions with regard 
to the local traditions of governance is portrayed as a unique feature of the ESDP project. 
The first accounts also reported that the mandated coordination of Lex with other 
international donors was being implemented. The practical illustration thereof was to be the 
setup of a Rule of Law Sector Working Group (ROLSWG), chaired by the Iraqi Chief Justice 
and tasked to coordinate the international donors’ initiatives in the rule of law sector with a 
view to producing a comprehensive strategy of reforming this area. The opening ceremony of 
ROLSWEG took place in October 2005. Only in February 2006, however, were some initial 
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initiatives formulated. The ROLSWEG conundrum can be attributed to volatile domestic 
situation where the Iraqi representatives change overnight, invalidating previously adopted 
arrangements.175 It may, however, also be a function of limited importance attached to the 
body by the Iraqi authorities, which prefer to operate within bilateral relations. Yet the 
examination of ROLSWEG may be instructive in tracing the relations within the EU family 
and with other international actors. Officially, the EU is represented in the group in a 
threefold way with an EC representative, a mission representative and the current Presidency. 
In practice, however, the EU functioning within the group is coordinated by the EC 
representative in Lex, which gave rise to a particular hijacking of the forum by the EC.  
From the perspective of the EC, Lex is a useful training intervention, which could not 
have materialised within the first pillar due to the security conditions on the ground. 
Substantively, however, it is “a drop in the ocean”:176 incapable of affecting the system as the 
courses last three weeks only and, being conducted abroad, relying on practical 
decontexualisation of the beneficiaries.177 In brief, it is a short political intervention, which 
ought to be followed by other EC programmes. At the very outset, the Commission declared 
its willingness to get more involved in Iraq with substantial projects after the closure of Lex. 
The focal point of this involvement has now become the ROLSWEG. In 2004, the EC 
established its Iraqi section of the EC Delegation in Amman, following the steps of other 
international donors that headquartered their organisations in Jordan owing to the dangerous 
situation in Baghdad. The section has been busy drafting assistance programmes for Iraq as it 
commences a full reconstruction programme beginning of 2007.178 The Commission 
announced in May 2005 its intent to open an EC Delegation in Baghdad.179. Its staff should 
comprise six individuals, tasked exclusively with the work of the ROLSWEG.180 
Accordingly, the Iraqi section in Amman will supervise reconstruction programmes while the 
Baghdad EC Delegation, headquartered next door with Lex in the British embassy, shall take 
up all the assignments performed now by the EC representative in the mission. As summed 
up, the EC/EU representation in the ROLSWEG is a practical arrangement enabled by Lex.181 
The ROLSWEG also provides another clue about the division of labour between the EU and 
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the US in Iraq and how this is arranged in practical terms. On the record, the EU was 
officially asked to lead the group by the Iraqis; off the record, it was the US lobbying for EU 
to take the lead, an opportunity seized by the EC representative.182  
The organisation of Lex courses further illustrates interesting themes in the making of 
ESDP. A considerable number of member states have conducted the courses while other have 
been involved in various ways, including joint partner arrangements.183 A degree of diversity 
necessarily follows from this arrangement. Although there exists a core syllabus drafted by 
the Lex team, emphasising cross-sectoral cooperation, human rights and management, the 
courses designed in different EU states by national trainers differ significantly. While this 
ensures greater dynamism, the EC should be able to offer a unified service.184 Here, however, 
the indication of potential superiority of the EC approach goes with an observation about the 
current shift in the EU where a preference is given to executing diverse tasks (also those that 
might have been previously performed under different labels and, possibly within the first 
pillar) in the framework of ESDP.  
This may possibly result in a less streamlined approach. Lex also struggles with more 
mundane concerns in terms of course organisation, e.g. its poor control over the local 
selection procedure. Despite the requirement of formal supervision, the selection is carried out 
by Iraqis exclusively with the Lex team given a post factum access to the CVs. This amounts 
to occasional arrival of students who seem ill suited for the specific courses offered through 
the mission.185 Likewise, the reintegration of the former students into the Iraqi system cannot 
be monitored due to the understaffing of the BLO. On a slightly different note, the feedback 
by students and the ‘lessons learnt’ from the first round of courses led to significant 
compromising of the overarching philosophy of the mission. The endeavour to place 
professionals from different areas of justice system (and thus social strata) in one classroom to 
breed trust and partnership relationships among them produced numerous requests for courses 
organised separately for different groups.186 This illustrates how the European standards 
                                                 
 
182 Interview with a member of Lex, Rome, November 2005. 
183 Countries that have provide the courses so far include Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Holland, 
Poland, Portugal, Spain, UK; Finland, Sweden, Estonia, Lithuania provided trainers for two courses conducted in 
Denmark; Slovenia, Greece and Austria will provide trainers for courses in Italy; Hungary and Luxemburg 
offered some finance to be distributed among the countries conducting the courses. Information obtained during 
an interview with a course coordinator at the DGE 9, April 2006. 
184 Interview with the desk officer for Iraq, Relex, EC, Brussels, April 2006. 
185 Interview with a course coordinator, DGE 9, Council Secretariat, Brussels, April 2006. 
186 Ibid. 
 
 
146
(however ideally framed) encounter significant resistance, in this case opposition to the 
perceived encroachment on social status rules. 
From the outset, and in light of the claim that the Iraqis would not be able to assume 
the training effort soon, there was an insistence that the mission should continue beyond its 
original mandate and proper arrangements in this direction should be taken well in advance. 
Already in the early stages, Lex management advocated that the extension of the mission 
should be based on the experience, expertise, and networks Lex had already accumulated. In 
November 2005, the efforts directed in organising further Lex engagement in Iraq were in full 
swing, notwithstanding the official assertion that at that point any solution, performed by the 
Community follow-on programmes, the extension of the Lex mandate, a follow-up to Lex, or 
even a different ESDP operation, remained conceivable. In particular, arguments were made 
that a high profile and effective involvement could only be accomplished through ESDP,187 
preferably as an extension of the (already successful) Lex—this in view of the fact that the 
ESDP seconded personnel from top positions in national systems who could be deployed 
relatively rapidly.188  
One can detect some resemblance with a threshold moment in the Themis story when 
the Georgian mission feared not to drop the momentum already created and dissipate what 
had been achieved. This may point to the unease on the part of the experts with quick-fix 
nature of ESDP. The earliest reports similarly assert that the operation managed to establish 
considerable visibility; it is indeed recognised to represent the EU as such in Iraq, providing 
for an appreciatively neutral but supportive presence.189 This verbiage belongs to the 
repertoire of the EU’s role construction and is drawn extensively upon when painting the 
picture of the mission to the internal, institutional and member states audience. With the 
rationale of highlighting the EU’s presence in Iraq against the background of the US 
monopoly and thereby bringing out the distinction of the EU involvement, Lex had to 
managed its image and legitimise its existence particularly actively.   
In April 2006, after a fervent presentation of the mission’s achievements by Lex HoM 
a month earlier, the PSC agreed to extend the mission for another eighteen months. It further 
acquiesced to the HoM’s propositions about the expansion of the mandate, together with plans 
for new courses introducing apprenticeship for course graduates in the MS institutions.190 
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This on-the-job training may to some extent substitute collocation. Formally a reverse 
arrangement, its aim is no different, i.e. to instil in the participants certain ideas about policing 
and the judiciary that would seem naturally to represent best practice. 
 
ESDP making in practice – conclusions  
In this chapter, I have dealt with the question what specific security practices ESDP has 
engendered. To conclude, I should start with a number of distinct themes associated with 
ESDP making in practice.  
A particularly salient aspect is the emergent belief among the member states that the 
EU should face up to its projected image as an international actor. This becomes tangible 
during instances of international crisis, when the resolve to demonstrate the EU’s involvement 
and the avoidance of exposing internal clashes finds its expression most clearly. Arguably 
revealing the contingency-driven character of the policy, it also indicates common 
expectations of member states as to the role of the EU. According to this reading, events of 
crisis in international politics call for the EU’s reaction and possible engagement, while 
failure to act on them may entail spoiling the EU’s image. As regards Themis, after the Rose 
Revolution the EU saw itself as obliged to express support for the reform path adopted by the 
new regime. An ESDP operation with its high political profile provided a gesture in that 
direction. Such an initiative was perceived as contributing to the aspired image of the EU as 
an important security player. In connection with Lex, it often supported the view that the EU 
should be engaged in any form in order to uphold its image as an international player. This 
indicates that a certain self-perception of the EU has crystallised, which, in turn, acts as a 
catalyst for initiating further action in accordance with the image. While the EU has not acted 
on all opportunities to get engaged, and it has oftentimes shrunk from taking action, there has 
nevertheless emerged a trend towards proactive management of the EU image.   
This image remains a dynamic phenomenon, malleable enough to allow considerable 
room for manoeuvre in terms of justifying the link between a given mission and the EU 
security. The role of the civilian ESDP is striking here in that police and rule of law missions 
are portrayed as serving the function of ensuring the EU’s security. While explicitly framed 
along the lines of spreading good governance along the EU’s borders, both in the interest of 
the communities involved and the EU itself, the employment of a security policy to this end is 
of interest. Until recently within the remit of EC projects, civilian assistance becomes a 
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contentious issue within inter-pillar struggles. The shapers of the ESDP policy have 
meanwhile also been busy with establishing a reverse to the EC motto understanding that 
security is prior to building civil society. They have managed to rally enough support around 
this vision in order to naturalise rule of law, etc. interventions under the aegis of a security 
and defence policy. If it is perhaps too early to claim that their conception has prevailed, they 
have definitely secured enough political capital to destabilise the previously central principle 
of forging security through development.   
 At the heart of this process lies the Solana milieu’s strategic investigation of 
possibilities for deployable missions. They are expected to boost the EU’s image and confirm 
the uniqueness of the EU approach to security while restrained to a scope agreeable by the 27. 
This is not to diminish the value of any mission, and neither does it denote that missions are 
merely a product of the lowest common denominator. They rather represent multilevel 
political negotiation with certain agents empowered to a greater extent than others. This 
negotiation is mediated by the different political positions of the member states who, 
however, do subscribe to a particular conception of the EU as they become persuaded to give 
consent to corresponding actions. The mission’s portrayal, both to internal and external 
audience seems vital here. Illustrative in this regard is the manner of missions’ evaluation and 
the procedure of drafting the ‘lessons learned’. Like Themis, where establishing good 
working conditions with the EC Delegation was claimed while in fact the relationships were 
tense, first reports Lex asserted that all the four main objectives of Lex were being achieved, 
including coordination with efforts of other international donors. Drafting the final lessons 
learned of Themis took several months and was subjected to numerous correctives aimed at 
diluting the most controversial points. The process of compiling reviews, reports and lessons 
learned is thus indicative of how missions are a politically conditioned exercise with strategic 
concerns beyond the substance of a mission. 
 The process of evaluation has thereby come to constitute a specific genre, difficult to 
explore comprehensively as the documents relating to missions assessment remain 
confidential. Still, some insights are instructive. The wording of the reports reflects a 
reluctance to admit institutional competition explicitly as much as it demonstrates 
disagreement among the member states. If any inadequacies are admitted it is through rather 
moderate suggestions and the very generic mantra of the necessity of coherence across the EU 
tools. Above all, however, the construction of the reports conveys the (surprisingly 
successful) positioning of the EU among other donors. Such a spin seems a deliberate move in 
light of the precarious member state consensus on missions. The guidance given to heads of 
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missions on how to manoeuvre among the member states positions similarly appears the 
major task of political advisors to missions. The process is also symptomatic of growing self-
awareness or institutional identity of the DGE 9 and other Council Secretariat bodies related 
to crisis management. Along these lines, the attainment so far in the realisation of ESDP 
projects should be shielded from any public contestation. The accounts of Themis and Lex 
fittingly show that the exaggerated depiction of a mission’s achievements and enthusiastic 
lobbying significantly impinges on the perception of the mission by the member states and, 
correspondingly, their fate.  
ESDP’s delve into previously civilian aspects of security and defence has caused 
considerable friction between the Council and the Commission. Widely acknowledged as 
embodying two different philosophies of action, the Council and the Commission are busy 
asserting their position vis-à-vis one another. Here, the Solana milieu attempts to wrestle the 
civilian crisis management out of Commission hands through differentiating the nature of the 
tasks and somehow denigrating the Commission’s role through insisting on its mainly 
technical relevance. Within this organisational identity building, ESDP operations are 
portrayed as a task of a more strategic and horizontal character, that offer a quick impact in 
order to come up with tangible political results.191 The Commission’s task, conversely, should 
be to reinforce this strategic vision with technical assistance and long-term development 
programmes.192 In this context, the rule of law area remains inherently contentious between 
the Council and the Commission. Until recently, the Commission regarded development and 
institution building as its exclusive task although according to the Treaty this can be 
interpreted as a shared competence.193 As it is not a clear-cut area, it is not immediately 
visible who is responsible for what, which inevitably causes overlaps and institutional 
tensions.  
In each particular case of a civilian operation, the negotiations with the Commission 
over the formula of the mission are conducted from scratch as the setting and context of each 
mission are specific. The state of affairs is additionally complicated by the fact that the 
Community has often been long present in a given country before an ESDP operation is 
deployed and it therefore has substantial institutional interests there. Moreover, the 
Commission sees the development area as time-consuming, and as a long-term investment 
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that the Community is better suited to tackle.194 The Rapid Reaction Mechanism195 created 
within the Community and designed to activate speedily financing resources for concrete 
projects, demonstrates, however, that the Commission is eager to expand on the 
understanding of reconstruction projects as durable and, consequently, that it is keen on 
catching up with ESDP mechanisms.196  
The embodiment of the EC’s attempts to offset the growing position of the second 
pillar in civilian crisis management, and more broadly in the EU’s domestic system of 
governance, is the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). Initially locked into the traditional 
tenets of its technocratic approach, the EU began to try to emulate the ESDP’s venture as a 
way of asserting how best to project order and security to the EU’s periphery. The EC 
increased activity has indeed been interpreted as catalysed by the robust ESDP action.197 Yet 
it is perhaps more adequately seen as strategic emulation that does not mechanistically copy 
but instead involves political choices and judgement. In this reading, the ENP is a way for the 
Commission to upgrade its profile in the field of external policy, i.e., it is the realisation of a 
certain political project.  
In spite of these frictions, the Council appears determined to expand its civilian realm 
and differentiate its nature from the mode of activity traditionally embodied by the 
Community. Justification thereof is now elaborate. First, the high political profile and 
strategic nature of ESDP interventions generate a powerful momentum for reforms in post-
crisis societies. This provides the scope conditions for the successful implementation of EC 
technical programmes.198 Second, given its political nature, ESDP is neither constrained by 
institutional rigidity nor impaired by overly complex and time-consuming procedures.199 It is 
thus a highly flexible tool, quickly adaptable to different situations;200 missions can be fine-
tuned to tackle unique challenges on the ground. Third, the fact that member states retain 
control over missions and their national staff makes them more willing to engage in hot spots 
around the world. Fourth, missions are rapidly deployable and have access to experts from the 
highest echelons of the administrative systems of member states.  
Active search for opportunities to deploy missions proves the most conspicuous 
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feature of this framing exercise. This becomes particularly evident in the operational shaping 
of the substance of the missions, which is far from a straightforward extrapolation of needs 
prioritisation as regards a particular region. Instead, it rather is negotiated arrangement 
between a number of intersecting positions. Yet ‘fishing for opportunities’ takes a brisk form 
and reveals a great deal of engagement. One illustration is the practice of dispatching a 
number of exploratory, or pre-fact-finding missions before the actual fact-finding mission. 
Frequently, several strictly political visits consisting of a few high rank officials from the 
Council Secretariat are paid to a given region before any call for experts for a fact-finding 
mission is organised. It is reasonable to argue that from the moment the actual fact-finding 
mission has set off for its destination, the EU has substantially committed itself to make it a 
success. The conclusions of any pre-mission undertakings are confidential and the fact of any 
such activities is barely publicised if at all. Both Themis and Lex furnish examples of these 
practices but so do other operations. Arguably, it should be a common diplomatic practice to 
carry out thorough groundwork before any significant action is taken—particularly in 
domains where reputational stakes are high. While ESDP shapers subscribe to this credo, 
however, their over-conscious approach represents what has been mocked as ESDP choosing 
its own enemies, carefully enough at least so that it can be certain of victory using its 
preferred methods.  
Along with risk aversion, distinct political self-interests beyond the mandate of a 
mission are also easily identifiable. The deployment of Themis signified an engagement in the 
country that assumingly marked a highly political moment on the post-Soviet space. It 
provided the Council Secretariat with possibilities to test a new form of security commitment 
in the form of a rule of law mission. There were other areas of possible engagement such as 
the conflict zones of South Ossetia and Abhazia, but the equivocal type of a rule of law 
mission better suited to serve the purposes at hand. Similarly, the later possibility of launching 
a fully-fledged ESDP mission on the Georgian-Russian border was avoided. This accentuates 
an important facet of the Council Secretariat seeking to mould the substance of a mission on 
its own terms. Although local needs are identified, the consequent mandate is drawn up as 
much in consideration of these needs as it is carefully composed with regard to the EU’s 
image. Further, the resolve on the part of the Council Secretariat to actually implement a 
mission once it has been identified as a promising opportunity is evident. In Themis, this was 
revealed through far-reaching compromises reached with the EC on the contents of the 
mandate. In Lex, it surfaced during negotiations with members states ardently opposed to any 
profound EU involvement in Iraq. Eventually, the tasks of the mission were drafted in such a 
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way as to be acceptable for the major protagonists in the debate, including the position of the 
EC, which was granted the position of the deputy head of the mission. Some member states 
diplomats engage (half-derisively) in figuring out the major idea behind other missions.201 
Here, the Monitoring Mission in Aceh (AMM) was allegedly intended to demonstrate the 
global scope of EU crisis management activity. Accordingly, at the consecutive gatherings of 
CIVCOM, new and more elaborate versions of the concept of the operation were presented, 
despite the overt protests of some member states.202 Not surprisingly, the aims and scope of 
AMM are indeterminate enough. Similarly, EU Border Assistance Mission for the Rafah 
Crossing Point (EU BAM Rafah) aims at validating the EU assertion that it is actively and 
prolifically engaged in the Middle East peace process. Curiously, the mission is tasked to 
provide a Third Part presence (emphasise mine) and should not undertake any substitution 
tasks (ESDP Newsletter 1, p.5). This provides for a mandate vague enough to be realised.  
 Interestingly, the formal legitimacy of a mission appears to be a fundamental concern 
for the Council Secretariat. In each case, local authorities are expected to issue a formal 
invitation for an ESDP mission in accordance with already previously negotiated mandate. In 
each statement on the occasion of launching an ESDP mission, the SG/HR underlines that the 
mission has been undertaken at the request of the local authorities. As the material of Themis 
and Lex reveal, the invitation is usually obtained after most operational arrangements have 
been completed. Rather than instigating a debate in the local community, the invitation is then 
more of a signpost of completing a crucial phase of a mission.  
In terms of constructing the definition of missions’ success, the top-down and bottom-
up actors, i.e. policy designers and implementation experts, form a tacit alliance, despite their 
division everywhere else. The Solana milieu has been busy imbuing the official discourse 
with ESDP’s tangible contribution to international presence in troubled regions. The experts 
involved in operationalising these assertions come up with detailed accounts of how the 
success of a particular mission fits into this picture. I described in depth the Themis definition 
of success and the attempts of Lex to position the operation as a particularly successful story, 
lauding the achievements of the EU presence on the ground and its effectiveness from the 
managerial perspective, aptly maximizing the budget and institutional opportunities. Along 
these lines, the notion of success becomes a crucial operative category. It is a matter of self-
definition and of sustaining a particular interpretation of events through the categorizations 
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and causal connections established by the policy model (Mosse 2006: 943). 
 Yet, the implementation dynamics of each ESDP operation acquires its own particular 
self-perpetuating and self-sustaining logic. Importantly, heads of missions are granted vast 
scope of managerial freedom and operational flexibility. In case of Themis and Lex, they 
already participated in fact-finding missions before their formal appointment. Having 
substantially contributed to drafting the fact-finding missions’ terms of reference they 
displayed genuine commitment to their realisation and ambitious plans of their 
operationalisation. Interestingly, in Brussels, heads of missions are viewed as stars and 
emblems of the success of operations, which additionally fuels their aspirations to meet the 
expectations to deliver. Experts on the ground, conversely, are typically overwhelmed by the 
mandate’s underspecification. Confronted with the necessity to design the mission from 
scratch without much instruction from Brussels, they are also baffled by the intricacies of its 
politics, which appears a major hindrance to their mission’s performance.  
The story told here hardly features in the official ESDP narrative. Only varnished 
accounts of the missions are presented to the public and the institutional actors. They thus 
represent what good evaluations are, namely an acceptable story that mediates interpretative 
differences in order to sustain relationships and the flow of resources (Phillips & Edwards 
2000). In so being, they are important building blocks of the Solana milieu’s strategic project 
where antagonising is avoided and informal, pragmatic negotiations constitute the major way 
of resolving daily crises and consolidating the institutional position. One concrete 
ramification is that even member states representatives at CIVCOM and PSC might not be 
fully informed on the actual performance of a particular mission.203 This points to a 
considerable discreet power of the Council Secretariat, a power that hinges on the non-
codified practices developed incrementally over a number of years. Since the establishment of 
the HR/SG position, there has materialised a whole pattern of rules and procedures. They 
constitute a tacit code of conduct in the realm of the policy making. The scarce secondary 
literature on the subject matter similarly shows that the policy area remains a realm of 
numerous exceptions to generic provisions on CFSP (Duke and Vanhoonacker 2006). Strict 
confidentiality attached to the policy, intertwined with a pursuit to come across as a highly 
successful crisis management actor result in the public getting a very crude picture of the 
situation. This curiously happens against the backdrop of legitimising policy through the 
reference to numerous opinion polls, which confirm European citizens’ support for the EU 
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enhanced role in international politics.  
 Indicative of a political urge, this resolve to endorse ESDP can be illustrated further 
by the exploitation of the civilian domain to boost the project. Civilian operations were not in 
the forefront of the agenda of crisis management as it was introduced in 1999 and the Feira 
Council where the Civilian Headline Goal was established did not immediately lead to any 
improvements in this area. However, it soon became clear that although ESDP would not yet 
develop along military lines, the opportunities to enlarge the policy via civilian realm abound 
and should be adequately handled. As no civilian scenarios for conflict management were yet 
prepared, military scenarios had to be modified in such a way as to fit the civilian option.204 
As Renata Dwan asserts, because the military staff have been far larger than civilian planning 
capacity, the “military were responsible for setting the framework and drafting the first texts 
for EU crisis management concepts and guidelines” (2005: 16). Planning staff in the Council 
Secretariat admit to following the guidelines where they can save time, but do not do so 
consistently (Hansen, A. 2006: 22). The labels of the consecutive documents in the run-up to 
the missions, e.g. concept of operation and operational plan, are indicative thereof. While 
similar projects could conceivably be launched by the EC, the changed institutional landscape 
and the ensuing shifting conceptions of security push the civilian projects to be executed via a 
security and defence policy.  
Interestingly, the Council Secretariat has not only succeeded in portraying ESDP as a 
must for the EU, as much as for the wider world, it has also managed to convert the seemingly 
deadly blows to the policy into moments of ‘catharsis’ or catalysts for the policy. Two 
instances are particularly evocative in this regard, namely the clash over the Iraq invasion and 
the failure of the Constitutional Treaty. They deserve attention as illustrations of how a skilful 
agenda-setter manages to frame unfavourable events into building blocks of his/her strategy. 
The degree of distress evoked in the old member states by the defiant position of the new 
member states allying with the US served to socialise the new comers into the conviction that 
such disagreements should not be played out in public as they do disservice to the EU’s 
image. The reputational harm evidently done was thereby transformed into the urgency to 
compensate. This spirit predates the watershed events in the ESDP story in 2003, i.e. the 
adoption of the ESS and the launching of first ESDP missions, as well as the deployment of 
Lex.  
The failure of the Constitutional Treaty has been heralded by many as a deplorable 
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example of the EU’s non-viability as a polity and the EU citizens’ defiance towards the idea 
of further integration. Leaving aside numerous discussions on the bankruptcy of the Treaty, 
some CFSP-connected aspects are of interest. Although the Treaty was to bestow coherence 
on the EU’s foreign policy/external action and despite the fact that all institutional parties 
officially grieve over its failure, one gets an impression of partial relief towards the non-
ratification. On the Commission side, the Treaty would have finally codified the first pillar 
subjugation in the foreign policy realm. On the Council Secretariat side, the Treaty 
codification would have ruled out many of the practices executed now in an informal and 
pragmatic manner, imposing heavy procedural requirements that the second pillar has evaded 
preferring to negotiate off the record. On a different note, the failure of the Treaty has hardly 
prevented ESDP development, partly because of its un-codified nature from the inception of 
the policy. ‘Business as usual’ is perhaps the best description of the state of affairs as regards 
ESDP after the Treaty’s failure.  
In effect, ESDP becomes a strategic tool for promoting a certain EU security claim. 
This security claim has been discursively woven out of ideas that circulated for decades. Yet 
it has a certain air of novelty about it as new vocabulary and new conceptions have been 
introduced via old formulations. The means of making the policy appear to work are missions 
deployed within its framework.205 They have proved the most efficient way of boosting 
ESDP. Nevertheless, the process of choosing what mission to launch is far from 
straightforward. As agreeing on military operations is problematic for the 27, the current 
focus is on civilian crisis management. The introduction of ESDP was initially justified by the 
necessity to build military capabilities in order to make CFSP work. However, meanwhile, 
there has been an interesting discursive twist to the project, in that civilian aims can be 
achieved under the heading of ‘defence policy’. Crucially, civilian missions are more 
ambiguous and carry less potential for outright failure, or, in other words, the potential fiasco 
is easier to disguise as a partial or even complete success. The second pillar’s attempts to 
hijack the realm of civilian crisis management has nonetheless caused friction with the 
Commission, which has so far regarded rule of law and institution building as its exclusive 
competence. This has instigated the reconfiguration of the domestic arena and the rise of 
intra-EU politics in the construction of EU external policy, a politics fuelled by distinct 
institutional identities and different visions of the EU’s role in international security. Thus, 
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interestingly, the development of ESDP, launched to address the outside of the EU, has served 
effectively to modify it internally.  
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CHAPTER V     A NEW SECURITY IDENTITY IN THE WORLD POLITICS? 
We are destined to be a barrier against the return of ignorance and barbarism. Old Europe 
will have to lean on our shoulders, and to hobble along by our side, under the monkish 
trammels of priests and kings, as she can. (Thomas Jefferson to John Adams, August 1, 
1816) 
 
Following on from the analysis of the practical development of ESDP, where the enabling 
discursive repertoire was explored, the operative agency identified, and the non-codified but 
crucial practices of ESDP making pinpointed, this chapter revisits the question of whether this 
has grown to be a defining quality of the EU on the international scene. It thus deals with the 
issue of the extent to which there has emerged a new EU security order of which the ESDP 
framing is a factor.  
 
A role approach to the EU internationality  
Academic works dealing with the nature of the EU as an international actor have burgeoned 
in recent years (Allen and Smith 1990, 1998; Bretherton and Vogler 2006; Carlsnaes et al. 
2004, Elgstom and Smith 2006; Hill 1993, 1998, Hill and Smith 2005; Knodt and Princen 
2003, Petersen and Sjursen 1998; Smith, H. 2002; Smith, K. 2003; Tonra and Christiansen 
2004; White 2001; Whitman 1998). My aim here is less concept-driven in terms of 
constructing a new analytical apparatus for approaching the EU international activities. 
Rather, I acknowledge these different propositions as having varying amounts of appeal, but 
nevertheless remaining distant from the body of my narrative. The latter relies on a specific 
interactional view on the EU posture as an international actor and the contingent character 
thereof. 
Taking an interactional view of the EU in international politics brings to the fore role 
theory and symbolic interactionism (Mead 1934). Roles refer in this context to patterns of 
expected or appropriate behaviour and are determined both by an actor’s own conceptions and 
the role prescriptions of others (Holsti 1970: 238-9). A role of an internationally present actor 
further involves a claim on the international system, recognition thereof by other international 
actors, and a conception of an identity (Le Prestre 1997: 5-6). Accordingly, borrowing from 
Horrocks and Jackson, a role taken presents the observer with a picture of identity in action 
(1972: 115). While ‘the sharing of expectations on which role identities depend is facilitated 
by the fact that many roles are institutionalised in social structures that pre-date particular 
interactions’ (Wendt 1999: 227), the roles an actor engages in are an effect of learning and 
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socialisation in interactive negotiation processes where self-conceptions are confronted with 
expectations (Aggestam 2004). Importantly here, role definition of an actor is not approached 
from a systemic perspective. It is has multiple sources and, rather than being a result of an 
objective distribution of power, it takes shape in the process of interaction where overlapping 
and cross-fertilising (self-)expectations have a bearing.  
I thus focus on the substance of expectations as they emerge in the process of 
interaction in order to examine the dense web of meanings each of the partners assigns to its 
own and others’ position in international security. Expectations are demands for rule-
governed behaviour in accordance with a commonly accepted norm, and roles are stabilised 
bundles of expectations that define the relationship of role bearers to given objects 
(Kratochwil 1978: 29). The question thus arises to what extent rules and norms determine 
behaviour (Ibid.). Wittgenstein argues that “a rule stands there like a sign-post. Does a sign-
post leave no doubt open about the way I have to go?” (Wittgenstein 1953: 85; cited in 
Kratochwil 1978: 30). According to this line of reasoning, rules are not ‘labels’ underlying 
facts, and they do not refer to mental states of the actor but they rather are ‘signals’ for social 
action (Ibid,). Accordingly, a great deal of interpretation is involved in a definition of the 
situation both by participants and players, and by the researcher exploring the context. The 
latter should therefore avoid converting particular events into building blocks of her empirical 
data. S/he should instead construe constellations of events by exploring the discourse within 
which they have been moulded. 
Exploring the notion of the expectations of expectations is instructive here. In 
particular that:  
A’s expectations of B will include an estimation of the B’s expectations of A. This 
process of replication, it must be noted, is not an interaction between the states, but rather 
a process in which decision-makers in one state work out the consequences of their 
beliefs about the world, a world they believe to include decision-makers in other states, 
also working out the consequences of their beliefs. The expectations which are so formed 
are the expectations of one state, but they refer to other states (Keal 1984, part I: cited in 
Kratochwil 1986: 46-47).  
 
While the process of expectation formation does not in strict terms equate to 
interaction, it would be hardly conceivable in a non-interactional manner. This is because 
different degrees and forms of interaction fuel the process of shaping expectations, and, 
subsequently, role construction. The establishment of roles would thus not be possible if it 
were not for engagement with other actors. The establishment of this bundle of intertwined 
expectations, i.e. the intersubjective role assignment in the system, hinges on particular rules 
of the game set within the system as the latter develops. The institutionalisation thereof is 
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hence weak. While role assignments are not inherently malleable since their very existence 
induces a degree of orderly arrangement, they are hardly constant. This finds its expression in 
the fluctuations of the post-Cold war world politics, and, more particularly, in the change as 
regards the international security role specification ESDP has contributed to.206
In the context at hand, the argument is that whereas the current role-taking in the EU-
US-UN triangle has deep historico-ideational roots, the inception and strategic moulding of 
ESDP sets new parameters for role-taking by the partners to the relationship. This proceeds in 
a Goffman’s fashion where the Self (political entity) has a certain leeway to shape its image 
within the interaction and it engages in continuous impression management while seizing 
opportunities for strategic moves. Two stipulations are due here. First, as ‘there is never a first 
encounter’ (Smith S. 2001: 245), the failure to recognise discursive and material ‘path 
dependency’ would be a serious omission. Second, the fibre of the interaction is 
intersubjectively constructed. Thus, while the actors’ conceptions contribute to producing and 
reproducing their milieu, the latter cannot be single-handedly altered to suit the actors fancy. 
Still, this should not exclude the possibility of change. Although ‘there is no individual apart 
from the network of systems in which he or she is embedded’ (Rosenau 1987: 45), the native 
rules of the game remain inherently contestable and should not be viewed merely as 
overdetermining and constraining structures. Similarly, despite the formative impact of 
socialisation and material resources, we should not be blinded to the acknowledgment that 
particular rules of the game become invariably internalised and, as such, draw the borders of 
the conceivable. The concept of mechanical internalisation both contradicts human reflexivity 
and it constrains the scope of strategic action, which constitutes much of daily practice. It 
further takes too lightly the phenomenon of ‘role distance’, which in the famous essay by 
Goffman implies a fully-fledged dichotomy between an ironic distance and a wholehearted 
commitment (Goffman 1961). Following on from that, and in line with the performativity of 
the social life that the Goffmanian dramaturgical metaphor entails, it hardly seems fruitful to 
assume any social/political action as inherently authentic. What we witness instead is the 
politics of everyday dealings across all social levels.  
In the case of a political entity, the EU with its ESDP tool, it should be considered that 
what provides for a potentially successful action on the world stage is less the non-reflexive 
internalisation of the rules of the game, but rather its thorough digestion and cunning 
application (i.e. politics). As March and Olsen state, political actors calculate consequences 
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and follow rules, and the relation between the two is often subtle (1998: 12). Moreover, a role 
taken is far from a constant, thereby allowing for considerable scope of ‘role-playing’ and 
room for manoeuvre. This take on the EU should be instructive in terms of changing role 
conceptions in the triangular relationship of the EU with its significant others; without, 
moreover, loosing sight of the actual performers and shapers of ESDP, i.e. the actors who 
contribute the most to the deliberate moulding of ESDP on the world stage and the 
materialisation of the policy through calculated political action.  
Chapters III and IV aimed at identifying the web of domestic actors involved in the 
endeavour while the present chapter seeks to situate the outcome of their performance in the 
world game. As I centre the research around such actors, I adhere to the position that agency 
matters in social life and agents are not simple ‘throughputs’ of some structures working 
behind their backs (Kratochwil 2006b: 6). 
Borrowing from Elgstrom and Smith (2006: 6-7), I first spell out more clearly the 
different categories of role approach that I apply in the analysis below. Accordingly, role 
conceptions encompass actors’ self-image and the effects of others’ role expectations together 
with the interplay between the two. In the literature, there has been a multitude of 
conventional propositions pertaining to the EU international role such as a balancer of power, 
a regional pacifier, a global intervenor, a mediator of conflicts, a bridge between the rich and 
poor, and a joint supervisor of the world economy (Hill 1998: 34-6). Others have 
conceptualised the EU role more broadly, e.g. normative power Europe (Manners 2002). The 
latter notion wears a particularly heavy normative scent and it adds to what I later empirically 
develop as the EU’s drive to lead by virtuous example and thereby civilise others. In order to 
capture this dimension, I resort to the EU-US-UN triangle with the self-understanding aspect 
examined in Chapter III. Considering the origins of particular roles highlights the extent to 
which roles are strategically conceived and are thus linked to design or choice, or are more a 
result of contingency and incrementalism. I have argued that deliberate action has been a 
crucial constituent behind the present standing of ESDP. Continuing this line of 
argumentation, in Chapter V I attempt to extend the analysis to the eternal dimension of the 
ESDP strategic moulding.  
‘Role institutionalisation’ focuses on the formalisation of the contingent division of 
labour through institutional frameworks. There are but few moments in the EU international 
role making through ESDP that have received a prescribed status, and the impact of ESDP has 
proven discretional and non-codified. This further points to the tendency towards particular 
political means for action as revealed by ESDP’s shapers both in the domestic arena and on 
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the world stage. ‘Role performance’ deals with how a role becomes enacted and how 
enactment both empowers the actor (as it acts upon an expected pattern which adds 
legitimacy) and constrains it through social prescription (which requires adherence for the 
sake of credibility). As it would be deceptive to expect that role conception (as analysed in 
Chapter III) impeccably translates into role performance, Chapter IV and V explore what 
becomes lost (wittingly or less so) in this translation process and how declaratory politics 
affects and matches the ‘on the ground’ materialisation. The focus is on how the range of 
possibilities created in the framing exercise is seized upon in the actual performance. Here, I 
proceed with the analysis of the interplay between the EU’s shifting identity induced through 
ESDP, and the response to it of significant others, including threads of manipulation and 
mutual disenchantment. Finally, ‘role impact’ concerns the extent to which the set goals 
become realised and it brings in the issue of effectiveness as well as the legitimacy question. 
The legitimacy plot recurs repeatedly in the course of the analysis, while effectiveness 
belongs more to the ‘ESDP conventional story’, featuring a distinct theme of ESDP’s alleged 
failure to deliver on its promises.  
 
Stage performers - the EU and its significant others  
The multilayered governance inherent to a complicated system of accountability, such as that 
of EU foreign policy making, significantly shapes the making of policy. While domestic 
struggles over security conceptions might hamper its effectiveness, other actors in the world 
performance hardly go to great lengths to trace these intricacies. The EU here is perceived as 
it appears to those on the outside, and the kind of sophisticated thinking about the institutional 
structure of the EU external policy does not feature as constitutive in this process. ESDP is 
thus interpreted as it presents itself on the world stage. Here, the policy has contributed to the 
process by which the EU revisits and significantly updates relationships with its two 
‘significant others’, the UN and the US.  
As the analysis deals with the pragmatic dimension of the ESDP recognition on the 
world stage, I find the heuristic of the EU-US-UN schema particularly instructive. Although 
perhaps oversimplified, it brings out the most significant parameters within which the EU’s 
international agenda, and consequently, its international identity, find expression. Further, this 
three-dimensional interaction appears crucial in the ideational constitution of ESDP where the 
US and UN feature as recurring points of reference. The ESS may serve as an evocative 
example in this respect. Approached as the EU’s international mission statement and the 
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reflection of its self-perception, the substance of this statement has not been contrived one-
sidedly in a manner of arbitrarily creating the EU image. To the contrary, it unravels the 
mediation of the EU’s image in relation to its significant others. In this reading, the ESS is a 
product of intense interaction in the course of which both self-perception, and a consequential 
if contingent division of labour, have been interwoven. Correspondingly, when interacting 
with others the EU strives to position itself in a favourable manner and thus engages in 
intense impression management.  
Literature on the subject struggles to pinpoint any stable elements of this process of 
establishment on the world stage. This is where the sui generic notion emerges. Accordingly, 
the EU is unique in a number of aspects: in its constitutive features and the character of its 
goals and values; in the configuration of political instruments used; and in its peculiar 
institutional construction (Elgstrom and Smith 2006: 2). In particular, unlike many of 
traditional actors, the EU objectives are milieu goals, i.e. rather than ‘possession goals’ linked 
to national interests, milieu goals aim to shape the environment in which the actor operates 
(Ibid). Less sympathetic critics of the EU’s assertiveness maintain that this ambition of 
shaping the EU neighbourhood reveals a policy of nascent neo-colonialism. The enhanced 
focus on effective multilateralism should be the recent form thereof as ‘the transmission of the 
European miracle to the rest of the world has become Europe’s new mission civilisatrice’ 
(Kagan 2003: 61).  
 
Modes of agenda setting  
Within the contours of the EU-US-UN relationship, the EU finds itself between a ‘thin’ global 
organisation—with diluted influence and fraught with charges of inefficiency—and 
traditional modern state, with international preponderance and high degree of traditionally 
conceived efficiency. This is revealing as regards the chaotic security order the EU co-
constitutes. A thorough investigation into the role taking in this triangle would require a study 
of its own. Instead, I examine the character of each participant’s agenda setting and the part-
played therein of the doctrine of multilateralism.  
The UN pursues an open security agenda, focussing on particular salient issues taken 
within its global scope, and with minimal degree of strategic agenda development. The 
established practice of handling with (unfounded) pride the most devastating blows to its 
reputation has made the UN rather less susceptible to reputational concerns than is the case 
with other political entities. In other words, the UN can somehow afford to fail, which is a 
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highly useful quality in the world of crisis management and humanitarian intervention. The 
experience of failure has not, however, been acknowledged to the extent of emasculation. 
With attempts at reform occurring regularly, the organisation remains at the heart of 
maintaining global security and a useful reservoir of international legitimacy. 
The EU agenda is more streamlined in that there exists a core identity, which allows 
for deliberate investigation of opportunities for asserting the interests of the polity. The 
framing of the agenda, heavily focused on the ethical dimension and traditionally connected 
with the urge to civilise international politics, involves the moral obligation to respond to the 
conscious-shocking situations if the EU credibility is to be upheld. The US fares much better 
in the messianic respect, however. Rather than implicitly hinting at its superiority, the US, as 
a modern state with clearly formulated objectives, is not shy about its perceived supremacy. 
Whereas the UN can somehow afford to fail out of habit, the US can afford to fail thanks to 
its status as a superpower. An evocative quote concerning the US’s performance in Iraq is 
illustrative:  
 America will remain the world’s most powerful country regardless of how Iraq turns out 
and how much U.S. foreign policy is blamed for it. The U.S. will continue to enjoy a 
benign international context in which it faces no great power rival, as it did throughout 
the cold war and as great powers have traditionally done throughout history (Haass 2006).  
 
Failure affordability does not appear so generous in the EU case. Perpetually charged 
with ineffectiveness and inability to deliver on its promise to contribute to international 
security, the EU’s role creation via ESDP acquires an air of urgency as it functions under 
considerable pressure to perform. This, rather than smothering the policy, has proven a 
momentous factor behind its creation. 
 
Multilateralism – code to differentiation in the triad  
If we regard multilateralism as an organisational form, which links contextual practices and 
focuses predominantly on pragmatic usefulness (Kratochwil 2006b: 140), we can look at the 
intricacies of the EU-US-UN triad through the lenses of one of the ESS’s strategic objectives, 
i.e. ‘the promotion of an international order based on effective multilateralism’.  
As expressed by one of ESDP ideational shapers: 
Multilateralism and the rule of law have an intrinsic value...Multilateralism – for which 
the EU stands and which is in some way inherent in its construction – is more than a 
refuge of the weak. It embodies at the global level the ideas of democracy and community 
that all civilised states stand for on the domestic level 
(Cooper 2003: 164, 168). 
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Multilateralism’s core revolves around superior legitimacy as it is currently conceived 
in international relations. It involves seeking the UN Security Council authorisation for any 
operation carried out by a regional organisation. While this perhaps exceeds the requirement 
of the UN Charter, which obliges obtaining consent only for forceful action, it reflects the 
current conceptions of the UN. Here, effective multilateralism requires meaningful and 
consistent communication with the UN throughout the course of the operation as a reflection 
of Article 54.207  
The UN puts forwards an elaborate understanding what the role of the EU could be 
with regard to its newly developed capabilities and ambitions (Annan 2005). The report by 
the UN Secretary-General delineates the EU possible contribution to the UN conceived 
understanding of security system in a threefold way. First, the EU, as a regional organisation, 
can help the UN in peacekeeping where the UN capacity is stretched, in particular due to the 
‘negative’ trend of many states preference to supply capabilities to ad hoc ventures. Second, 
qua watchdog, the EU could work for spreading the adherence to international norms, a part 
already appropriated by the EU through the ESS. Third, the EU could adopt significant 
function in implementation by leading by example and thereby solidifying some codified 
practices. Along these lines, the UN welcomes the EU as an intimate ally with converging 
interests in terms of advancing multilateral international relations. Presumably in need of 
substantial support, the UN still promises a tangible reward in return. Joining forces with the 
UN on upholding global values effortlessly brings rhetorical legitimacy. It conveys an 
impression of integrity and goodness, which may be implicitly played out in the interaction 
with the ‘mighty’ significant other.  
Yet, appearances aside, it is rather the EU that sets the agenda and defines the terms of 
the relationship. This becomes apparent through the divide between what the UN wants and 
what the EU is willing to offer. Seemingly, the UN can be taken advantage of to seize global 
opportunities and thereby broaden and provide the EU agenda with an aura of righteous 
legitimacy. The UN further conjures up a slant of weakness, which may be quite squarely 
brought into play in order to highlight the EU unique approach. “We are not the UN!” was a 
mantra adopted by the EUPM planning team to Bosnia and Herzegovina prior to the mission’s 
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launch.208 It illustrates the EU’s desire to differentiate itself from the UN on the ground as 
well as find its own niche in the international policing /rule of law ‘market’.  
One may argue that the EU-UN relationship resembles a process of factual 
emancipation of the former in conjunction with taking over agenda setting and under the 
disguise of serving the function of Chapter VIII. Although the EU cannot be legally classified 
as a regional arrangement in the sense of Chapter VIII, it is nevertheless a regional 
organisation, which has gone the farthest in its relationship with the UN, and the one that 
appears most promising in terms of fruitful cooperation on crisis management. While Brussels 
has invariably supported the UN as a champion of effective multilateralism, ESDP has given 
it (potentially) even more powerful means than those available to the UN to promote values 
shared by both institutions. Illustratively in this respect, ESDP provides “oxygen for the 
United Nations” (House of Lords Minutes of Evidence 2004: 7). Importantly, the EU upholds 
the principle of the primacy of the Security Council in the maintenance of international peace 
and security, and it commits to contributing to the objectives of the UN in crisis management 
in accordance with the UN Charter.209 The salience of this theme came evocatively to the 
surface in the process of negotiating the final version of the ESS, highlighting particularly the 
central importance of the UN .210 While in the initial draft the UN was acknowledged as a 
primary framework for international relations based on international law and thereby a 
European priority, the final framing includes a major elaboration. The UN becomes the main 
area of effectively fostering multilateralism where the EU’s objective of boosting multiparty 
governance of the world affairs can find its full expression.  
                                                 
 
208 ‘Future of ESDP: Lessons from Bosnia’, European Security Review, No. 29, June 2006 
209 See e.g. Joint Declaration on UN-EU Co-operation in Crisis Management, 24 September 2003. 
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Despite this acknowledgment, while the UN plays the role of a legitimising body for 
ESDP, its consent may not always be indispensable (Tardy 2005: 49-51). The examples of 
ESDP operation launched without a UNSC resolution are numerous, both in Europe, such as 
the EU police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Concordia and Proxima in Macedonia, and 
beyond, for example with Themis (Georgia), Lex (Iraq) and EUPOL Kinshasa (Congo). 
Whereas the EU recognises the primacy of the UN, it does not want to be bound too strongly 
to it by means of an explicit mandate for each of its operations (Chinkin 2001: 1). There 
emerges a telling dualism where the recognition of primacy has to be reconciled with the 
EU’s drive to set its own principles of cooperation (Novosseloff 2004: 7-8). In effect, through 
ESDP, the EU has become a major saviour of the UN reputation and an endorser of its 
declaratory politics, while at the same time forging a distinct profile for itself.  
The relationship with the UN is somehow a reverse to the modalities of the EU-US 
relationship. A distinct appeal of the UN is their unswerving recognition of the EU role in 
international crisis management. This differs significantly from the EU position vis-à-vis US 
or its protégé NATO, where the EU is compelled to strive to assert its standing. The EU might 
take pride in providing the UN oxygen for acting; it usefully falls back on the legitimising 
capacity the UN can provide and takes the UN as an ally in championing the effective 
multilateralism, the ideology within which the EU feels best. The imbalance between the two 
is well captured through the UN insistence on institutionalising the cooperation and the EU 
recoiling from this. As Tardy illustrates, the UN has advocated an institutionalised partnership 
with the EU which would not be confined to the subcontracting model and ad hoc assistance, 
but committed the EU to direct contribution to the UN operations (2005: 67). While 
confirming the necessity of this cooperation, the EU favours its flexible, case-by-case 
variation, where its political autonomy would prevail and with no guarantee that the UN 
needs will ever be met (Ibid, 67-8).  
The US overtly challenges effective multilateralism and the Bush administration opts 
for ‘selective’ or ‘à la carte’ multilateralism (Nye 2002: 154). Paradoxically, the EU’s 
positioning of itself as an agent amicably containing the US’s vigorous unilateralism adds 
particular legitimacy to the EU’s action. It enhances its image as a good-natured crisis 
manager, sending the signal of a non-confrontational posture and the desire to make the world 
a better place in an agreeable fashion. This appears to be yet another rendering of the 
projection of Europe’s Utopia on the rest of the world, a long tradition of many labels, from 
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enlightenment to colonialism, civic imperialism, or civilian power.211 The historical core of 
this notion is a depiction of Europe as a vanguard that has something to teach the rest of the 
world and its function is to assert some form of control over the rest of the world. In the 
situation at hand, the rhetoric of the EU’s uniqueness in the triangle re-emerges continuously 
in efforts at positioning and differentiating itself. The most fundamental message in this 
process is the implicit historical superiority disguised under rhetoric of equality. This finds its 
expression particularly vividly on the ground of the missions where the EU approach, 
however ineffective and admittedly flawed with numerous imperfections, is framed to fare 
better as it embodies the ‘European’ solution.  
Illustratively, a recurring narrative in the Themis story was that the mission represents 
the embodiment of providing international assistance in the EU mode. The adopted modus 
operandi was correspondingly considered exceptional as compared to other donors in the 
field. Along these lines, the human capital aspect (as opposed to the US’s financial capital) 
was emphasised, and mentoring, instead of imposing solutions (the American ‘one size fits 
all’ where no consideration is taken of the local context and instead US remedies 
thoughtlessly inflicted) was placed to the fore. In particular, the already described practice of 
collocation facilitated the operationalisation of the European approach. Georgian accounts 
were more nuanced on this score. Next to the opinions that without tangible financial carrots 
the EU might be wasting its time engineering human capital projects, Georgian’s close to the 
mission rather accurately recognised the decontextualisation of the experts and their vague 
grasp of the socio-political situation.  
 
US change of attitude – instrumental approval of ESDP 
The evolution of the US’s stance towards ESDP, and thereby the EU’s global role in general, 
has been an important determinant of the rise of ESDP. Initially concerned with the potential 
of ESDP to undermine NATO (Giegerich et al. 2006: 388),212 the US has evolved into an 
important backer of the enterprise, and the ESDP’s record can be capitalised upon across 
other transatlantic issues. The picture has changed significantly. Whereas previously the EU’s 
attempts to design its security were approved provided they involved defence capabilities 
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development within the European pillar of NATO, and that they aimed at transatlantic burden 
sharing, now, despite the abandonment of the NATO option in favour of autonomous policy, 
the US sees ESDP as instrumental in cases when its status as the sole superpower and its 
correlated international image prevents it from effective crisis management. The EU is thus 
welcome as a deputy, preaching the same values but doing so in a less confrontational 
manner, which makes its involvement in certain regions more acceptable.  
The shift in the US approach has still been an incremental and contested development. 
The context of launching Althea in 2004 in Bosnia and Herzegovina, a UN-mandated and 
NATO-supported first ESDP operation, illustrates the US’s wavering position. The possibility 
of the EU taking over in Bosnia and Herzegovina was first suggested at the European Heads 
of State Summit in Copenhagen in December 2002, following the conclusion of negotiations 
on the ‘Berlin-plus’ agreement. Initial reactions to the proposal were mixed. The UK and 
France strongly advocated the move, while the US expressed concern over the EU’s ability to 
take over the Bosnia operation successfully. An article in The Independent in August 2003 
reported: 
NATO’s military commander has cast doubt over plans to launch the European Union's 
biggest military mission - a peace-keeping operation in Bosnia - in a sign of new 
transatlantic tensions. General James Jones, a United States Marine and NATO’s supreme 
allied commander in Europe, said the proposed date of 2004 might be “too early” for the 
EU to step in. He also questioned whether a European military mission in Bosnia would 
be needed […] While the US initially seemed anxious to scale down its force in the 
Balkans, it has been having second thoughts. Washington sees the region as increasingly 
important for counter-terrorism operations, and has been less enthusiastic about the EU’s 
military ambitions since the transatlantic rift over Iraq.213
 
 
Following extensive negotiations, NATO foreign ministers announced in December 
2003 that an assessment of the possible termination of the operation by the end of 2004 and 
the transition to a new EU-led mission within the framework of ‘Berlin-plus’ would 
nevertheless be undertaken (Ibid, 51). Analysts suggested that the decision to conclude SFOR 
and accept the possibility of the EU takeover had been made with reticence. The International 
Institute for Strategic Studies concluded that “even though the US military, severely 
overstretched, was eager to palm-off one of its many commitments, the Istanbul agreement on 
actually doing so was more than a minor achievement”.214 This marked a moment of 
reconfiguration towards the instrumental approval of ESDP. More than a desire for burden-
sharing, this arrangement reflects the realisation that the American international posture has 
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tied the US hands in many areas. A possible way of squaring this circle is to rely on an ally 
that is ideologically close and increasingly capable of particular (unthreatening) security 
actions. 
Chapter IV provides one example of such US attempts at delegation in connection 
with the failed initiative of an ESDP border monitoring operation on the Georgian-Russian 
border. Palestine is another case in point. An honest broker image of the EU emerged in the 
case of EU BAM Rafah in autumn 2005, where it was actually the US side, and Condoleezza 
Rice personally, that negotiated EU involvement in the monitoring of the Israeli-Palestinian 
border. The question was first discussed with the EUSR for this region, who subsequently 
reported the issue to the PSC.215 Reporting on the US image in the region, European Voice 
concluded in September 2006 that: 
Because of Iraq, Guantanamo and Abu Ghraib, the feeling is that the US has been 
discredited in the Middle East to such a degree that it is unable to act decisively. …Many 
now question whether high-profile US engagement is still desirable or even 
possible…While the US has its hands tied, actors in the region are increasing turning to 
the EU. After years of favouring US involvement, Israel has … showed a willingness to 
see the EU play a greater role. 
 
These instances point to the set of expectations the US holds of the EU’s international 
actorness. The US now sees the EU as fit to become involved in a number of areas where the 
US’s own engagement would prove an irritant but the EU’s seemingly neutral approach is 
acceptable for the third party and politically secure for the US. This instrumental recognition 
of EU capabilities has given rise to a shift in role assignments and it paints an interesting 
picture of the transatlantic link in the EU-US-UN triad. The high-flying rhetoric on the EU’s 
role coming from the Solana office could hardly acknowledge a somewhat secondary part to 
play. Still, ESDP performers are more than happy to seize and skilfully build upon the 
distinctive scope of possibility that has emerged with respect to both the US and the UN. This 
again conjures up the notion of situated agency. Socially situated agents bring about change 
by strategically responding to novel problems via reasoning that is embedded in the ideology 
they inherit and necessarily constrained through political and material factors. Change is thus 
possible thanks to the reflexive and purposeful action of the actors involved. While the 
discrepancy between the vision and the end effect of the deliberate action may be 
considerable, the transformation cannot be denied.  
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This pragmatic change of attitude towards ESDP may also be linked to a broader shift 
in US foreign policy. As identified by Financial Times,216 there has been a reformulation of 
means of conducting diplomacy by the Bush administration, embodied by Condoleezza Rice. 
In her message in a 2000 article in Foreign Affairs, she derided the Clinton administration’s 
proclivity for nation-building: “There is nothing wrong with doing something that that 
benefits all humanity but that is, in effect, a second-order effect”. Now humanity gets a more 
prominent billing: 
I have spent a lot of time at the department in something that we generally call 
transformative diplomacy. It really is kind of fancy term for something which is quite 
simple, which is that the civilian side of our security establishment has to be more 
capable in helping to prevent, and if necessary, repair failed states through helping to 
build governance structure.217
 
Since this declaration was made, however, the US has earned notoriety for unscrupulous 
behaviour on the world stage. The old adage, so often invoked by the Bush administration and 
other unilateralists, that “the strong do what they have the power to do and the weak accept 
what they have to accept”(Thucydides 1972: 402) may no longer apply so automatically, if it 
ever has. The weak do not always roll over or fall into line, and the strong are not always 
strong enough to achieve their objectives on their own or on their own terms. Even a nation as 
incontestably powerful as the United States today finds that its greatest foreign policy 
challenges are not about doing what it wants to do but about getting others to do what it wants 
them to do and ensuring that the outcomes are what it wants them to be (Jentleson 2003/4: 
10). The Rice initiative of transformative diplomacy may still be ignored if allies are not 
actively rallied around US policies. 
In the tour around Europe in February 2005 designed to prepare the ground for the 
European visit of President Bush, Rice launched a revival of the transatlantic partnership, the 
task of which was not merely to cure the wounds of the Iraq but also to introduce a qualitative 
change in the American conception of the international division of labour. An interesting 
speech at the Institut d’Etudes Politiques de Paris bears witness to this endeavour with the 
centrepiece message being a historical opportunity for both partners to shape “a global 
balance of power that favours freedom and that will therefore deepen and extend the peace 
worldwide if the power of the transatlantic partnership is put to good use so as to advance 
shared ideals and values worldwide (Rice 2005). In this regard, both partners’ roles appear 
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clear: “We on the right side of freedom’s divide have an obligation to help those unlucky 
enough to have been born on the wrong [emphasise mine] side of that divide” (Ibid). Notably, 
Rice recognises that although the transatlantic partners agree on the “the interwoven threats 
that we face today”, they “have not always seen eye to eye, however, on how to address the 
threats” (Ibid). Still, “it is time to turn away from the disagreements of the past. It is time to 
open a new chapter in our relationship and a new chapter in our alliance” (Ibid).  
Although this chapter might be thought to hold a significant place for the EU, it is 
striking how little Europe itself as such features in the scheme. Instead, the need to relocate 
diplomats from Europe broadly conceived to Africa and Asia is emphasised.218 Arguably, the 
EU is expected to cope with Europe as a regional manager while contributing to initiatives 
farther afield, in particular in the Middle East where the EU’s presence proves vital for 
appeasing the conflicting parties. This, first, points to the accomplished political emancipation 
of the European continent and its newly acquired capability to think on its own, and, second, 
it gives the US a particular luxury to look elsewhere while maintaining good faith in the EU’s 
capacity to deal with the business of day-to-day security in Europe.  
That the US is barely able bring about a solution it favours purely unilaterally has been 
meaningfully illustrated on a number of occasions when the US looks to the EU to smooth the 
edges of its proposals and to dilute their indigestible extract. Examples provided above 
illustrate how CFSP/ESDP has become significant for the US. This applies to partaking in the 
diffusion of shared ideals, even if in evidently dissimilar ways. But above all, it implies a 
pragmatic recognition of the EU’s potential for crisis management where the US involvement 
is not welcome but the EU’s image is acceptable and thus capable of influencing the situation 
in the direction favoured by the US. Here the US profile is wisely decreased and the EU 
presence visibly enhanced. The EU’s role becomes foregrounded where the US direct and 
evident involvement would merely exacerbate tensions. This role ultimately relies on the 
recognition of commonality and difference, a dynamic settlement based on ideological 
affinity between the two actors. While this should not be construed as an entirely harmonious 
                                                 
 
218 An important part of the reform is global staff repositioning: “At present, the allocation of American 
diplomatic resources still has vestiges of our Cold War posture. We have nearly the same number of State 
Department personnel in Germany, a country of 82 million people, as we do in India, a country of over one 
billion people. Diplomats are generally located in embassies in Europe, and centralized within capital cities. To 
meet current diplomatic challenges, the Secretary will begin a major repositioning of US diplomatic personnel 
across the world. In a multiyear process, hundreds of positions will be moved to critical emerging areas in 
Africa, South Asia, East Asia, the Middle East and elsewhere. [...] Beginning this year, 100 current positions 
largely from Europe and Washington will be moved. To accomplish this goal, existing State Department 
resources will be readjusted to fit new priorities”. Source: Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice’s vision for 
‘Transformational Diplomacy’, Fact Sheet, Office of the Spokesman, Washington, DC, January 18, 2006. 
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marriage, it reveals a relationship reading from common script. The script remaining an 
output of vibrant interaction, it provides room for manoeuvre within which the EU can play 
out its role and attempt to manage its image internationally. ESDP’s shapers and performers 
seem to have been rising to this occasion. Subsequently, the EU has increasingly become a 
repository of capabilities to act in the world, which, in turn, has added new elements to the 
EU-US relationship. The recent case of negotiating the deployment of European troops in 
Southern Lebanon after new eruption of violence between Israel and Hezbollah219 serves as 
an illustration of what image of the EU ESDP has generated and how this becomes acted out 
within the EU-UN-US triangle. 
 
Taking stock - the Lebanese case  
There is no time to sit on the fence. Europe must cough up with contingent contributions. 
This is about Europe’s credibility in the field of foreign and security policy.220
 
On 25 August 2006 the General Affairs and External Relations Council (GAERC) announced 
in the presence of UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan that EU member states would make 
substantial contributions to the UNIFIL II mission in Lebanon. The magnitude of the 
European contribution to UNIFIL II is remarkable if compared with past commitments. EU 
member states supply about half of the operation’s total personnel of 15,000 troops. With 
more than 7,000 soldiers, the European contribution to UNIFIL surpasses the troop levels of 
the Althea operation in Bosnia-Herzegovina, presently Europe’s largest mission. Moreover, 
EU states provide crucial military components as well as the operational command for 
UNIFIL-II (Dembinski 2007: 2). 
The way in which the EU has positioned itself with regard to the conflict in Lebanon 
was facilitated by the capital previously generated through ESDP’s record, with the latter 
enabling CFSP to function. Formally outside of the ESDP framework, the possibility and 
actual materialisation of the EU’s contribution to the stabilisation forces in Lebanon heavily 
                                                 
 
219 The outbreak of renewed hostilities between Israel and Hezbollah began on 12 July 2006 when Hezbollah 
militants attacked Israeli forces on the Lebanese border. Seven soldiers were killed and two kidnapped. 
Hezbollah continued to launch rockets into Israel in response to which Israel sent land forces into Lebanon and 
attacked targets with continued air strikes. This caused heavy civilian loss and instigated criticism against Israel 
for using disproportionate force. The offensive however received strong backing from the Israeli population. The 
USA further backed the Israeli line of only committing to a ‘sustainable ceasefire’. This was interpreted as 
Israel’s wish to ‘finish the job’, which would mean eradicating Hezbollah or at least seriously weakening its 
forces. 
220 Danish Foreign Minister Per Stig Moeller in an interview with the Berlingske Tidene daily as reported by 
International Herald Tribune on 24.08.2006. This is of particular interest as Denmark is the only opt-out country 
to the ESDP. 
 
 
174
relied on the institutional, operational and ideational resources spawned since ESDP’s 
inception. In this respect, the applied strategies of building international credibility and 
legitimacy through piecemeal pragmatic action, no matter how relatively insignificant in size 
this action may have appeared, have yielded a tangible outcome. They contributed to the 
emergence of an intersubjective consensus on the EU as a capable international crisis 
manager, a muscular civilian power with a strong military dimension. This consensus has a 
number of aspects. It encompasses the growing perception of the international community, the 
UN’s reliance on the EU to operationalise the Security Council resolution and the US 
preference for the EU engagement in the volatile region. Importantly, it now constitutes a 
naturalised tool in the EU’s repertoire as seen from the perspective of the EU members. It was 
not, for example, the initiative of individual EU member states to contribute their troops as 
individual UN members, but an effort put together under the aegis of the EU, and, as such, 
carefully engineered by the Solana milieu.  
This clearly demonstrates the empowerment of the EU through ESDP. The political 
mechanisms that gave rise to this empowerment internationally are intimately connected to 
the strategic moulding of the policy and the act of playing it out within the EU-US-UN 
triangle. This particular entrenchment should also be read against the backdrop of the EU’s 
international impression management. For the Solana milieu, the Lebanon crisis constituted 
yet another call for action, an opportunity for deployment, which triggered the urge to uphold 
and boost the EU’s image. As framed by Solana:  
Lebanon is another example of where Europe has heeded the call for action (emphasis mine - XK). From 
the beginning: 
- we have been united and steadfast in our approach: 
- in our condemnation of Hezbollah’s actions and the kidnapping of the Israeli soldiers; 
- in our support for the Lebanese government and our solidarity with the Lebanese 
people, 
- in our efforts in New York and elsewhere to bring about an end to the violence; 
- in our firm belief that only a broader political effort can address the underlying 
causes for the conflict; 
- and most of all in our willingness to provide the backbone of the reinforced UNIFIL (Solana 2006b: 3). 
 
While this plays down the degree of divergence on the problem among the member 
states evident in their discussions,221 this framing remains part of an image-consolidation 
endeavour. Prominent here are grandiose expectations of the EU’s capabilities, both in the 
region and from the European publics, as is the assertion that their presence on the ground 
                                                 
 
221  The national divergences mainly centred around the French insistence on calling for an immediate cease-fire 
and other states’ (Britain, Germany, the Netherlands and Poland) calling for the immediate cessation of 
hostilities to be followed by a sustainable cease-fire.  
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strengthens the EU’s footing in the Middle East crisis. The latter provides yet another sign of 
the EU’s aspiration to play a role of importance in resolving an issue perceived as crucial to 
international security. As a nascent global crisis manager, the EU should prove through 
concrete action its commitment and deliver success in a conflict regarded as representing the 
problems of a difficult region. More than merely another building block of the EU’s role in 
the making, the Lebanese case served to build on what had already been accumulated. It 
offered an opportunity to benefit from the capital generated in order to plough it back into an 
investment of high revenue promise. Importantly, as the contribution is of military character, 
a scarce possibility was grabbed where the EU could display its capabilities.  
With risk-aversion featuring characteristically high on the agenda, the EU’s 
contribution was mandated by the UN, which undoubtedly played into the hands of all parties 
involved. The EU would hardly have acted so swiftly and substantively if it had not been for 
the failure-absorbing umbrella of the UN and the air of legitimacy the organisation provides. 
The UN itself would barely have been able to mobilise the resources so rapidly and 
effectively if at all. It seems equally inconceivable that the US would have deployed its troops 
in the region permeated with openly hostile anti-American sentiments. Instead of soothing the 
situation, direct US deployment might have exacerbated the tensions. A similar outcome may 
have been engendered by a US-sponsored coalition of the willing. “We would be glad to help, 
you know, with logistics and/or command and control,” said Bush [but] “most nations 
understand that we won’t have troops there on the ground” (cited in International Herald 
Tribune, 1 August 2006). As the international community could not possibly remain dormant 
in the face of another episode in the Palestinian-Israeli drama, the EU image-consolidating 
proposal of contribution was warmly welcomed and perceived as a possible way out of the 
deadlock. On the day of the EU’s decision to commit, Kofi Annan rewarded the EU by saying 
that “Europe has lived up to its responsibility, provided the backbone to the force, and we can 
look forward confidently as we’re building a credible force that will help the international 
community achieve its goals in the region.”222
Not surprisingly, the influence of the United States is again discernible here, and was 
somewhat defining before and throughout the process of the UN and EU discussions over 
Lebanon. The Secretary of State was actively negotiating in the region and preparing the 
                                                 
 
222 Secretary-General’s press conference with EU High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy, 
Javier Solana, EU President Erkki Tuomioja, Foreign Minister of Finland, and Benita Ferrero-Waldner, 
European Commissioner for External Relations, after attending the Extraordinary General Affairs and External 
Relations Council, Brussels, Belgium, 25 August 2006, http://www.un.org/apps/sg/offthecuff.asp?nid=919, 
accessed 5 July 2007. 
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groundwork before further debates could commence. On 31 July 2006, Rice announced an 
“emerging consensus” and concluded: “I believe our work has prepared the way for the 
United Nations Security Council to act on both an urgent and comprehensive basis this week” 
(Rice 2006). On the following day, the Council called for an immediate end to the fighting 
between Israel and the Hezbollah militia in Lebanon:  
The Council calls for an immediate cessation of hostilities to be followed by a sustainable 
cease-fire. In this context, the Council fully supports the efforts of the UN Secretary 
General and the Security Council to be rapidly convened to define a political framework 
for a lasting solution agreed by all parties, which is a necessary precondition for 
deployment of an international force. Such a force requires a strong mandate from the UN 
to act in support of a political settlement and the Lebanese armed forces. Once this 
framework has been established, EU Member States have indicated their readiness to 
contribute to such an operation together with international partners.223
 
Following this statement, the discussions in the Security Council on possible 
undertakings and in the EU on their European execution could begin in earnest. The UN 
became a platform through which the EU could assert its position as a high profile player, 
having beforehand consulted the options with the US.  
 
Role performance  
The crux of the argument is that international politics, as any social forum, is inherently a 
daily struggle over meaning, a strategic interaction undertaken by actors in pursuit of 
particular agendas. In this chapter, I have projected this notion onto the performance of actors 
busy with furthering the plot to their own advantage: Solana-Rice-Annan. Embodying the 
scripts of their respective communities, their action provides for bona fide operationalisation 
of the EU-US-UN triangle. It also illustrates how a broad ideational script becomes 
strategically restructured through political dealings in concrete historical circumstances. 
Crucially, the performance of the EU’s role should be viewed simultaneously as both the 
reflection of the EU’s empowerment through ESDP and a specific delineation of possibilities. 
Within this realm, role performance proceeds through intense image management where 
commitments declared are extensively framed to be followed. Through this process, the EU’s 
security identity on the world stage emerges.  
                                                 
 
223 Council Conclusions, Extraordinary General Affairs and External Relations Council meeting, Brussels, 1 
August 2006. 
 
 
 
177
The notion that the international role of a post-Westphalian actor depends on how it 
conceptualises itself (Larsen 2002: 286) and that for the postmodern state, as for the 
individual, identity is a matter of choice (Cooper 2003: 173), fail to capture the social nature 
of role formation. The EU role conception relies on a dense web of expectations embracing 
the EU’s self-portrait and pictures thereof ingrained in the mind of others. It would still be 
unsustainable to claim that the EU’s posture results from internalised convictions of what the 
EU is and how it should ‘lead by virtuous example’. The ESDP story to date has illustrated 
that there is a strategic element to the EU international position. Indefinable as the impact of 
ESDP may seem, it has translated into a tangible social commitment. This becomes most 
visible in an instance of an international crisis when the EU is now expected to engage most 
concretely. Failure to do so puts the ESDP performers seriously ill at ease. It is perceived as a 
blow to the EU ascending stardom in international security. This fear of failing is partly 
alleviated by jumping on deployable occasions that are easily digestible by the system and yet 
contribute to the image enhancement; an effort, moreover, which should pay off in more 
difficult times. Notably here, insofar as ESDP has become an enabling factor, a means to 
engage and therefore play a role, it has equally converted into a certain social prescription. 
Hence, the EU must get involved as much in order to contribute to the well-being of 
communities under threat as to measure up to the image it has created. This demands 
concentrated discursive efforts, highflying rhetoric, risk aversion and distinct framing of the 
EU’s performance on the ground, oftentimes in exceedingly flattering terms.  
Yet the political malleability of ESDP means that it would be misguided to focus 
solely on the extent to which the goals set in the ESDP doctrine have been realised. The 
declared goals primarily act as labels and, as such, are not necessarily pursued in their 
entirety. Providing as they do political fibre and the necessary ideological justification, they 
contribute to the constitution of a political reality and its legitimacy criteria. In the daily 
political struggle, however, the declaratory goals are approached instrumentally and the 
pursuit of more piecemeal objectives of a day comes to the fore. Further still, the actual 
completion of the declaratory goals alters in the process of attempted implementation. 
Although they might maintain the same wording, transformation of their substance seems a 
rule rather than an exception. On top, the alleged accomplishment of certain goals is without 
doubt subjected to heavy framing, the example of which ESDP endorsement supplies in 
abundance.  
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A new security order as the EU perspective – conclusion  
Having elaborated on the precarious yet consequential cluster of role assignments within the 
EU-US-UN set and, more specifically, on the EU role construction through ESDP, the 
question remains whether this specific division of labour amounts to a new 
international/world/security order. Here, it is perhaps impossible to avoid the question when 
we can say that a fully global international system came into being (Buzan and Little 2000: 
18). Depending on the definition of an international order adopted, i.e. whether we are after 
its thick version or remain satisfied with any indicators of quasi-orderly arrangement, the 
answer varies significantly. Likewise, the conceptualisation hinges on whether the state-
centeredness is a nucleus of the approach, or whether transnational and domestic factors are 
foregrounded. Traditionally, the former has carried the label of correctness in the discipline. 
My proposition of the EU-US-UN functionally differentiated triad as a useful take on the 
problem conversely betrays allegiance to a state-centred view. After Buzan and Little (2000: 
87), I argue that functional units’ differentiation, i.e the specialisation within a system, is key 
to understanding change in international systems. In my reading, the differentiation is 
expressed by the role assignment that becomes fixed through contextual recurrent patterns of 
interaction. This role distribution cannot be regarded as a pivot on which the world order 
hinges, however. It rather expresses an arrangement enacting practices that regulate the code 
of conduct in a given domain. This further indicates the possibility of many such 
arrangements simultaneously unfolding, overlapping and permeating each other.  
Accordingly, whereas I do not defy the salience of the nation state (its action in EU 
diplomacy has been amply demonstrated in this thesis), I point to the importance of other 
parallel arrangements generating distinct international practices. Having argued that ESDP 
heavily influenced the shape of the EU domestic system of governance, I do not immediately 
consider member states as primary units of analysis here. Although this system is in itself an 
inter-state one, the politics of ESDP has produced a phenomenon where political action 
formally negotiated by member states acquires its own self-governing status. More 
concretely, even if it is the member state which takes decisions, the process of instigating 
particular initiatives and their execution is hardly inter-governmental in the conventional 
sense of the word. Intergovernmentalism obtains a new negotiated meaning with the 
mediation of the EU institutions yielding practices previously divorced from the concept.  
The focus on the EU-US-UN triangle may also breed criticism of falling for the 
Eurocentric assertion that the world revolves around Europe, the fixation on the US 
preponderance being yet another indication that only some obsessions are liable to analysis 
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while others should be neglected. Traditionally conceived, world order can be defined as a 
governing arrangement among states, meeting the current demand for order in major areas of 
concern (Sorensen 2006: 343). Why should the EU constitute such a pivot of examination 
with other centres barely acknowledged and yet others ignored altogether? This apparent bias 
of the analysis has easily traceable sources in the research process. The major fibre of the 
argument has been accessed through the accounts of important participants to the constitutive 
events under study. Theirs was the perspective of the EU stance, both in terms of the EU 
domestic system of governance and its international posture. In adopting this research 
strategy, I agree with the notion that world order can hardly be an objective concept but 
instead it becomes a perspective on the world and the place therein as perceived by a 
particular entity. The concept of world order thereby becomes inevitably contextual and 
inherently variable. This variability not only depends on major historical shifts, but it is also 
heavily influenced by local transformations of the entity’s own pursuits and their legitimacy 
as recognised by other players. Thereby, the question of ‘what kind of order’ loses its 
cognitive grip and converts into a set of questions on division of labour and role assignments 
in the current world arrangement.  
The main body of the argument here is that, through ESDP, the shapers of the idea 
embarked on persuading the international audience of their definition of the EU’s role in 
world affairs. By doing so, they had but to confront head-on the question whose security order 
they were about actively to engage with. The issue of the hedonistic American hegemony, and 
the UN’s shameful bankruptcy, indicate entrenched signposts in this endeavour. Although the 
role of the EU member states seems diminished in this regard, this is more a result of 
emphasising the role of the Solana milieu as an organising agency. This remains in line with 
tracing the contours of the world order according to the notion of a perspective rather than a 
concept. The latter involves bringing in the conceptualisation of actors engaged in negotiating 
this order and grasping the roles players assign to each other. Here, the major interest of the 
Solana milieu appears the advancement of the policy despite national incongruence, 
domestically conditioned resistance and international dismissal that has meanwhile 
transformed into incremental acceptance and granting a role to which concrete expectations 
are attached.  
While ESDP performance is heavily embedded in old scripts about the EU, these have 
been exploited so as to bring about a new vocabulary and with it a conceptual change. In this 
respect, ESDP appears an artefact through which skilful political actors have been endorsing a 
set of notions about the EU both domestically and internationally. Certainly, an argument 
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about smooth translation of their framing into an established international practice would be 
unsustainable. First, the substance of the agenda itself hardly features a thorough plan of 
action. It is more constructive to conceive of the ESDP idea as an ideological vision, 
operationalised ‘on the ground’ in the political conversion and in accordance with 
opportunities at hand. Second, the shape of this agenda is mediated by the social modalities of 
international interaction. Thus, although its main message is identifiable and can be succinctly 
put as the pursuit of a meaningful role in security affairs, the concrete conceptual methods of 
implementation have been changing in response to contextual requirements. This highly 
uneven character of the process acknowledged, the claim remains that the policy has been an 
enabling factor in the EU’s international presence and as such has contributed to the shifts in 
the role assignments on the world stage.  
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CONCLUSIONS 
 
[...] the social world does not present itself to us in the form of a thesis, monograph, or 
journal article. The data that we accumulate day by day, week by week, and month by 
month do not automatically yield an understanding that is organised in terms of themes 
and chapters. We all have to struggle to turn the dense complexity of everyday life into a 
linear structure -  an argument that starts on page one, and progress through a logical 
sequence, and ends on a final page. The transformation of cultural life into 80,000 words 
(or whatever) and a series of more or less uniform chapters is achieved through the 
imposition of some major – more or less arbitrary – frameworks and constraints. 
(Atkinson 1992: 5)  
                                                                 
In an effort to understand the contextual logic of the EU’s development in the area of security, 
I have presented a multifaceted argument. In this concluding chapter, I revisit the substance of 
the argument as it has been developed here and put it to a final theoretical trial. Firstly, I 
discuss the EU’s mode of securitisation, indicating how it differs from the classical reading of 
the theory, i.e. that it breeds debate rather than forecloses it, and that it hinges on ‘moulding 
others’ in order to create a secure world for the EU, a practice that I contend amounts to 
‘creeping imperialism’. In order to avoid a misdiagnosis that exaggerates the significance of 
one line of reasoning, I then sketch other possible explanations of ESDP. Finally, I point to 
further research paths, both in terms of additional testing of the argument presented here and 
with regard to paths yet unexplored but worth including in the research agenda.  
 
Development of ESDP 224
The argument is a multilayered story about the EU’s development, told from a particular 
angle but with a desire for a broader appeal. Hence, while expanding on particular elements of 
the argument has been the task of preceding chapters, here I sketch the main body of the case.  
The establishment of the office of the High Representative/Secretary General for 
CFSP and the appointment of Javier Solana to the post has been the driving force behind the 
strategic development of ESDP. This challenges the claim that there is no evidence of top-
down initiatives within the policy apart from the European Defence Agency (Khol 2005; 
Biscop 2005) and the European Security Strategy (Bailes 2005). Assuming a substantial 
entrepreneurial role in ESDP, the Council Secretariat exploits opportunities to paint a 
particular picture of the EU as a crisis manager that is ‘active but non-threatening’ (Solana 
2006). ESDP operations represent in this respect its most significant, if not its defining, 
                                                 
 
224 This section is based on Kurowska 2007b. 
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feature. Formally, missions are reactions to crises on the ground225 as the EU engages with 
what it encounters (Serrano 2006: 39). However, the decision-making process leading to 
deployments challenges this assertion. Notwithstanding the critique that missions come about 
in an accidental fashion and that they represent a case of ‘putting a tool ahead of the analysis’, 
the decisions to launch them never arise out of thin air. Deployment decisions rather reflect 
the strategic investigation of opportunities. They make a statement about the EU directed 
towards external audiences (thereby contributing to the EU’s international positioning of 
itself). Crucially, however, this process also creates useful institutional precedents and 
evidence that can be used in internal political struggles, i.e. turf battles among the institutional 
actors over the viability of what the EU should be like in terms of security policy. The 
preoccupation with seizing suitable possibilities to deploy missions might result in less 
emphasis being given to the actual substance of mandates. This reflects the mediated 
character of the ESDP enterprise where a number of intersecting agendas are in confrontation 
with one another. Yet it also indicates the Solana milieu’s proactive approach to the 
construction of an EU security role in which different possible roles are conceived.  
In a similar vein, ESDP deployments are viewed by the Council Secretariat as testing 
grounds for establishing whether and how the EU is capable of delivering substantive positive 
results. The Laeken declaration announcing ESDP’s operationality provided an enabling carte 
blanche in this context. Regarded by many as merely declaratory politics, it nonetheless 
initiated a number of missions and led to the accumulation of institutional experience. While 
the challenge of the Laeken declaration of operationality was to convert intention into deed, 
the relationship between ESDP and the ESS represents a case of cross-fertilisation. The 
perceived need to provide conceptual and political grounding for missions and to strengthen 
ESDP at a time when CFSP seemed to be in a shambles over Iraq were important reasons 
underlying the formulation of the strategy (Mawdsley and Quille 2003). The perceived 
necessity to operationalise the latter and demonstrate its feasibility generated a demand for 
more missions in line with the goals outlined in the strategy. In this sense, the ESS has 
become a constant point of reference providing justification for further action where the 
expansion of ESDP missions is seen as an endorsement of the ESS. ESDP operations are, 
therefore, as much a response to an international security issue as they are a political means to 
advance a particular agenda. The process of choosing what mission to launch is therefore 
highly nuanced. The Council Secretariat looks for deployments that promise to generate 
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maximum political capital whilst avoiding radical positioning and challenges that might end 
up in total disaster. This strategic approach has resulted in making ESDP an impressive 
success story. 
The decision by the member states to establish the Rapid Reaction Force as part of 
ESDP has been variously described as ‘Europe’s military revolution’ (Andreani et al 2001) 
and as breaking the ‘glass ceiling of Europe’s self-denying ordinance on EU access to military 
competencies’ (Deighton 2002). Yet, although the build-up of military capabilities tends to 
dominate debates (public and academic) on ESDP, it is the number of civilian ESDP missions 
that has rocketed over the last few years. Likewise, although the launch of ESDP proceeded 
under the motto of the necessity to add a military option if the EU is to be a credible 
international actor, the success story of ESDP is, in fact, its civilian crisis management. 
Indeed, of the 15 ESDP operations launched at the time of writing (May 2007), only three 
were military in nature.  
This having been said, considerable effort has been made to build up a pool of 
capabilities readily available for military crisis management. The Berlin Plus agreement with 
NATO on EU access to NATO assets, the Helsinki Headline goal 2010 on capabilities 
improvement, the establishment of the European Defence Agency, and the concept of battle 
groups, come to mind at once. So too does the set-up of military structures in the Secretariat 
General. Moreover, the symbolic dimension of actually launching military missions should 
not be underestimated. With the deployment of Concordia (around 400 troops) to Macedonia, 
the EU has demonstrated for the first time that it is capable of mounting a military 
peacekeeping operation. Althea showed off the EU’s growing actorness in Bosnia as it 
deployed approximately 7,000 troops. And Artemis symbolised that ESDP also functions 
without NATO support under the Berlin-plus agreement. The operation, which was led by 
France as its framework nation, was conceived as a vehicle for asserting the autonomous 
capability of the EU to intervene militarily abroad. In short, just like the civilian ESDP, the 
military ESDP is at least partly the manifestation of the Council’s desire to develop and 
institutionalise its security vision rather than simply a response to (human) security threats 
abroad. 
Not only, however, has the military ESDP so far failed to spawn a parade of 
operations similar to the civilian ESDP, it has also lacked the kind of institutional, bottom-up 
inventiveness present in its civilian counterpart. A conventional explanation of these 
differences might point towards, first, the circumspection towards military missions among 
member states due to their allegiance to NATO, and, second, the scarcity of military resources 
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at the EU’s disposal. However, another reason appears to be equally important in accounting 
for the particularities of ESDP development. Early on, the Solana circle realised that the 
military dimension of ESDP remained controversial, while there were many political 
opportunities to deepen and widen the policy via civilian missions. The Council Secretariat 
has adopted a position that may be seen as thoroughly pragmatic. Setting the grandiose goal 
of becoming a fully capable military actor has not blinded the institutional entrepreneurs to 
becoming stuck with these infeasible objectives. To take advantage of deployable 
opportunities as quickly as possible, mission planners even employed modified military 
scenarios inherited from the WEU as there were initially no civilian conflict management 
scenarios. Traces of this strange origin of civilian missions persist in mandates and planning 
documents in the form of military terminology such as concept of operations (CONOPS) and 
operational plan (OPLAN). 
The greater dynamism of the civilian ESDP is thus explained by the fact that civilian 
missions are a comparatively easy option to advance the security profile of the EU. Troop 
deployments are difficult to agree on and the high end of military operations is unlikely to be 
accomplished soon. Against the backdrop of controversies surrounding military operations, 
the Council Secretariat ventured on to the field of civilian crisis management, traditionally 
occupied by the EC, to boost ESDP. From the perspective of the institution-builders in the 
Secretariat, civilian missions have a number of advantages. To begin with, they are more 
ambiguous and hence are less likely to fail, or, more precisely, their shortcomings can be 
easier disguised as a partial or even full success. The formulation of their mandates is 
evocative in this respect. For instance, it is difficult to imagine any scenario that would allow 
critics to describe the EU Border Assistance Mission Rafah as an outright failure. Its mandate 
tasks it to provide a ‘Third Party presence [emphasis mine - XK] at the Rafah Crossing Point 
in order to contribute to the opening of the Rafah Crossing Point and to build up confidence 
between the Government of Israel and the Palestinian Authority’ (Council Joint Action 
2005/889/CFSP)’. Moreover, civilian missions represent a nuanced engagement with little 
risk of radical positioning, which might otherwise clash with member state agendas. Finally, 
they are good ‘value for money’,226 enabling the EU to engage in relatively low budget 
ventures that nonetheless highlight its presence in a given international situation. 
ESDP’s deep intrusion into the area of civilian crisis management has caused frictions 
with the Commission, which until recently regarded the promotion of the rule of law and 
                                                 
 
226 Interview with a member state representative to the PSC, Brussels, 24 November 2005. 
 
 
186
institution-building as its exclusive competence. Its institutional resentment of this 
encroachment on its turf is further aggravated by the current trend that sees the Council 
reclaim political influence it had previously ceded to the supranational body. In response, the 
Commission seeks to be involved at every stage of the ESDP policy cycle. This is facilitated 
by, first, its role as a budget manager and executor of the civilian ESDP and, second, its 
mandate to ensure consistency and procedural integrity of EU external action at every level of 
CFSP. In practical terms, the involvement of the Commission becomes politically tangible in 
the course of negotiating the formats of particular mission as well as their budgets and 
adherence to procurement policy rules.227  
In light of the empirical record, it is thus premature to claim that the proliferation of 
ESDP missions implies a second-pillarization of EU crisis management. Rather, political 
struggles are in full swing with both pillars strategically employing different media and 
channels to affirm their respective institutional distinctiveness in external policy. The concept 
of emulation is useful to account for this process. Emulation does not refer here to an attempt 
to imitate or copy but points to a political contest over how to frame reality. Opportunities for 
engagement open to both pillars give rise to battles over the definition of situations and issues 
and, consequently, the choice of appropriate policy instruments. The examples recounted 
before, namely the involvement of the Commission in EUJUST Lex and the intricate structure 
and status of the EU Border Assistance Mission to Moldova/Ukraine underscore this point. 
 To conclude, I argue that the development of ESDP has contributed to the emergence 
of EU domestic politics. There the Council Secretariat and the European Commission 
represent actors who produce and reproduce certain beliefs and ideologies about what the EU 
should be like, and work at constructing alliances around these conceptions (Wodak 2004). 
Inter-pillar relations in crisis management reflect the larger phenomenon of the Community 
and the CFSP pillars functioning according to differing working philosophies. This has to do 
not only with the fact that the Commission is a supranational body and CFSP is an 
intergovernmental policy, but also with the increasingly diverging ideational principles 
sustaining their institutional identity. The two institutional entities hold disparate standpoints 
on best practices in crisis management. Their policies and channels of implementation 
accordingly reveal contrasting beliefs about the image of the EU as an international actor, 
including dissimilar security conceptions. Although they essentially agree on what is to be 
                                                 
 
227 Each time a civilian mission is planned, negotiations over its format between the Commission and the 
Council begin from scratch as no template of co-operation has been agreed as of yet. Interview with the EC 
representative to CIVCOM, Brussels, 24 November 2005. 
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achieved to make the world a better place – the usual ‘European’ values of democracy, rule of 
law and so forth, – they nonetheless characteristically diverge on the matter of best strategies, 
means and practices to reach that ideal state. 
Conceptually, whereas the Commission inhabits the world of ‘civilian power Europe’, 
even if modified in accordance with the changing historical conditions, the Solana milieu has 
ventured to make the EU a ‘militarised civilian power’, believing such a transformation is the 
proper response to the exigencies of a globalised world. Solana, as the personification of EU 
foreign policy, represents the trend of the EU ‘coming of age’ and shedding the clothing of a 
civilian power only. He generally advocates an approach according to which the security 
situation has to be stabilised before major long-term development assistance can be initiated. 
He further favours high-profile political action, which should generate substantial even if 
cursory political capital with immediate impact in a particular environment. Because of the 
large publicity they generate, military and civilian missions have become the cutting edge of 
ESDP, its essence and, simultaneously, a vehicle for implementing ‘militarised civilian 
power’. This notion was codified in the ESS, a manifesto of Solana’s vision of the 
international security role of the EU.  
The European Commission, although initially lagging behind, eventually established 
the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) as the embodiment of its conceptual stance on 
how best to project order and security to the EU’s periphery. A comprehensive attempt to 
emulate the robust ESDP venture, the ENP is a way for the Commission to upgrade its profile 
in the field of external policy, i.e. it is the realisation of a certain political project. The 
objective of the ENP as articulated by the Commission is for the EU to act coherently and 
efficiently in the world by integrating related components from all three pillars; as such, it 
should also support efforts to realise the goals of the ESS (Communication from the 
Commission 2004:6). Importantly, by arguing this no challenge to the payoff of the ENP is 
meant, neither is its potential diminished or equated with taking underhanded institutional 
revenge. Instead, the process is rather perceived as the materialisation of politics within the 
EU. More specifically, the differing political discourses that the two bodies have brought into 
being provide for political action as they produce and reproduce beliefs and rally support 
around them.  
The external dimension highlights another concurrent phenomenon that ESDP has had 
a role in producing. ESDP operations and more broadly the endorsement of the policy through 
diverse channels have served the political aim of actively fostering certain expectations 
towards the EU. This can now be capitalised along a wider spectrum of international 
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activities. The distinct quality of the EU’s new makeup in security affairs can be fruitfully 
approached through the EU-US-UN interactional triangle. Within this relationship, there 
emerges a dynamic division of labour constituting scripts which the actors fall back on. In 
effect, the EU acquires a certain international identity, which is now recognised and acted 
upon by other international players. Although the regions of ESDP application and further 
centres of influence in international relations (e.g. China, Russia, India) should hardly be 
downplayed in the analysis of the EU international image, the treatment they receive in the 
EU external agenda is largely a reflection of the stance within the triad. Further, in spite of its 
postmodern characteristics, the EU hangs on to fairly traditional conception of carrying the 
torch of civilisation, ESDP being yet another if very specific instance thereof.  
The main ‘significant other’ in the EU’s international impression management remains 
the US. Some may crudely construe that the US ultimately sets the terms of reference for the 
EU international presence. This would diminish the actual impact of ESDP developments on 
the EU international performance and its own ascendance on the world stage along with a 
genuine strategic effort at constructing a niche in which the EU can excel. I argue instead that 
ESDP has added to new recognition of the EU on the part of the US. First, the European 
continent seems to have now been largely conceded to the Europeans to deal with. What was 
once a main theme of European leaders’ nightmares, i.e. being abandoned by Big Brother, has 
incrementally happened as a result of the EU’s own actions. The entrepreneurial role played 
by the Council Secretariat in initiating ESDP missions and building on the political capital 
they have generated prove effective in fashioning the EU as a unique crisis manager. The 
tangible, high-profile presence on the ground has contributed to the enhancement of the EU’s 
political status, giving its security policy greater clout. Second, the US has grown to treat the 
EU as a kind of deputy in world security affairs where it is preferable for the US to keep a low 
profile so as not to exacerbate potential tensions. Accordingly, the EU takes the lead, after 
thorough consultation with the US counterparts and their consent, in many instances where its 
image of a benign broker acts as a lubricant in negotiations. The EU is thus welcome as a 
deputy, preaching the same values but less confrontationally, which makes its involvement in 
certain regions more acceptable. This does not denote harmonious settlement of the EU-US 
relationship. Similarly, as the issue of Iraq clearly demonstrated, national differences within 
the EU itself come to the surface at transformative moments. It is still important to see the 
willingness and ability of the EU to transform the diplomatic fallout among member states 
over the US-led invasion of Iraq from a crisis into a catharsis and an impetus to ESDP 
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development (cf. Menon 2004). This indicates strong commitment both in Brussels and in 
national capitals to continue despite many hurdles on the way.  
The UN in this regard often becomes a forum on which certain games are played out. 
Although the importance of this facilitating function can hardly be discounted, seeing the 
organisation only as a playground would be deceptive. The UN has a discernible agenda at 
work. Brussels has always been an important supporter of the UN as a champion of effective 
multilateralism, and ESDP has given it even more powerful means than those available to the 
UN to promote values shared by both institutions. This changes the parameters of the EU-UN 
relationship. ESDP thus provides “oxygen for the United Nations” (House of Lords Minutes 
of Evidence 2004:7). With such equipment at its disposal, it is rather the EU that sets the 
agenda and defines the terms of the relationship with the UN, the latter playing the role of a 
legitimising body for ESDP whose consent, however, may not always be indispensable 
(Tardy 2005: 49-51). This is clearly a breach of the spirit of the UN Charter. The long-
established view on the global-regional relationship in security matters posits that a dominant 
UN would delegate tasks to subordinate regional institutions. In this conception, the region is 
simply an intermediate actor that undertakes tasks determined at the multilateral level. The 
main purpose of regional agencies, according to this perspective, is to contribute to a 
multilateral system controlled by the UN Security Council (Hettne and Söderbaum 2006: 
227). In the case of the EU, the roles are reversed. Somehow it is the global organisation that 
seeks legitimacy through reliance on a regional performer invoking the UN authority. 
Mutually advantageous as the relationship indisputably is, the traditional terms of reference 
have shifted and the enabling character of ESDP for the EU can hardly go unnoticed.  
Having examined the shift in role assignment via ESDP, one should address what in 
particular the EU role involves. This has been partly attended to in the course of the analysis 
above. A further conclusion should follow that ESDP is a fundamentally curious label for the 
EU’s role as it has been enacted to date. At its core, the policy is that of crisis management 
broadly conceived, but it also includes acting on situations, which can be called crises only 
thanks to extensively framing them as such. On other occasions, conversely, the EU has often 
failed to act in security matters of acute international importance. Still, this should not evoke 
criticism that fails to acknowledge substantial achievements in generating innovative 
scenarios of (civilian) crisis management/reform assistance and robust attempts at their 
implementation. If substance were to be a defining category, the policy should thus rather be 
named European Crisis Management Policy. Such a label, in line with the analysis of the 
EU’s relationships with the US and the UN, further implies that the EU’s role is to carry out 
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auxiliary functions sooner than an independent undertaking. According to this reading, the EU 
lubricates the actions of the UN and US while the latter two enable its crisis management 
activities by providing recognition and the actual room for acting. This would again be too 
hasty a conclusion. One might instead venture a claim that the EU has skilfully curved a 
particular niche for itself in the realm of international civilian assistance. It can hardly be 
sustainable denigration if this has been performed via climbing the shoulders of others. 
 
Securitisation the EU way 
The analytical framework employed here features two central tenets, namely the 
intersubjective discursive variability of the concept of security, and, secondly, the constitutive 
role therein of actors who strategically act to endorse their political projects. These are 
theoretical lenses through which to look at three important dimensions of the politics of 
European security: the institution of different security conceptions within the EU, the internal 
politico-institutional struggles that have been inherent to this process, and the accompanying 
EU repositioning on the world stage.  
 I analyse the framing of a particular meaning of security at the EU level from the 
generic perspective of securitisation, i.e. the discursive process of rendering certain issues 
security issues. On the premise that security is a historically variable condition, I see ESDP as 
an instance of contextualised securitisation. Along these lines, the shaping of ESDP is not an 
objective or ahistorical phenomenon but it rather represents a contextual political project. The 
referent object of security in this exercise remains the notion of the EU as a cherished 
common good that provides for the peaceful wellbeing of its more than 450 million citizens. 
The way to guard this achievement is through moulding others in accordance with the EU’s 
successful model and by instilling ideologies within which the polity operates most 
comfortably. In this sense, the EU is busy constructing its ‘creeping empire’ and portraying its 
laws as a natural arrangement of things. Protagonists across the EU spectrum wholeheartedly 
concur that the aim to be achieved is to foster good governance and rule of law within the 
EU’s neighbourhood. Illustratively, ESDP and the ENP overlap in their efforts to create good 
neighbours, the kind who conforms not only to ‘EU values’ generally speaking, but also to 
EU standards and laws in specific areas. In short, the objective is to extend the EU’s values 
and norms to neighbours through conditionality and thereby ‘make the world a better place’: 
effectively one in which the EU feels at ease. Whereas actors agree on this abstract objective, 
they nonetheless characteristically diverge on the matter of best strategies, means and 
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practices to reach the ideal state. Hence, while the Solana milieu and the Commission already 
differ in language relating to the same goals, they produce thoroughly diverging conceptions 
of how to accomplish them. 
Security being a realm of intense struggles over meaning, ESDP has thus become a 
field of turbulent political interaction with distinct internal and international political actors 
pursuing their competing agendas. This empirical conclusion trespasses upon the major 
proposition of securitisation theory, the principle that security claims eradicate the possibility 
of politics. The major thesis of securitisation according to the Copenhagen School is ‘the 
move that takes politics beyond the established rules of the game and frames the issue as a 
special kind of politics or as above politics’ (Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde1998: 23). In other 
words, the enunciation of security itself creates a new social order wherein ‘normal politics’ is 
bracketed. The development of ESDP, conversely, defies the assertion that the label of 
security entails the rejection of ‘normal politics’ in favour of exceptional measures. The 
politics of security appears a major field of politico-institutional struggle in the EU domestic 
arena and as such becomes a realm of fierce debate rather than foreclosing it. In particular, the 
inception of this securitising project opened rather than precluded debates about what EU 
security is about and how it should be pursued.  
The creation and institutional endorsement of the project similarly aroused resistance 
and emulation attempts within the EU’s system of governance. This denotes the involvement 
of judgment and strategic game as well as it weakens clear legalistic rules that previously 
regulated the conduct of many institutional bodies. Here politics enters the scene from 
backstage, i.e. it involves the transferral of the decision making process onto the realm of the 
informal and setting in un-codified practices of policy making. The introduction of security 
thus prompts a move from a technocratic legalistic culture to a robust political one. This 
marks the moment at which legal regulations alone can no longer be relied upon, and political 
choices must be made. The ensuing power relations enact practices that empower one group 
of actors while disabling another. However, power being something that is inherently 
contestable, the arrangements are far from settled. The political struggle in the realm of 
security goes on, both in discursive terms of constantly framing and reframing, and as regards 
institutional battles where concrete projects become grounds for building up political capital. 
Still, paradoxically, the rise of politics has in fact strengthened the contours of the domestic 
arena in that ESDP has forged a distinct framework where the institutional conflict could 
unfold. This is because despite the differences, there is commitment to on-going negotiation, 
both among the member states and across institutions.  
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At the heart of this struggle lies the experience of nuisance with civilian power 
vocabulary and the desire to break free from its constraints. The entrenched vocabulary of 
civilian power features a sense of inferiority and unjustified marginalisation despite the 
perceived importance and ability to make the world a better place. ESDP’s performers 
brought back to bear what the EU had been occupied refuting after the Second World War, 
i.e. great desires to be a player with ‘a say’, preferably more considerable than others and at 
least as vital as the US. Security being at the core of posturing in international affairs, there 
must have emerged a tool empowering the EU in this respect. Here, ESDP represents the 
pursuit for recognition as an eligible security player. This attempt has then yielded tangible 
acknowledgment of the EU’s instrumental role in security affairs.  
Provocatively, one may approach the EU as a typical instance of a neurotic personality 
(Horney 1936). Inherently convinced of its uniqueness, it acts to the contrary towards the 
outside, with this guise of inferiority aimed at alleviating the pain of exceptionality not 
recognised. As the direct wish-fulfilment involves a great deal of anxiety, allaying this 
anxiety becomes more urgent than a direct fulfilment of the wish. Never entirely unforeseen, 
there might, however, come a moment of major breakthrough when aspirations are finally 
admitted and acted upon. This comes with actual acknowledgment that any kind of 
achievement presupposes taking risks and making efforts. Modestly but tangibly, ESDP 
seems to have freed the EU from the most debilitating traits of neurotic personality. In effect, 
ESDP making has proven transformative both domestically and internationally. A policy 
addressed towards the outside has significantly reconfigured the inside, shifting the local rules 
of conduct as much as it contributed to particular recognition of the EU as an international 
crisis manager. 
As regards the theoretical perspective of securitisation, one may have doubts whether 
selecting this theory is an appropriate choice for the research at hand. If it has been so 
thoroughly defied in some of its major principles, perhaps it is no longer securitisation theory 
that I am testing. Two qualifications are in place. First, it is part of conventional scientific 
procedure to dissect theories and confront their failings, as much as it is to expand/narrow 
their scope of application by modifying their fundamental tenets. In this project, I interpret 
securitisation as a mode of agenda-setting and political framing. I thus approach it as 
productive of a field of political action and I attempt to restore politics to the theoretical 
perspective that seems unduly devoid of it. Second, manifestly, the choice of theories we 
make for our projects is not an innocent endeavour. In line with the assertion that theories are 
always ‘for’ someone and ‘for’ some purpose (Cox 1986), they perform a particular job upon 
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our work. Ole Wæver suggests in this respect that theory should be as a speech act, enabling 
the researcher to claim what s/he would otherwise be unable to argue. Were the theory not 
there, the conclusions would accordingly turn out different228 for we never see the ‘world out 
there’ as it is, but comprehend it through our concepts (Kratochwil 2007:25). In this thesis, 
securitisation theory allowed to bring out the security aspect of the EU integration in the 
present context. This hardly denotes the conventional reading of the EU project as a way of 
‘making the war impossible among its members’. It rather appeals to the EU as an active 
securitiser towards its outside where securitisation involves moulding others according to 
one’s own model, labelled as ‘making the world a better place’. Fundamentally here, the 
theory is essential to illustrate how security is a variable concept whose meaning cannot be 
determined philosophically, or by social scientists’ conceptual analysis, but it is instead an 
attribute of a community. As an intersubjective phenomenon, it can be framed politically in 
accordance with the local rules of the game. This is where politics comes in and where 
domestic struggles over meaning enter the scene.  
‘Empire in denial’  
There is an interesting consequence of the EU growing out of its civilian power clothing. A 
policy initiated to add a military dimension to the EU has flourished through the launching of 
missions of strictly civilian character, in particular police, rule of law and border monitoring 
operations. Characteristically, civilian crisis management within ESDP may resemble 
different variations of development aid the Commission has engaged in to date. Yet ESDP is 
no development aid by definition. Its crisis management capabilities bear witness to it, so 
does the emphasis on the military aspect development aid stuns from. The presentation of 
ESDP is designed so as to differentiate it from the conventional Community tools in the realm 
of development assistance. The shift the policy has marked from inducing security via 
boosting development, the traditional Community approach, to first guaranteeing security as a 
sine qua non of development is similarly evocative here. There are, nevertheless, many traits 
of ESDP that look a lot like a practice historically rooted in the Europe’s self-acclaimed and 
self-interested civilising vocation.  
 In this reading, ESDP acquires characteristics that conjure up the ‘white man’s 
burden’ of civilising others. No suggestion at the tutelage of backward people is thereby 
                                                 
 
228 Remark by Ole Wæver in the panel ‘Desecuritization and security as a common good’ in the 6th Pan-
European International Relations Conference, Turin, 14 September 2007. 
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implied. This would constitute a substantial breach of the received language surrounding the 
EU’s role. Rather, while the genuine urge to help and the respect for equality have become 
universal principles, a paternalistic and coercive (in the form of conditionality) strain remains 
a clear undercurrent. One can argue after Michael Merlingen and Rasa Ostrauskaite that the 
ethos of care at the heart of ESDP, even while it promotes ethical security policies that 
downplay the moral and political significance of the difference between citizens and 
foreigners, still licences practices solidifying the power of internationals (Europeans) over the 
locals (2006: 3). Such practices may subsequently congeal into patterns of paternalism and 
domination, which stifle what David Scott (1999) calls the local demand for a future 
constructed in its own vernacular image.  
On the wave of ‘imperialism coming back into fashion in the West’ (Easterly 2006: 
270), ESDP may stand as a new byword of an ideology of contemporary neo-imperialism. 
The question arises what the benefit for the donor should be in this context. In the 
traditionally conceived development aid, the latter is often ‘tied’. This denotes that with the 
flows of cash, etc. there comes the requirement on the recipient to purchase some products in 
the donor country, to facilitate tenders for the donor’s country companies or to provide 
political alliance, e.g. in UN voting. How is the EU rewarded for its engagement? Most 
recently, promoting democracy and good governance has often meant engaging in state-
building in fragile states. Such an intervention denotes significant influence on the structures 
of the state, which may be swayed in a preferred direction. The EU aims at building ‘a ring of 
well-governed states in its neighbourhood’ and wider. Accordingly, the impact on 
reconstituting the institutions of fragile societies becomes crucial for the EU own wellbeing. 
Moulding others according to its model is the EU‘s preferred method of providing its own 
security.  
This is, however, also a particular way of building an empire, a practice fervently 
denied or rather meticulously backgrounded in the official discourse. The main feature of this 
‘empire in denial’ (Chandler 2006) is that the EU seeks to deny accountability and 
responsibility for the power it effectually exercises (Ibid, 8). Officially, the EU strives to be a 
subtle donor who fosters homely-grown solutions and spreads best practices without prejudice 
to the local tradition. Wielding considerable influence on the shape of local institutional 
arrangements, it still takes a posture of a facilitator, or a broker providing advice while 
emphasising the principle of local ownership. It thereby accepts no liability for actions that go 
to the core of the local governance system. This is because admitting imposition and power 
hardly belongs in the EU’s vocabulary.  
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As Cooper has argued, although the most logical way of coping with chaos is through 
colonisation and all the conditions for imperialism are there, the phenomenon has long been a 
synonym for abuse and therefore impossible to apply (2002). There are no colonial powers 
today willing to take on the job, though the opportunities, perhaps even the need for 
colonisation, is as great as it ever was in the nineteenth century. What is needed then is a new 
kind of imperialism, one acceptable to a world of human rights and cosmopolitan values. The 
EU with its postmodern personality may offer such a system, which, like all imperialism, 
aims to bring order and organisation, but which in the EU case  rests on the voluntary 
principle. Here, the EU’s way stands out favourably against the rough and ready empire of the 
US, and the bungling and bureaucratically-impaired UN. The uniqueness of the EU as a crisis 
manager allegedly derives from the civilisation standing of the EU. The EU should thus exert 
a large degree of influence since it represents ‘Europe’ and because it constitutes some kind of 
alternative thinking to the one embraced by the US. Many Europeans truly believe the Union 
to be the world’s leading moral authority and they are convinced that it can lead by virtuous 
example both when it comes to a number of issues of global governance and being capable of 
bearing the historical responsibility towards the former colonies (Vogt 2006b: 3). The 
discursive salience of this theme crops up repeatedly across the whole range of ESDP 
activities. One may then conclude that the policy has become a new form of denied neo-
imperialism. 
 
Alternative perspectives  
This thesis embraces and implements a non-causal research approach as a viable option for 
understanding a particular social setting. While Chapter I presents the conventional ESDP 
story as a misguided vantage point for grasping the policy, this section grapples with a 
conventional element of a doctoral thesis, i.e. alternative explanations. Here I bring back 
some well-entrenched theoretical positions in order to reflect on what I might have silenced in 
the narrative underpinning this thesis. The most prominent among alternative hypotheses is 
the conception of CFSP/ESDP as a counterweight to US preponderance. 
The theory of the balance of power from which this hypothesis springs offers a neat 
explanation that we can expand to the problem at hand. I take here the Waltzian and 
Mearsheimerian framing of the notion (Mearsheimer 2006). While the former reading 
represents a version of neorealism labelled as defensive (“Waltz has a rather benign theory of 
international politics. He believes that international anarchy encourages aggression, but not 
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too much of it, mainly because he thinks that states balance efficiently against aggressors. If a 
great power gets too greedy, according to Waltz, the other great powers will gang up on it and 
crush it”, Ibid, 110), the latter is termed ‘offensive realism’. The crux of its claim is a 
structural determinism that produces an unending quest for hegemony (Ibid, 111). These two 
readings of international politics might be considered together in order to examine the 
modalities of ESDP explanation through the neorealist lenses.229  
The Waltzian position rests on two assumptions: (1) the system is anarchic, and (2) 
states seek to survive. He explicitly maintains that he does not assume that states are rational 
actors. Offensive realism theory is based on five assumptions: (1) the system is anarchic, (2) 
all great powers have some offensive military capability, (3) states can never be certain about 
other states’ intentions, (4) states seek to survive, and (5) great powers are rational actors or 
strategic calculators (Ibid, 112). The resulting claim should thus be that all great powers at all 
times behave aggressively because the system makes them do so.  
Two lines of reasoning may be pursued. A true Waltzian would perhaps conceive of 
ESDP as a tool to equip the EU with means to act in the dangerous and chaotic world with an 
aim to protect the EU project from extinction. No matter how frivolous this may sound in the 
light of the neorealist emphasis on national sovereignty as a core value to be safeguarded (the 
EU being a synonym of pooling national sovereignty for broader communal purposes), and 
how close it is to the Weaver/Buzan line, the plausibility of such an argument cannot be 
discarded. In fact, an exact translation of such a position into a policy guideline recurs 
repeatedly in the discursive repertoire of Solana and Cooper. If one delves into the matter  
more deeply, an idea emerges that behind the discursive moulding of ESDP there must keep 
themselves busy the conscientious students of Waltz’s theory, conceding to the assertion by 
Posen that: 
ESDP is best explained by the international relations theory known as structural realism, 
the modern guise of balance of power theory. Balance of power theory is contrasted with 
balance of threat theory. Though European states are not motivated by a perception of an 
imminent threat from the US, they are balancing the US power. The concentration of 
global power in the US, unipolarity, is uncomfortable even for its friends who fear the 
abandonment that the US freedom of action permits and who wish to influence the global 
political environment the US could create. (Posen 2006: 149). 
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There is an important analytical corollary to this perspective. Despite the amount and 
intensity of politics involved in policy making, the researcher is ill-advised to study the latter 
as an independent variable for eventually structures will determine actors’ behaviour. 
According to this reading, the emergence of ESDP was thus pre-determined by the 
regularities of the international system. 
Two aspects seem neglected in this account. First, the rejection of the role of agents in 
the theory in favour of systemic variables denies the very achievement behind the ESDP, the 
strategic political struggle towards empowering a certain notion about the EU that facilitated 
the emergence of the policy. Second, such commitment seizes the phenomenon as a natural 
occurrence and not a contextual development from within a range of possibilities.  
Mearsheimer’s argument emphasises the rationality of the actors involved and the 
strategic calculation they bring to bear. Quite apart from the fact that he perceives only states 
as rational actors granting no leeway for crucial domestic contention, a fundamental flaw 
seems to be the literal fusion of rationality and deliberation with the strong emphasis on the 
genuinely logical nature of these two. Accordingly, being rational means deliberating on all 
the options available (how can this be exhaustively covered?) and then consciously choosing 
the one, which maximises one’s interests (how is this to be known?). The subsequent step is 
to design a meticulous plan of how to proceed in order to realise one’s choice, and 
painstakingly sticking to the method throughout the process. This explicitly means the denial 
of politics along numerous important dimensions. First, it downplays the extent to which what 
is ‘rational’ is socially conditioned. Put differently, the set of priorities that we cherish is 
endogenous to our position and not autonomously put together. The intersubjective 
conceptions of what is right to be wished for come to play. Second, the situation of choice is 
hardly lucid even in the most seemingly unambiguous moment of facing two alternative 
options, e.g. whether to invade Iraq or not. In addition to a lingering possibility that the 
decision has been taken before the choice situation is staged, little appears obvious. An 
evocative quotation elucidates the matter: 
The usual choice situation is one of befuddlement and insecurity in which neither the 
options nor the situation are obvious. When we finally have acted in any reasonably way 
in complex situations and are not simply “acting out”, we usually did so on the basis of 
“all things considered”. This process involved several goings back and forth, examining 
the situation, the alternatives, weighing the urgency and the possibilities of avoiding 
choices etc. Also when we have made a decision there are usually several “reasons” that 
were in the motivational set and they are frequently clearer to an observer than to 
ourselves. While we, of course, might be deceiving ourselves (and also might have 
reasons for wanting to deceive our audience by providing different justifications), good 
reasons for actions resemble more like the different “legs” that support a chair in 
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conjunction with each other, rather than a “link” that bind one element of a chain to the 
other. (Kratochwil 2006a: 18). 
 
Third, the managerial perspective on strategy as a clear-cut methodological scheme 
that provides for appropriate solutions throughout the process poorly reflects political 
dynamics. A ‘thin’ version of the concept seems more appealing. In particular, a loose 
strategically-informed framework created in a piecemeal fashion, malleable enough to adjust 
on the way to accommodate new developments better illustrates how a viable strategy is 
drafted. Likewise, the contentious character of political situations with both internal and 
external challenges cannot but affect the substance of the strategy and call for manoeuvres 
that might seemingly defy the strategy itself.  
The above considerations make both Waltz’s and Mearsheimer’s proposals 
incongruent with the argument of the thesis. Foreign to the logic adopted here, they still open 
interesting ways of playing with ESDP possibilities, or, rather, they show how problems are 
reconfigured depending on what the starting position happens to be. Importantly, adopting 
offensive realism entails not merely stating that at the origins of ESDP there lies the intention 
of curbing the US’s imperial drive (Waltzian), but, essentially ESDP must have been 
catalysed by the EU’s desire for hegemony, if not on the global scale, then certainly within its 
own backyard. This argument makes a strange but arresting bedfellow with the idea that 
ESDP should be another form of Europe’s civilising mission towards the rest of the world.  
Another alternative structural explanation of ESDP would be to see ideational factors 
as predominant, i.e. the notion that the emergence of ESDP has been brought about through 
the ideational shifts in security thinking and its principles. While neo-realism removes ideas 
from its concept of world politics, states strive for hegemony for power’s sake regardless of 
norms and identities, in the ideational perspective norms and ideas prevail because they merit 
such prominence and not because they happen to embody certain contentious agendas. 
Paradoxically, this position is not as far from the neorealist posture as it may initially appear 
given the neorealist disdain for ideas as powerless with regard to the system. Purely ideational 
explanations similarly overemphasise systemic factors. They lose sight of the (political) actors 
in performance and downplay the role of contentious politics. In so doing, they reject the idea 
that agency matter in social life since agents are not simple ‘throughputs’ of some structures 
working behind their backs (Kratochwil 2006b: 6). Still, actors matter as performers of certain 
political projects enacted with a view to impose a specific definition of a situation.  
Lastly, I might have fallen prey to a typical scholarly malady of exaggerating the 
salience of the subject under study. Behind this, there lurks the charge that I have 
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correspondingly been busy with giving substance to an elusive phenomenon deemed to fade 
away before long. ESDP might perhaps be seen as a paper tiger, a fleeting occurrence yet 
expanded in the research to appear otherwise. Intimately connected, exploring the subject in a 
particular way might have proceeded with a view to establishing a specific scholarly agenda. 
Impossible to defy this in its entirety, in order to avoid such an entanglement I have attempted 
to report in detail the procedure applied with a belief that narrating the procedure provides for 
a sound account of how the research has been conducted. Describing the procedure is a means 
of disclosing to the public what happened in the course of the research that makes the 
researcher think what s/he claims to be her/his argument over things. It sheds light on the 
critical moments of the research. Ideally then, while there are many ways of telling the same 
story, recounting the procedure should someway diminish the possibility of ‘cooking’ data 
and bestowing interpretations, which claim unfounded salience.  
 
Where to carry on the research 
Within the thesis I advocate a research approach that sees particular value in micro-political 
analysis as a way to understand broader political orders. I have accordingly attempted to 
combine discourse analysis and an ethnographic approach in order to problematise the 
emergence and practices of ESDP making. This has been limited in scope. So as to study the 
rules of the ESDP game and the politics behind the enterprise more thoroughly, the research 
agenda on ESDP should include comprehensive politico-institutional ethnographies where 
different constitutive actors can be observed at work, including those contesting the policy. 
Such research would ideally cover two critical dimensions. The decision-making milieu in 
Brussels offers examples of establishing concrete practices in negotiating the policy and 
struggling over its various meanings, institutionally and conceptually. Research based on 
thorough embeddedness in this setting could provide material to gauge the extent to which the 
argument presented here about the rise of the domestic politics within the EU actually reflects 
the daily practice of the EU. It would further allow for the tracking of the operating power 
relations within the policy. Different milieus of ESDP operations, conversely, provide ample 
data for studying the dynamics of implementing the policy. The analysis to date shows that 
the latter acquire logics of their own, and feature a considerable degree of managerial and 
operational flexibility. In a sense, each ESDP operation is a full-fledged story in itself. While 
it reflects the practices of the policy at large, it also presents rich contextual accounts that 
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deviate from the official ESDP narrative. Engaged study of different ESDP operations 
settings would provide for a particularly rich picture of the policy. 
Regarding the implementation of particular ESDP projects, an interesting and sorely 
underexplored aspect remains the receptiveness of ESDP on the ground and, crucially, the 
terms of the EU-local community relationship. This thesis mentions the notion of ‘empire in 
denial’. Yet it would be of interest to examine more systematically EU practices in concrete 
cases of engagement in moulding local societies, and, more interestingly, the terms of 
interaction that underpin these practices. Detailed reports, thorough in substance and strong 
on conceptual insights that would problematise the EU performance in this regard are rare. 
This might be because traditional IR approaches have difficulty grappling with the multilevel 
diversity inherent to ESDP where little is standardised, yet issues are dealt with (in a more or 
less effective manner). Still, this manner of working at contextually viable solutions despite 
apparent absence of an overarching formula might indeed capture most aptly the postmodern 
character of the EU as a polity. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
201
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
202
BIBLIOGRAPHY: 
 
Adler, E. and Barnett, M. (1998) ‘A Framework for the Study of Security Communities’ in E. Adler and 
M.Barnett (eds) Security Communities, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 29-65.  
 
Agar, M. H. (1996) The Professional Stranger. An Informal Introduction to Ethnography, London and 
San Diego: Academic Press, Inc.  
 
Aggestam, L. (2004) ‘Role Identity and the Europeanization of Foreign Policy: a Political-Cultural 
Approach’, in B. Tonra and T. Christiansen (eds) Rethinking EU Foreign Policy, Manchester: Manchester 
University Press, pp. 81-98. 
 
Albright, M. (1998) ‘The Right Balance will Secure NATO’s Future’, Financial Times, 7 Dec. 1998. 
 
Allen, D. and Smith, M. (1990) ‘Western Europe’s Presence in the Contemporary International Arena’, 
Review of International Studies, 16 (1): 19-37. 
 
Allen, D. and Smith, M. (1998) ‘The EU Presence in the new European Security Order: Barrier, 
Facilitator or Manager’ in C. Rhodes (ed) The EU in the Global Community, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.  
 
Andersen, N. (2003) Discursive Analytical Strategies. Understanding Foucault, Koselleck, Laclau, 
Luhman, Bristol: The Policy Press. 
 
Andreani, G., Ch. Betram and Ch. Grant (2001) Europe’s Military Revolution, London: Centre for 
European Reform.  
 
Ashley, R. (1989) ‘Living on the Borderlines’, in J. DerDerian and M. J. Shapiro (eds) 
International/Intertextual Relations, New York: Lexington Books, pp. 259–321. 
 
Atkinson, P. (1992) Understanding ethnographic texts, Newbury and London: Sage. 
 
Austin, J. L. (1962) How to Do Things with Words, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
Baldwin, D. (1997) ‘The Concept of Security’, Review of International Studies, 23: 5-27. 
 
Bailes, A. (2005) ‘The European Security Strategy: An Evolutionary History’, SIPRI Policy Paper no. 10. 
Stockholm: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. 
 
Balzacq, T. (2005) ‘Three Faces of Securitisation: Political Agency, Audience and Context’, European 
Journal of International Relations, 11(2): 171-201.  
 
Berenskoetter, F.S. (2005) ‘Mapping the Mind Gap: A Comparison of US and European Security 
Strategies’, Security Dialogue, Vol. 36(1): 71–92. 
 
Berger, P. L. and Luckman, T. (1991) The Social Construction of Reality, London: Penguin Books.  
 
Bevir, M. and Rhodes, R.A.W. (2006) Governance Stories, London and New York: Routledge, 
 
Biscop, S (2002) ‘In Search of a Strategic Concept for the ESDP’, European Foreign Affairs Review, 
7(4):473-490.  
 
Biscop, S. (2005a) ‘E Pluribus Unum? Military Integration in the European Union’, Egmont Papers no 7. 
Brussels: Royal Institute for International Relations (IRRI-KIIB). 
 
Biscop, S. (2005b) The European Security Strategy. A Global Agenda for Positive Power, Aldershot 
2005. 
 
Biscop, S.and Coolsaet, R. (2003) ‘The World is the Stage - a Global Security Strategy for the EU’, 
Policy Paper 8, Paris: Notre Europe. 
 
 
203
 
Blumer, H. (1969) Symbolic Interactionism: Perspectives and Method, Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-
Hall. 
 
Bono, G. (2002) ‘Democratic accountability of international military and police cooperation in the EU’, 
Geneva: Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces. 
 
Booth, K. (1991) ‘Security and Emancipation’, Review of International Security, 17(4): 313-326. 
 
Booth, K. (2004) ‘Realities of Security’, International Relations, 18 (1):5-8. 
 
Brenner, M. (1998), Terms of Engagement: The United States and the European Security Identity, 
London: Praeger. 
 
Brenner, M. J. (2002) ‘Europe’s New Security Vocation’, McNair Paper 66, Washington: Institute for 
National Strategic Studies, National Defense University. 
 
Bretherton, Ch. and Vogler, J. (2006) The EU as a Global Actor, London and New York: Routledge. 
 
Brzeziński, Z. (1997) The grand chessboard: American primacy and its geostrategic imperatives, New 
York, NY: Basic Books. 
 
Bull, H. (1983) ‘Civilian power Europe: a contradiction in terms’, in L. Tsoukalis (ed) The European 
Community: Past, Present and Future, London: Blackwell, pp.149-70. 
 
Burchill, S. (1996) ‘Introduction’, in S. Burchill and A. Linklater (eds) Theories of International 
Relations, Basingstoke an London: MacMillan Press Ltd. 
 
Buzan, B. (1991) People, States and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold 
War Era, 2nd ed., Brighton: Harvester Wheatsheaf. 
 
Buzan, B. and Little, R. (2000) International Systems in World History: Remaking the Study of 
International Relations, Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press. 
 
Buzan, B. and Wæver, O. (2003) Regions and Powers. The Structure of International Security, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Buzan, B., Wæver, O. and de Wilde, J. (1998) Security: A New Framework for Analysis Boulder: Lynne 
Rienner. 
 
Buzan, B. and Wæver, O. (1997) ‘Slippery? Contradictory? Sociologically Untenable? The Copenhagen 
School Replies’, Review of International Studies 23(2): 241–50. 
 
Campbell, D. (1992) Writing Security. US Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity, Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press. 
 
Campbell, D. (1998) National Deconstruction: Violence, Identity, and Justice in Bosnia, Minneapolis and 
London: University of Minnesota Press 
 
Carlsnaes, W., Sjursen H. and White, B. (eds) (2004) Contemporary European Foreign Policy, London: 
Sage. 
 
Cederman, L. (2001) ‘Political Boundaries and Identity Trade-Offs’ in L. Cederman (ed) Constructing 
Europe’s Identity. The External Dimension, Boulder London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, pp. 1-32.  
 
Chandler, D. (2006) Empire in denial: the politics of state-building, London: Pluto. 
 
Charillon, F. (2005) ‘The EU as a security regime’, European Foreign Affairs Review, 10: 517-533. 
 
Chilton, P. (2004) Analysing political discourse: theory and practice, London and New York: Routledge. 
 
 
204
 
Chinkin, Ch. (2004) ‘European Security Strategy: an International Law Framework with Respect to 
International Peace and Security’. Background paper for the Barcelona group, London: The Centre for the Study 
of Global Governance.   
 
Chryssochoou D. et al. (1999) Europe in Change. Theory and Reform in the European Union, 
Manchester: Manchester University Press. 
 
Clifford, J. (1988) ‘On ethnographic self-fashioning: Conrad and Malinowski’ in Predicament of Culture. 
20th Century Ethnography, Literature, and Art, Cambridge, MA and London: Harvard University Press, pp.92-
113. 
 
Cogan, Ch. G. (2001) The Third Option. The Emancipation of European Defence, 1989-2000, Westpoint 
and London: Praeger. 
 
Cohen, J. (2002) ‘Regional Introduction: Struggling to Find Peace” in  P. van Tongeren, H. van der Veen 
and J. Verhoeven (eds), Searching for Peace in Europe & Eurasia. An Overview of Conflict Prevention and 
Peacebuilding Activities, London: European Centre for Conflict Prevention  
 
Comaroff, J. and Comaroff, J. (1992) Ethnography and the Historical Imagination, Boulder, CO: 
Westview Press.  
 
Connolly, W. (1983) The Terms of Political Discourse, 2nd ed., Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
 
Connolly, W. (2002) The Augustinian Imperative: A Reflection on the Politics of Morality, Lanham, MD: 
Rowman and Littlefield.  
 
Cooper, R. (2002) ‘The New Liberal Imperialism’, Observer, 7 April 2002.  
 
Cooper, R. (2003) The Breaking of Nations. Order and Chaos in the 21st Century, London: Atlantic 
Books. 
 
Corsaro, W. (1982) ‘Something Old and Something New. The Importance of Prior Ethnography in the 
Collection and Analysis of Audio-Visual Data’, Sociological Methods & Research, 11: 145-166. 
 
Cox, R. (1986) ‘Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory’, in R.O. 
Keohane (ed) Neorealism and its Critics, New York: Columbia University Press, pp.204-254. 
 
Cox, R. (1992) ‘Towards a Post-Hegemonic Conceptualisation of World Order: Reflections on the 
Relevancy of Ibn Khaldun’ in J. Rosenau and E. Czempiel (eds) Governance without Government: Order and 
Change in World Politics, Cambridge: CUP 
 
Croft, S. (2000) ‘The EU, NATO and Europeanisation: The Return of Architectural Debate’, European 
Security, 9 (3): 1–20. 
 
Czerniawska, B. (2004) Narratives in Social Science Research, London and Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. 
 
Czerniawska-Jorgensen, B. (1991) ‘Culture is the Medium of Life’ in P.J.Frost, L.F. Moore, M.Luis, C. 
Lundberg, and J. Martin (eds) Reframing Organisational Culture, Newbury Park, CA: Sage, pp.285-287. 
 
Davis, J. (2005) Terms of Inquiry: Reflections on the Theory and Practice of Political Science, Baltimore: 
John Hopkins University Press.  
 
Deighton, A. (2002) ‘The European Security and Defence Policy, Journal of Common Market Studies, 
10(4): 719-41.  
 
Deighton, A. (2006) ‘Foreign Policy and the European Union’s Security Strategy’ in A. Deighton (ed) 
Securing Europe? Implementing the ESS, ZÜRCHER BEITRÄGE ZUR SICHERHEITSPOLITIK NR. 77, 
Zürich: Center for Security Studies, pp.17-30. 
 
 
 
205
Dembinski, M. (2007) ‘Europe and the UNIFIL II Mission: Stumbling into the Conflict Zone of the 
MiddleEast’,  CFSP Forum, 5 (1): 1-4.  
 
Dijkzeul, D. (2006) Book review in Development and Change 37(5): 1137–1143. 
 
Diez, T. (1999) ‘Riding the Am-track Through Europe; or, the Pitfalls of the Rationalist Journey Through 
European Integration’, Millennium, 28(2):355-369. 
 
Diez, T. (2004) ‘Europe’s Others and the Return of Geopolitics’, Cambridge Review of International 
Affairs, 17: 319–35.  
 
Doty, R. (1993) ‘Foreign Policy as Social Construction: a Post-Positivist Analysis of US 
Counterinsurgency in the Philippines’, International Studies Quarterly, 37 (3): 297-320. 
 
Duchene, F. (1973) ‘The European Community and the uncertainties of interdependence’, in M. 
Kohnstamm and W. Hager (eds) A Nation Writ Large? Foreign Policy Problems Before the Community, 
London: Macmillan. 
 
Duke, S. (1994) Europe’s New Security Disorder, London: Macmillan. 
 
Duke, S. (2002) ‘CESDP and the EU Response to the 11 September: Identifying the Weakest Link’, 
European Foreign Affairs Review, 7(2): 153-169. 
 
Duke, S. (2002) The EU and Crisis Management, Maastricht: European Institute for Public 
Administration. 
 
Duke, S. (2004) ‘The European Security Strategy in a comparative framework: does it make for secure 
alliances in a better world?’ European Foreign Affairs Review, 9: 459-481. 
  
Duke, S. and Vanhoonacker, S. (2006) ‘Administrative governance in the CFSP: development and 
practice’, European Foreign Affairs Review, 11: 163-182.  
 
Dwan, R. (2004) ‘Civilian tasks and capabilities in EU operations’, First draft for Berlin meeting, 18-19 
May 2004. http://www.lse.ac.uk/Depts/global/StudyGroup/CivilianTaskspaper.htm.  
 
Dwan, R. (2005) ‘Civilian Tasks and Capabilities in EU Operations’, in M. Kaldor and M. Glasius (eds) 
A Human Security Doctrine for Europe: Project, Principles, Practicalities, Routledge: London. 
 
Easterly, W. (2006) The White Man’s Burden. Why the West’s Efforts to Aid the Rest Have Done so Much 
Ill and So Little Good, New York: The Penguin Press. 
 
Elgstrom, O. and Smith, M. (eds) (2006) The EU’s Roles in International Politics, London and New 
York: Routledge. 
 
Elster, J. (1982) ‘The Case for Methodological Individualism’, Theory and Society, 11(4): 453-82. 
 
Emerson, R. M. (1983) ‘Introduction’, in: R. M. Emerson (ed.) Contemporary Field Research, Prospect 
Heights: Waveland. 
 
Everts, S. (2003) “Two cheers for the EU’s new security strategy”, London: Centre for European Reform, 
December 2003.  
 
Everts, S. and Keohane, D. (2003) ‘The European Convention and Foreign Policy: Learning From 
Failure’, Survival 45(3):167-186.  
 
Fairclough, N.and Wodak, R. (1997) ‘Critical discourse analysis’, in T. van Dijk (ed.) Discourse Studies: 
A Multidisciplinary Introduction, vol. 2, London: Sage, pp.258-84.  
 
Feldman, M. (1995) Strategies for interpreting qualitative data, Thousand Oaks: Sage.  
 
 
 
206
Fenno, R.F. (1990) Watching Politicians: Essays on Participant Observation, Berkley, CA: Institute of 
Governmental Studies: University of California.  
 
Fierke, K. M. (1998) Changing Games, Changing Strategies, Manchester: MUP. 
 
Fierke, K. M. (2001) ‘Critical Methodology and Constructivism’, in K. M. Fierke and K. E. Jorgesen 
(eds) Constructing International Relations: the next generation, London and New York: M. E. Sharpe, pp.115-
135. 
 
Fierke, K. M. and Jorgesen, K. E. (eds) (2001) Constructing International Relations: the Next 
Generation, London and New York: M. E. Sharpe.  
 
Fisher, W. R. (1987) Human Communication as Narration: Towards Philosophy of Reason, Value and 
Action, Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press. 
 
Flechtner, S. (2006) ‘European Security and Defense Policy: Between „Offensive Defense“ and „Human 
Security“’, Bonn: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung Internationale Politikanalyse. 
 
Fligstein, N. (1997) ‘Social Skill and Institutional Theory’, American Behavioral Scientist, 40(4): 397-
405. 
 
Forsberg, T. (2006) ‘Explaining the Emergence of the ESDP: Setting the Research Agenda’. Paper 
prepared at the British International Studies Association Meeting, Cork, December 18-20, 2006. 
 
Foucault, M. (1972) The Archaeology of Knowledge, London: Pantheon. 
 
Foucault, M. (1980) Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings 1972-1977, C. Gordon 
(ed), New York, NY: Pantheon Books. 
 
Foucault, M. (1991) Discipline and Punish:  the Birth of the Prison, London: Penguin.  
 
Freeden, M. (2006) ‘Ideology and political theory’, Journal of Political Ideologies, 11(1): 3-22.  
 
Freedman L. and Menon, A. (1997) ‘Conclusion: Defence, States and Integration’ in J. Howorth and A. 
Menon (eds) The European Union and National Defence Policy London: Routledge. 
 
Gadamer, H-G. (1986) ‘What is practice?’ in H-G Gadamer Reason in the Age of Science, Cambridge, 
MA: MIT Press. 
 
Gallie, W.B. (1956) ‘Essentially Contested Concepts’, in Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, N.S., 
pp. 167–98. 
 
Gerring, J. (2004) ‘What is a Case Study and What is it Good for?’ American Political Science Review, 
98 (2):341-354. 
 
Geertz, C. (1973) The Interpretation of Culture, New York: Basic Books.  
 
Gibbons, M. (1987) ‘Introduction. The politics of interpretation’, in M. Gibbons (ed.), Interpreting 
Politics, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, pp.1-31. 
 
Giddens, A. (1977) Studies in Social and Political Thought, London: Hutchinson. 
 
Giegerich, B., Pushkina, D and Mount, A. (2006) ‘Towards a Strategic Partnership? The US and Russian 
Response to the European Security and Defence Policy’, Security Dialogue. Vol. 37(3): 385–407. 
 
Gill, Z. and Colebatch, H.K. (2006) ‘“Busy Little Workers”: Policy Workers’ Own Accounts’ in H.K. 
Colebatch (ed) Beyond the Policy Cycle: the Policy Process in Australia, Sydney: Allen and Unwin, pp. 240-
265. 
 
 
 
207
Gnesotto, N. (2004) ‘Introduction’ in N. Gnesotto (ed) EU Security and Defence Policy. The first five 
years (1999-2004), Paris: European Union Insitute for Security Studies. 
 
Goffman, E. (1959) The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life, Garden City, NY: Doubleday Anchor 
Books. 
 
Goffman, E. (1961) Encounters: The Studies in the Sociology of Interaction, Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill. 
 
Goffman, E. (1969) Strategic Interaction, Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press. 
 
Goffman, E. (1974) Frame Analysis. An Essay in the Organisation of Experience, New York: Harper 
Colophon Books.  
 
Goffman, E. (1982) Interaction Ritual. Essays in Face-to-face Behaviour,  New York: Pantheon Books.  
 
Goffman, E. (1989) ‘On Fieldwork’, Journal Of Contemporary Ethnography, 18(2): 123-132. 
 
Gordon, P. (1998) ‘The Limits of Europe’s Common Foreign and Security Policy’, in A. Moravcsik (ed.), 
Centralization or Fragmentation? Europe Facing the Challenges of Deepening, Diversity and Democracy, New 
York: Council on Foreign Relations.  
 
Gramsci, A. (1971) Selections from Prison Notebooks, London: Lawrence and Wishart. 
   
Guehenno, J-M. (2005) ‘Foreword’ in M. Ortega (ed) ‘The EU and the UN – partners in effective 
multilateralism’, Chaillot Paper 78, Paris: EUISS. 
 
Haass, R.N. (2006) ‘How to Avoid Iraq Syndrome’, Times Magazine, December 10 2006. 
 
Habermas, J. (1984) Theory of Communication Action, Vol.1: Reason and Rationalisation of 
Society,Boston, MA: Beacon Press. 
 
Haftendorn, H. (1991) ‘The Security Puzzle: Theory Building and Discipline-Building in International 
Security’, International Studies Quarterly, 35 (1): 3-17. 
 
Hajer, M. (1995) The Politics of Environmental Discourse, Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
 
Van Ham, P. (2000) ‘Europe’s Common Defence Policy: Implications for the transatlantic Relationship’, 
Security Dialogue, 31(2):215-228. 
 
Van Ham, P. (1995) ‘The Prospects for a European Security and Defence Identity’, European Security, 4 
(4): 523-545. 
 
Hansen, A. (2006) Against all Odds – The Evolution of Planning for ESDP Operations. Civilian Crisis 
Management from EUPM onwards, Berlin: Center for International Peace Operations.  
 
Hansen, L. (2006) Security as Practice. Discourse analysis and the Bosnian War, London and New York: 
Routledge. 
 
Heisbourg, F. (2000) ‘Europe’s Strategic Ambitions. The Limits of Ambiguity’, Survival, 40(2): 5-15. 
 
Heiselberg, S. (2003) ‘Pacifism or Activism: Towards a Common Strategic Culture within the ESDP?’, 
ISS Working Paper 2003/4, Copenhagen: Institute for International Studies. 
 
Helly, D. (2006) ‘EUJUST THEMIS in Georgia: an ambitious Bet on Rule of Law’ in A. Nowak (ed) 
‘Civilian crisis management: the EU way’, Chaillot Paper 90, Paris: EU Institute for Security Studies. 
 
Hettne, B. and Söderbaum, F.  (2005) ‘Civilian Power or Soft Imperialism? The EU as a Global Actor 
and the Role of Interregionalism’, European Foreign Affairs, 10: 535-552. 
 
 
 
208
Hettne, B. and Söderbaum, F. (2006) ‘The UN and Regional Organizations in Global Security: 
Competing or Complementary Logics?’, Global Governance, 12: 227-232. 
 
Hill, Ch. (1993) ‘The Capability-Expectation Gap, or Conceptualising Europe’s International Role’, 
Journal of Common Market Studies, 31(3): 305-328.  
 
Hill, Ch. (1998) ‘Closing the Capability-Expectation Gap?’ in J. Peterson and H. Sjursen (eds) A 
Common Foreign Policy for Europe? Competing Visions of the CFSP, London: Routledge, pp.18-38. 
 
Holsti, K. (1970) ‘National Role Conceptions in the Study of the Foreign Policy’, International Studies 
Quarterly, 14: 233-309. 
 
Horrocks, J.E. and Jackson, D.W. (1972) Self and Role: a Theory of Self-process and Role Behaviour, 
Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin. 
 
Howorth, J. (2000) ‘Britain, France and European Defence Initiative’, Survival, 42(2): 33-56. 
 
Howorth, J. (2007) Security and Defence Policy in the European Union, Basingstoke and New York: 
Polgrave Macmillan. 
 
Howorth, J. and Keeler, J. (2003) ‘The EU, NATO and the Quest for European Autonomy’, in J. Howorth 
and J. T.S. Keeler (eds) Defending Europe, London and Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 
 
Hughes, E. (1971) A Sociological Eye, Chicago: Aldine. 
 
Huysmans, J. (1996) Making/Unmaking European Disorder. Meta-Theoretical, Theoretical and 
Empirical Questions of Military Stability after the Cold War, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven.  
 
Huysmans, J. (1998) ‘Security! What do you Mean? Form Concept to Thick Signifier’, European Journal 
of International Relations, 4(2): 226-255.  
 
Hyde-Price, A. (2000) ‘Reflections on Security and Identity in Europe’ in L. Aggestam and A. Hyde-
Price (eds) Security and Identity in Europe. Exploring the New Agenda, London: Macmillan Press, pp. 22-48.  
 
Jentleson, W.B. (2003/4) ‘Tough Love Multilateralism’, The Washington Quarterly, 27 (1): 7–24. 
 
Joenniemi, P. (2007) ‘Towards a European Union of Post-Security?’, Cooperation and Conflict, Vol. 
42(1): 127–148. 
 
Juncos, A. and Reynolds, Ch. (2007) ‘The Political and Security Committee: Governing in the Shadow’, 
European Foreign Affairs Review 12: 127–147.  
 
Jung, D. (2004) ‘Securitising European Integration’ in S. Guzzini and D. Jung (eds) Contemporary 
Security Analysis and Copenhagen Peace Research, London and New York: Routledge. 
 
Kagan, R. (2004) Of Paradise and Power. America and Europe in the New World Order, London: Vintage 
Books. 
 
Keal, P. (1984) Unspoken Rules and Superpower Domination, London: Macmillan.  
 
Khol, R. (2005) ‘Ongoing Cooperation Between Europe’s Armed Forces’, in S. Biscop (ed) ‘E Pluribus 
Unum? Military Integration in the European Union’, Egmont Papers no 7. Brussels: Royal Institute for 
International Relations (IRRI-KIIB), pp. 5–12. 
 
Kirchner, E. (1999) ‘Second Pillar and Eastern Enlargement. The Prospects for a European Security and 
Defence Identity’ in J. Sperling (ed) Europe in Change. Two Tiers or Two Speeds? The European Security 
Order and the Enlargement of The European Union and NATO, Manchester: Manchester University Press. 
 
Kirste, K. und Maull, H. (1996) ‚Zivilmacht und Rollentheorie’, Zeitschrift fuer Internationale 
Beziehungen, 3(2): 283-312. 
 
 
209
Klotz, A. and Lynch C. (2007) Strategies for research in constructivist international relations, Armonk, 
NY: M.E. Sharpe. 
 
Knodt, M. and Princen, S. (eds) (2003) Understanding the EU’s External Relations, London and New 
York: Routledge. 
 
Knudsen, O. F. (2001) ‘Post-Copenhagen Security Studies: Desecuritising Securitisation’, Security 
Dialogue, 32(3): 355-368.  
 
Kratochwil, F. V. (1978) International Order and Foreign Policy, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, Inc. 
 
Kratochwil, F. (1986) ‘Of Systems, Boundaries, and Territoriality: An Inquiry into the Formation of the 
State System’, World Politics, Vol. 39 (1): 27-52. 
 
Kratochwil, F. V. (2001) ‘Constructivism as an Approach to Interdisciplinary Study’, in K. M. Fierke and 
K. E. Jorgesen (eds) Constructing International Relations: the Next Generation, London and New York: M. E. 
Sharpe, pp. 13-35.  
 
Kratochwil, F. V. (2003) ‘Reflections on Theory and Practice’, EUI Working Paper SPS No.2003/16, 
Florence: European University Institute.  
 
Kratochwil, F. V. (2006a) ‘History, Action, and Identity: Revisiting the “Second” Great Debate and 
Assessing its Importance for Social Theory’, European Journal of International Relations, 12(1): 5–29.  
 
Kratochwil, F. V. (2006b) ‘The Genealogy of Multilateralism: Reflections on an organisational Form and 
Its Crisis’ in E. Newman, R. Thakur and J. Tirman (eds) Multilateralism under Challenge? Power, International 
Order, and Structural Change, Tokio, New York and London: United Nations University Press, pp.139-159. 
 
Kratochwil, F. V. (2007a) ‘Of false Promises and Good Bets: a Plea for a Pragmatic Approach to Theory 
Building’, Journal of International Relations and Development 10: 1-15. 
 
Kratochwil, F. V. (2007b) ‘Looking Back from Somewhere: Reflections on What Remains ‘Critical’ in 
Critical Theory’, Review of International Studies 33: 25-45. 
 
Kratochwil, F.V. (forthcoming) ‘Constructivism: what it is (not) and how it matters’ in: D. della Porta and 
M. Keating (eds) Approaches in the Social Sciences. 
 
Krause, K. and Williams, M.C. (1996) ‘Broadening the Agenda of Security Studies: Politics and 
Methods’, Mershon International Studies Review, 40 (2): 229-254. 
 
Kuhn, T. (1970) The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 2nd editions, Chicago: Chicago University Press. 
 
Kurowska, X. (2006a) ‘A frustrated expert? A story of a rule of law mission experts’, Conference on 
Interpretive Practitioner, University of Birmingham, 8-10 June 2006. 
 
Kurowska, X. (2006b) ‘Beyond the Balkans but Still in Civilian Uniform: EUJUST THEMIS to Georgia’, 
CFSP Forum 4 (3), pp.8-11. 
 
Kurowska, X. (2007a) ‘More than a Balkan Crisis Manager: The EUJUST Themis in Georgia’ in M. 
Merlingen and R. Ostrauskaite (eds) The European Security and Defence Policy: Implementation Perspective, 
London and New York: Routledge. 
 
Kurowska, X. (2007b) ‘The Role of Missions in the ESDP’ in M. Merlingen and R. Ostrauskaite (eds) 
The European Security and Defence Policy: Implementation Perspective, London and New York: Routledge. 
 
Kurowska, X. and Tallis, B. (forthcoming) ‘EU Border Assistance Mission to Ukraine/Moldova – 
Beyond Border Monitoring?’ in A. Juncos and E. Gross (eds) ‘EU Crisis Management and Prevention: How far 
does it Reach?’, Geneva: DCAF.  
 
 
 
210
Lantis, J. (2002) ‘The Moral Imperative of Force: the Evolution of German Strategic Culture in Kosovo’, 
Comparative Strategy, 21, 21 – 46.  
 
Larsen, H. (2002) ‘The EU: a Global Military Actor?’, Cooperation and Conflict, 37(3):283-302. 
 
Laswell, H. (1977) Psychopathology and Politics, Chicago: University of Chicago Press 
 
Lawson, G. (2005) ‘A Conversation with Michael Mann’, Millennium, 34(2): 477-489. 
 
Latawski, P. and Smith, M. A. (2002) ‘Plus ca change, plus c’est la meme chose. CESDP since 1998: The 
View from London, Paris and Warsaw’, Journal of European Area Studies, 10(2):211-228.  
 
Le Prestre, Philipe (1997) (ed) Role Quests in the Post-Cold War : Foreign Policies in Transition, 
Montréal: McGill-Queens University Press. 
 
Lodge, J. (1993) ‘From Civilian Power to Speaking with the Common Voice: the Transition to CFSP’ in 
J. Lodge (ed) The European Community and the Challenge of the Future, London: Pinter, 227 – 251. 
 
Lofland, J. (1995) ‘Analytic ethnography: features, failings, and futures’, Journal of Contemporary 
Ethnography, 24 (1): 30-67.  
 
Lofland, J. and Lofland, L. (1984) Analysing Social Setting, Belmont, CA: Wadsworth. 
 
Lipschutz, R. (1995) On Security, New York: Columbia University Press. 
 
Little, D. (1991) Varieties of Social Explanation, Boulder: Westview Press.  
 
Lucarelli, S. (2006) Values and principles in European Union foreign policy, London and New York: 
Routledge. 
 
Lukes, S. (1974) Power: a Radical View, Basingstoke and London: Macmillan Press Ltd.  
 
Lynch, D. (2003) ‘The South Caucasus: A Challenge for the EU’, Chaillot Paper no.65, Paris: EU 
Institute for Security Studies. 
 
Lynch, D. (2006) ‘Why Georgia matters’, Chaillot Paper no. 86, Paris: EU Institute for Security Studies. 
 
MacQueen, N. (2004) ‘The dimensions of the European security: from Iraq to...Iraq’, Perspectives on 
European Politics and Society, 5 (3): 385-394.  
 
Majone, G. (1989) Evidence, Argument and Persuasion in the Policy Process, New Haven CT, Yale 
University Press.  
 
Manners, I. (2000) Substance and Symbolism: An Anatomy of Cooperation in the New Europe, Aldershot: 
Ashgate. 
 
Manners, I. (2002), ‘European [security] Union: from existential threat to ontological security’, COPRI 
Working Paper5/2002, Copenhagen: COPRI. 
 
Manners, I.  (2002) ‘Normative Power Europe: A contradiction in terms?’ Journal of Common Market 
Studies, 40 (2): 235 – 258.   
 
Manners, I. and Whiteman, R. (2003) ‘”The difference engine”: constructing and representing the 
international identity of the EU’, Journal Of European Public Policy, 10(3): 380-404. 
 
Manning, P.K. and Cullum-Swan, B. (1994) Narrative, content, and semiotic analysis’’ in N.K. Denzin 
and Y.S. Lincoln (eds) Handbook of qualitative research, Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, pp. 463-477. 
 
March, J.G and Olsen, J.P. (1989) Rediscovering Institutions: The Organisational Basis of Politics, New 
York: Free Press.  
 
 
211
March, J.G and Olsen, J.P. (1998) ‘The Institutional Dynamics of International Political Orders’, Arena 
Working Paper 5, Oslo: Centre of European Studies, University of Oslo. 
 
Marcus, G. E. (1998) Ethnography through Thick and Thin, Princeton, NJ: PUP. 
 
Martinsen, P. M. (2003) ‘ESDP – a Strategic Culture in the Making?’ Paper presented to the ECPR 
General Conference, to the section ‘Europe and Global Security’, 18 – 21 September, Marburg. 
 
Maul, H. W. (1990) ‘Germany and Japan: the New Civilian Powers’, Foreign Affairs, 69(5): 91-106. 
 
Maull, H. W. (2000) ‘Germany and the use of force: still a ‘Civilian Power?’’, Survival, 42 (2): 56-80.  
 
Mawdsley, J. and Quille, G. (2003) The EU Security Strategy: A new framework for ESDP and equipping 
the EU Rapid Reaction Force, Brussels: ISIS Europe. 
 
McSweeney, B. (1996) ‘Identity and Security: Buzan and the Copenhagen School’, Review of 
InternationalStudies, 22(1): 81-93. 
 
McSweeney, B. (1999) Security Identity and Interests: A Sociology of International Relations, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
McSweeney, B. (1998) ‘Durkheim and the Copenhagen School: A Response to Buzan and Wæver’, 
Review of International Studies, 24(1): 137-140.  
 
Mead, H. (1934) Mind, Self, and Society, Chicago: University of Chicago Press 
 
Mearsheimer, J.J. (2006) ‘Conversations in International Relations: Interview with John J. Mearsheimer 
(Part I)’, International Relations, 20(1): 105–123. 
 
Medley, R. (1999) ‘Europe’s next big idea’, Foreign Affairs, 78(5): 18-23. 
 
Menon, A. (2004) ‘From Crisis to Catharsis: ESDP after Iraq’, International Affairs, 80 (4): 649-663. 
 
Merlingen, M. and Ostrauskaite, R. (2005a) ‘ESDP Police Missions: Meaning, Context, and Operational 
Challenges’, European Foreign Affairs Review, 10: 215-35. 
 
Merlingen, M. and Ostrauskaite, R. (2005b) ‘Power/Knowledge in International Peacebuilding: The Case 
of the EU Police Mission in Bosnia’, Alternatives, 30: 297-323. 
 
Merlingen, M. and Ostrauskaite, R. (2006) European Union Peacebuilding nd Policing. Governance and 
the ESDP, London and New York: Routledge.  
 
Miller, G. (1994) ‘Towards Ethnographies of Institutional Discourse. Proposal and Suggestions’, Journal 
of Contemporary Ethnography, 23(3): 280-306. 
 
Missiroli, A. (2003) ‘The EU; Just a Regional Peacekeeper?’ European Foreign Affairs Review,8, 493 
503. 
 
Missiroli, A. (2006) ‘Money Matters: Financing EU Crisis Management ’ in: A. Deighton (ed) Securing 
Europe? Implementing the ESS, ZÜRCHER BEITRÄGE ZUR SICHERHEITSPOLITIK NR. 77, Zürich: Center 
for Security Studies, pp.43-58. 
 
Moravcsik, A. (1999) ‘The Future of European Integration Studies: Social Science or Social Theory?’, 
Millennium, 28(2): 371-91. 
 
Multimer, D. (1999) ‘Beyond Strategy: Critical Thinking and the New Security Studies’, in: Craig Snyder 
(ed.) Contemporary Security and Strategy, London: Macmillan Press LTD, pp. 77-101. 
 
Nikolaidis, K. and Howse, R. (2002) ‘”This is my Utopia...” Narrative as power’, Journal of Common 
Market Studies, 40 (4): 767-92.  
 
 
212
 
Nicolini, D., Gherardi, S., Yanow, D. (2003) ‘Introduction: Towards a Practice-Based View of Knowing 
and Learning in Organizations’, in D. Nicolini, S. Gherardi and D. Yanow (eds) Knowing in Organisations. A 
Practice-Based Approach, New York: M.E. Sharpe, pp.3-31. 
 
Novosseloff, A. (2004) EU-UN Partnership in Crisis Management: Development and Prospects, New 
York: International Peace Academy.  
 
Nye, S. (2002) The Paradox of American Power: Why the World's Only Superpower can’t Go it Alone, 
Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press. 
 
Orbie, J. (2006) ‘Civilian Power Europe. Review of the Original and Current Debates’, Cooperation and 
Conflict,  41(1): 123–128. 
 
Philips, N. and Hardy, C. (2002) Discourse analysis. Investigating Processes of Social Construction, 
Thousand Oaks, London, New Delhi: Sage Publications. 
 
Parker, I. (1992) Discourse Dynamics, London: Rutledge. 
 
Penksa, S. E. and Mason, W. (2003) ‘EU security cooperation and the transatlantic relationship’, 
Cooperation and Conflict, 38(3):255-280.  
 
Peterson, J. and Sjursen, H. (eds) (1998) A Common Foreign Policy for Europe? Competing Visions of 
the CFSP, London: Routledge.  
 
Pond, E. (1999) ‘Kosovo: Catalyst for Europe’, The Washington Quarterly, 22(4): 72-92.  
 
Posen, B. (2006) ‘ESDP: Response to Unipolarity?’, Security Studies, 15(2): 149-186. 
 
Rein, M. and Schon, D. (1994) Frame Reflection: Towards the Resolution of Intractable Policy 
Controversies, New York, Basic Books 
Risse, T. (2003) ‘Social Constructivism and European Integration’, in A. Wiener and T. Diez (eds) 
European Integration Theory, Oxford: OUP, pp.159-176.  
 
Rorty, R. (1989) Contingency, Irony and Solidarity, New York: CUP. 
 
Rotschild, E. (1993) ‘What is Security?’, Deadalus, 124(3):53-98. 
 
Ruggie, J. G. (1993) ‘Territoriality and beyond: problematising modernity in international relations’, 
International Organisation, 47(1): 139-74. 
 
Rumelili, B. (2004) ‘Constructing Identity and Relating to Difference: Understanding the EU’s Mode of 
Differentiation’, Review of International Studies, 30, 27-47. 
 
Rynning, S. (2003a) ‘The European Union: Towards a Strategic Culture?’ Security Dialogue,34(4): 479-
496.  
 
Rynning, S. (2003b) ‘Why not NATO? Military Planning in the EU’, The Journal of Strategic Studies, 26 
(1): 53-72. 
 
Sartori, G. (1970) ‘Concept Misformation in Comparative Politics’ American Political Science Review, 
64(4):1033-1053.  
 
Scannel, D. (2004) ‘Financing ESDP military operations’, European Foreign Affairs Review, 9: 529-549. 
 
Schimmelfennig, F. (2002) ‘Goffaman meets IR: Dramaturgical Action in International Community’, 
International Review of Sociology,12(3):417-437.  
 
Scott, D. (1999) Refashioning Futures: Criticism after Postcoloniality, Princeton: NJ: Princeton 
University Press.  
 
 
213
 
Scott, W.R. (1995) Institutions and Organisations, Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. 
 
Serrano, P. (2006) ‘A Strategic Approach to the ESDP’, in A. Nowak (ed) Civilian Crisis Management: 
the EU 
Way, Chaillot Paper 90, Paris: EUISS, pp.39-48. 
 
Shepherd, A. J.K. (2003) ‘The European Union’s Security and Defence Policy: A Policy without 
Substance? ’, European Security, 12(1):39-63. 
 
Shepherd, A. J.K. (2006) ‘Irrelevant or indispensable? ESDP, the ‘War on Terror’ and the fallout from 
Iraq’, International Politics, 43:71-92. 
 
Shore, C. (2000) Building Europe. The Cultural Politics of European Integration, London and New York: 
Routledge. 
 
Shore, C. and Wright, S. (1997) ‘Introduction’ in: C. Shore and S. Wright (eds) Anthropology of policy: 
critical perspectives on governance and power,  London and New York: Routledge, pp. 3-42. 
 
Simmel, G. (1986) ‘Domination and Freedom’, in S. Lukes (ed) Power, New York: New York University 
Press, pp. 203-210. 
 
Sjursen, H. (1998) ‘Missed Opportunity or Eternal Fantasy? The Idea of a European Security and Defence 
Policy’ in John P. and H. Sjursen (eds) A Common Foreign Policy of Europe? Competing Visions of the CFSP, 
London: Routledge, pp. 95-114. 
 
Sjursen, H. (2003) ‘Understanding the Common Foreign and Security Policy ’ in M. Knodt and S. 
Princen, (eds) Understanding the EU’s External Relations, London and New York: Routledge, pp. 35-53. 
 
Sjursen, H. (2006) ‘What Kind of Power?’, Journal of European Public Policy 13 (2): 169–181. 
 
Skinner, Q. (1988) ‘A Reply to My Critics’ in J. Tully (ed.) Meaning and Context. Quentin Skinner and 
his Critics, Cambridge and Oxford: Polity Press. 
 
Smith, H. (2002) European Union Foreign Policy. What It Is and What It Does, London and Sterling, 
VA: Pluto Press. 
 
Smith, K. (2000) ‘The End of Civilian Power EU: A Welcome Demise or Cause for Concern?’ The 
International Spectator, 35 (2): 11 – 28.  
 
Smith, K. (2003) European Foreign Policy in a Changing World, Oxford: Polity Press. 
 
Smith, K. (2004) ‘The Outsiders: the European Neighbourhood Policy’, International Spectator, :757-
773. 
 
Smith, S. (2000) ‘The Increasing Insecurity of Security Studies: Conceptualising Security in the Last 
Twenty Years’ in S. Croft and T. Teriff (eds) Critical Reflections on Security and Change, London and 
Portaland OR: Frank Cass, pp.72-101.  
 
Snow, D. A. and Benford, R. D. (1988) ‘Ideology, Frame Resonance and Participant Mobilization’, 
International Social Movement Research 1 , pp. 197-219.  
 
Solana, J. (2003) ‘Joining forces against common threats’, International Herald Tribune, 12 December 
2003. 
 
Sorensen, G. (2006) ‘What Kind of World Order?’, Cooperation and Conflict, 41(4): 343–363. 
 
Spencer, J.W. (1994) ‘Mutual Relevance of Ethnography and Discourse’, Journal of 
ContemporaryEthnography, 23(3): 267-279. 
 
 
 
214
Stavridis, S. (2001a) ‘’Militarising’ the EU: the Concept of Civilian Power Revisited’, The 
InternationalSpectactor, 36 (4): 43 – 50.  
 
Stavridis, S. (2001b) ‘Why the ‘Militarising’ of the European Union is Strengthening the Concept of 
‘Civilian Power Europe’’, EUI Working Papers, RSC No. 2001/17.   
 
Stritzel, H. (2007) ‘Towards a Theory of Securitization: Copenhagen and Beyond’, European Journal of 
International Relations, 13(3): 357–383 
 
Strömvik, M. (2005) ‘To Act as Union. Explaining the Development of the EU’s Collective Foreign 
Policy’ Lund Political Studies 142, Lund University: Department of Political Science. 
 
Tallberg, J. (2006) Leadership and negotiation in the European Union, Cambridge, UK and New York: 
Cambridge University Press. 
 
Tardy, T. (2005) ‘EU-UN Cooperation in Peacekeeping: a Promising Relationship in a Constrained 
Environment’, in: Martin Ortega (ed) The EU and the UN: Partners in Effective Multilateralism, Chaillot Paper 
no. 78, June 2005, Paris: EU Institute for Security Studies, pp.48-68. 
 
Thatcher, M. (2002) Statecraft. Strategies for a Changing World, HarperCollins: New York: 
HarperCollins. 
 
Terriff, T. (2000) ‘Change, Security and Surprise’, in: Croft and Terry Teriff (eds.) Critical Reflections on 
Security and Change, London and Portaland OR: Frank Cass, pp. 231246.  
 
Thucydides (1972) History of the Peloponnesian War, trans. Rex Warner. New York: Penguin.  
 
Throgmorton, J. (1996) Planning as Persuasive Storytelling: The Rhetorical Construction of Chicago's 
ElectricFuture, Chicago: University of Chicago. 
 
Toje, A. (2003) ‘The First Casualty in the War Against Terror: the Fall of NATO and Europe’s Reluctant 
Coming of Age’, European Security, 12 (2): 63-76.  
 
Tonra, B. and Christiansen, T. (eds) (2004) Rethinking European Union Foreign Policy, Manchester: 
Manchester University Press. 
 
Treacher, A. (2004) ‘From Civilian Power to Military Actor: The EU’s Resistable Transformation’, 
European Foreign Affairs Review 9: 49–66. 
 
Tuchman Mathews, J. (1989) ‘Redefining Security’, Foreign Affairs, 68(2): 162-177. 
 
Ullman, R. (1983) ‘Redefining Security’, International Security, 8 (1): 129-153. 
 
Underdal, A. (1994) ‘Leadership theory. Rediscovering the arts of management’ in I. W. Zartman (ed) 
International Multilateral Negotiation. Approaches to the Management of Complexity, San Francisco: Jossey 
Bass Publishers, pp.176-197. 
 
Vogt, V. (2006a) ‘Coping with Historical Responsibility: Trends and Images of the EU’s Development 
Policy’ in H. Mayer and H. Vogt (eds) A Responsible Europe? Ethical Foundations of EU External Affairs, 
Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 159-180. 
 
Vogt, V. (2006b) ‘Introduction’ in H. Mayer and H. Vogt (eds) A Responsible Europe? Ethical 
Foundations of EU External Affairs, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 1-16. 
 
Wagner, W. (2006) ‘The Democratic Control of Military Power Europe’, Journal of European Pubic 
Policy, 13(1): 200-216. 
 
Walt, S. (1991) ‘The Renaissance of Security Studies’, International Studies Quarterly, 35(2): 211-239.  
 
Waltz, K. (1979) Theory of International Politics, New York : Random House. 
 
 
215
 
Wæver, O. (1993) ‘Resisting the Temptation of Post Foreign Policy Analysis’, Working papers 22/199, 
Copenhagen: Centre for Peace and Conflict Research. 
 
Wæver, O. (1995) ‘What is Security? – the Securityness of Security’ in B. Hansen (ed) European 
Security 2000, Copenhagen: Copenhagen Political Studies Press, pp. 222-255. 
 
Wæver, O. (1996) ‘European Security Identities’, Journal of Common Market Studies, 34 (1): 103-128.  
 
Wæver, O. (1998a) ‘Insecurity, Security, and Asecurity in the West European Non-war Community’ in E. 
Adler and M. Barnett (eds) (1998) Security Communities, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 69-118. 
 
Wæver, O. (1998b) ‘Integration as Security. Constructing a Europe at Peace’, in: Charles A. Kupchan 
(ed.) Atlantic Security. Contending Vision, New York, NY: council on Foregn  Relations: 45-63. 
 
Wæver, O. (2003) ‘Discursive approaches’ in A. Wiener and T. Diez (eds) European Integration Theory, 
Oxford: OUP, pp.197-215. 
 
Weiss, G. and Wodak R. (2003) ‘Introduction: Theory, Interdisciplinary and Critical Discourse Analysis’ 
in G. Weiss and R. Wodak (eds) Critical Discourse Analysis. Theory and Interdisciplinary, Basingstoke: 
Palgrave Macmillan. 
 
Weldes, J., Laffey, M, Gusterson H. and Duvall, R. (eds) (1999) Cultures of Insecurity. States, 
Communities, and the Production of Danger, Minneapolis and London: University of Minnesota Press. 
 
Weldes, J. (2006) ‘High Politics and Low Data. Globalisation Discourses and Popular Culture’ in: D. 
Yanow and P. Schwartz-Shea (eds) Interpretation and Method: Empirical Research Methods and the 
Interpretive Turn, pp.176-186. 
 
Wendt, A. (1994) ‘Collective Identity Formation and the International State’, American Political Science 
Review, 88 (2): 384-96. 
 
Wendt, A. (1999) Social Theory of International Politics, Cambridge: CUP. 
 
Wessels, R. (1999) The EU’s Foreign and Security Policy: A Legal Institutional Perspective, The Hague: 
Kluwer Law International. 
 
White, B. (2001) Understanding European Foreign Policy, Basingstoke:  Polgrave/ Macmillan.  
 
Whitman, R. (1998) From Civilian Power to Superpower? The International Identity of the EU, 
Basingstoke: Macmillan.  
 
Whitman, R. (2006) ‘Road Map for a Route March? (De-)civilianizing through the EU’s Security 
Strategy’, European Foreign Affairs Review 11: 1–15. 
 
Wittgenstein, L. (1958) Philosophical Investigations, New York: Macmillan. 
 
Wodak, R. (2004) ‘The power of language in political discourse’, Journal of Language and Politics 3 (3): 
381-383. 
 
Wolfers, A. (1952) ‘”National Security” as an Ambiguous Symbol’, Political Science Review, 67(4):481-
502. 
 
Wood, L.A. & Kroger, R.O. (2000) Doing discourse analysis: methods for studying action in talk and 
text, Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. 
 
Yanow, D. (1996) How Does a Policy Mean? Interpretive Policy and Organisational Actions, 
Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press. 
 
Yanow, D. (2000) Conducting Interpretive Policy Analysis, Thousand Oaks and London: Sage.  
 
 
216
 
Yanow, D. (2006a) ‘Neither rigorous nor objective? Interrogating criteria for knowledge claims in 
interpretive science’ in D. Yanow and P. Schwartz-Shea (eds) Interpretation and Method: Empirical Research 
Methods and the Interpretive Turn,  pp. 67-88. 
 
Yanow, D. (2006b) ‘Thinking interpretatively: philosophical presupossions and the human sciences’ in D. 
Yanow and P. Schwartz-Shea (eds) Interpretation and Method: Empirical Research Methods and the 
Interpretive Turn,, pp. 5-26.  
 
Youngs, R. (2002) ‘The European Security and Defence Policy: The Impact of the EU’s Approach to 
Security Challenges?’ European Security, 11 (2):101-124. 
 
Zielonka, J. (1998) Explaining Euro-Paralysis: Why Europe is Unable to Act in International Politics, 
Basingstoke: Macmillan.  
 
De Zwaan, J.W. (1995) The Permanent Representative Committee: Its Role in European Union Decision-
Making, Amsterdam: Elsevier. 
 
 
DOCUMENTS AND SPEECHES 
 
Annan, K. (2005) In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human Rights for All. Report 
of the Secretary-General, A/59/2005. 
 
Annan, K. (2006) Secretary-General's address at the Truman Presidential Museum and Library, 11 
December 2006, http://www.un.org/apps/sg/sgstats.asp?nid=2357#, accessed on 14th January 2007. 
 
Blair, T. (1998) Tony Blair at the press conference after an informal European summit Portschach, 24-25 
October 1998.  
 
British-French Joint Declaration (1998) St. Malo Summit, 3-4 December 1998 in: European Defence: 
Core Documents, Chaillot Paper 47, Paris: Institute for Security Studies: Western European Union. 
 
CIVCOM (2004) CIVCOM note on the Draft General Concept for a Rule of Law Mission to Georgia in 
the context of ESDP, 10225/04, 7 June 2004. 
 
Communication from the Commission (2004) ENP Strategy Paper, Brussels, 12 May 2004.  
 
Council Joint Action 2005/776/CFSP of 7 November 2005 amending the mandate of the European Union 
Special Representative for Moldova. 
 
Council Joint Action 2005/889/CFSP of 12 December 2005 on establishing a European Union Border 
Assistance Mission for the Rafah Crossing Point. 
 
Council of the EU (1999a) European Council, Cologne, 3-4 June, Presidency Report on Strengthening the 
CESDF. 
 
Council of the EU (1999b) European Council, Helsinki, 10-11 December, Presidency Conclusions. 
 
Council of the EU (2000) European Council, Santa Maria da Feira, 19-20 June, Presidency Conclusions. 
 
Council of the EU (2001a) ‘General Affairs Council Conclusions’, Brussels, 26-27 February 2001. 
 
Council of the EU (2001b) European Council, Laeken, Presidency Conclusions. 
 
Council of the EU (2003) ‘Council Joint Action 2003/496/CFSP of 7 July 2003 concerning the 
appointment of an EU Special Representative for the South Caucasus’. 
 
Council of the EU (2004) ‘Council Joint Action 2004/523/CFSP of 28 June 2004 on the European Union 
Rule of Law. Mission in Georgia, EUJUST THEMIS’. 
 
 
217
 
Council of the EU (2006) ‘Council Joint Action 2006/121/CFSP of 20 February 2006 appointing the 
European Union Special Representative for the South Caucasus’. 
 
European Commission Legal Service (1999) Critères généraux pour l'exercice soit de la competence 
commupnautaire, soit de celle de l'Union européenne au titre de la PESC. JUR(99)50931, Brussels: 07.10.1999. 
 
European Commission (2003) Country Strategy Paper 2003-2006, and Tacis, “National Indicative 
Programme 2004-2006, Georgia”, adopted 23 September 2003, pp.21-23. 
 
European Commission (2005) ENP Country Report Georgia, Commission Staff Working Paper COM, 
Brussels, SEC (2005)288/3).   
 
Ferrero-Waldner, B. (2006) ‘Human Security and Aid Effectiveness: The EU’s challenges’, Overseas 
Development Institute, London, 26 October 2006. 
 
House of Lords (2004) House of Lords Minutes of Evidence. Evidence taken before the Select Committee 
on the EU Sub-Committee C, The European Union Security Strategy, Tuesday 6 July 2004, Mr Javier Solana. 
 
Patten, Ch. (2004) “The Western Balkans: The Road to Europe”, German Bundestag, European Affairs 
Committee, Berlin, 28 April 2004. 
 
Prodi, R. (2002) ‘A wider Europe: a proximity policy as the key to stability’, speech to the 6th ECSA-
World Conference, Brussels, 5-6 Dec.  
 
Rice, C. (2005) ‘Speech by the Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice on Transatlantic Ties at Sciences 
Politiques in Paris’, February 8, 2005. 
 
Rice, C. (2006) ‘Statement on Three-Part Comprehensive Settlement’, Jerusalem, July 31, 2006. 
 
Robertson, L. (1999) Speech by Lord Robertson, Nato Secretary-General, Annual Session of the Nato 
Parliamentary Assembly, Amsterdam, 15 November 1999. 
 
Solana, J. (1999a) Appearance of Dr. Javier Solana, SG/HR for CFSP, before the European Parliament, 
Strasburg, 17 November 1999 
 
Solana, J. (1999b) Remarks to the press by Dr. Javier Solana, Secretary General of the Council, High 
Representative of the European Union for the CFSP, Brussels, 18 October 1999. 
 
Solana J. (2000e) Speech by Dr Javier Solana, Foreign Policy Association, New York, 25 January 2000. 
 
Solana J. (2000b) Speech by Dr Javier Solana, “The development of a CFSP and the role of the High 
Representative”, Danish Institute of International Affiars DUPI, Copenhagen, 11 February 2000.  
 
Solana J. (2000a) Address by Dr Javier Solana, WEU Secretary-General, to the second part of the 46th 
session of the WEU Assembly, Paris, 5 December 2000. 
 
Solana J. (2000d) Speech by Dr Javier Solana at the inaugural conference of the course “Towards a new 
international morality: the humanitarian interventions”, Madrid, University of Alcala de Henares, 7 July 2000.   
 
Solana J. (2000c) Speech by Dr Javier Solana, “The development of a CFSP and the role of the High 
Representative”, Institute of European Affairs, Dublin, 30 March 2000.  
 
Solana, J. (2000f) Speech by Dr. Javier Solana, HR for the CFSP, organised by the Liberal International, 
‘The Foreign Policy of the EU’, The Hague, 7 November 2000.  
 
Solana, J. (2000g) Speech by Dr Javier Solana, HR for CFSP, at the Forschungsinstitute der Deutschen 
Gesellschaft fuer Auswaertige Politik, ‘Where does the EU stand on CFSP?’, Berlin, 14 November 2000. 
 
 
 
218
Solana, J. (2001a) Address by the HR for CFSP, Mr Javier Solana before the European Parliament, 
Brussels, 31 January 2001.  
 
Solana, J. (2001b) Address to the Austrian Institute for European Security Studies by Dr Javier Solana, 
“ESDP after Nice, where do we stand? Where do we go?” Vienna, 18 January 2001. 
 
Solana, J. (2001d) Speech by Dr Javier Solana Madariaga, HR for the EU CFSP, ‘EU Foreign Policy’, 
Bruges Town Hall, 25 April 2001.  
 
Solana, J. (2001c) Speech by Dr Javier Solana, EU HR for CFSP to the Economist Conference, 
“Leadership strategy in the security area. The political perspective”, Athens, 3 April 2001 
 
Solana, J. (2003a) ‘A Secure Europe in a Better World’, Javier Solana, EU HR for CFSP, European 
Council, Thessaloniki, 20 June 2003. 
 
Solana, J. (2003b) ‘A Secure Europe in a Better World’, The EU Security Strategy, Brussels, 12 
December 2003.  
 
Solana, J. (2004) ‘Message from Javier Solana, EU High Representative for the CFSP, on the occasion of 
the launch of the mission EUJUST THEMIS in Georgia’, Brussels, 23 July 2004. 
 
Solana J. (2005a) Address to the Joint Meeting of the Committees on Foreign Affairs and Defence Policy 
of the Parliaments of EU-Member States and the European Parliament, 5 October 2005. 
 
Solana, J. (2005b) Speech by Javier Solana, EU HR for CFSP, Man of the Year award, Gazeta Wyborcza, 
Warsaw 11 May 2005. 
 
Solana, J. (2006a) ‘Mediating today’s conflicts for tomorrow’s peace’, Oslo Forum, 27 June 2006.  
 
Solana, J. (2006b) Speech by Javier Solana, EU High Representative for the Common Foreign and 
Security Policy “Europe’s answers to the global challenges”, University of Copenhagen, 8 September 2006. 
 
Talbott, S. (1999) ‘America’s stake in a strong Europe’, Conference on the future of Nato, London: Royal 
Institute of International Affairs.  
 
UK Non-Paper (2002), EU Civil-Military Co-Ordination, 15 July 2002. 
 
Washington Communiqué (1999) North Atlantic Council summit, Washington, DC, 24 April 1999, Final 
Communiqué. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
219
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
220
ANNEX – NOTE ON INTERVIEWS  
 
Interviews for this thesis were conducted throughout the research process, i.e. from the 
beginning of the empirical phase in spring 2005 until the summer of 2007. While preparing 
the final version to be defended in winter 2007 I further had a chance to incorporate a number 
of insights acquired during the fieldwork in connection with my postdoctoral project on the 
EU’s civilian crisis management concepts in Eastern Europe and the South Caucasus. Many 
crucial interviews occurred on occasions, which could hardly be described as meticulously 
directed and following a predetermined plan. A lot of them had an informal and 
conversational character. While criticism can be raised that this mode of empirical inquiry 
challenges the principle of systematicity and scientific rigour, this research practice remains 
consistent with an ethnographic approach adopted here. Fundamentally, the research process 
did follow a strategic if flexible design within which I sought to identify and obtain access to 
actors who had emerged as defining figures in the field. 
 As mentioned, numerous interviews were performed when an occasion arose and they 
barely adhered to a questionnaire model. They rather went along the unfolding of a 
conversation while still seeking to obtain relevant insights. Additionally, due to the 
confidential character of many interviews and the repeated requests to remain anonymous (in 
particular by diplomats), in the text I often only indicate the person’s institutional affiliation. 
Still, several concentrated and planned fieldwork sessions should be distinguished. I list them 
below together with the names of those persons that consented to be mentioned in an 
academic context. 
 The first phase of interviewing took place during a four-week fieldwork in Tbilisi 
Georgia where the Themis rule of law mission was deployed. I interviewed repeatedly and 
conversed informally with all the members of the operation, a number of national Georgian 
assistants and technical staff (drivers, IT experts) employed at that time. The interviewed 
members of Themis included:  
- Sylvie Pantz, head of the mission, with whom I conducted a two-hour semi-
structured interview and conversed repeatedly on a number of formal and less 
formal occasions during my participation in the mission’s activities; 
- Rafal Pelc, a seconded legal expert collocated in the Georgian office of the 
ombudsman, with whom I conducted two semi-structured interviews and 
numerous daily conversations on different aspects of the mission’s 
performance. I also engaged in an extended email interview with him over the 
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period between summer 2005 and summer 2006 and conducted a two-hour 
interview in January 2006 in Warsaw regarding the follow-up to Themis; 
- Kaupo Kand, a seconded member state diplomat and the second political 
advisor to the mission with whom I conducted two interviews on the site of 
Themis, a number of less formal conversations and a two-hour semi-structured 
interview in Brussels in November 2005 after the closure of Themis when he 
returned to his function as a national representative in CIVCOM; 
- Annette von Sydow, a seconded legal expert collocated in the General 
Prosecutor’s office whom I interviewed together with Maurizio Salustro and 
with whom I conversed informally on a number of occasions; 
- Maurizio Salustro, a seconded legal expert collocated in the General 
Prosecutor’s office whom I interviewed together with Annette von Sydow and 
individually on two other occasions. I then engaged in email interviews with 
him until spring 2006 and conducted a three-hour interview in October 2005 in 
Rome while he served as an expert to EUJUST LEX in Iraq; 
- Ole Gaard, a seconded legal expert collocated in the Ministry of Interior with 
whom I conducted a two-hour semi-structured interview and conversed 
informally on a number of occasions; 
- Gerritjan van Oven, a seconded legal expert collocated in the Procurator’s 
office with whom I conducted a two-hour semi-structured interview and 
conversed informally on a number of occasions; 
- Ellen Best, a seconded legal expert collocated in the Supreme Court with 
whom I conversed informally on a number of occasions; 
- Thomas Baranovas, a seconded legal expert collocated in the Ministry of 
Justice with whom I conducted a two-hour semi-structured interview and 
engaged in an email interview in summer 2007 about his responsibilities as a 
seconded member of the EUSR enhanced border support team in Chisinau, 
Moldova. 
- Uldis Kinis, a seconded legal expert collocated in the Appeal Court with whom 
I conducted a two-hour semi-structured interview and conversed informally on 
a couple of occasions. 
 
On the Themis site, I further interviewed four Georgian legal assistants and conversed 
informally with drivers of the mission. Via the mission’s facilitation, I conducted a formal 
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interview with Sozar Subari, at the time the Georgian ombudsman and a member of the 
working group on the strategy of the criminal law reform, and Merab Turawa, at the time a 
high-level judge engaged in the judiciary reform in Georgia. The participation in a number of 
seminars organised by the mission allowed me to exchange views with numerous employees 
of the Georgian justice system. Formally, I also interviewed two other members of the 
strategy working group, Nika Gvaremia, a Georgian MP and Levan Ramishvili, a civil society 
representative. On two occasions, I talked more broadly about the political situation in 
Georgia with the Polish ambassador in Tbilisi. For a week, I stayed in the Georgian 
Foundation for Strategic Studies where I discussed the state of Georgian reform with 
professor Alexander Rondelli, the director, and two researchers, Archil Gegeshidze and 
Temuri Yakobashvili. 
 In July 2005, I spent a working week interviewing researchers from the EU Institute 
for Security Studies in Paris where I participated in two conferences. In particular, I organised 
a focus group on ESDP comprising Dr Dov Lynch, Dr Walter Posch, Dr Judy Butt, Dr Marcin 
Zaborowski and Dr Agnieszka Nowak. I separately interviewed Dr Lynch and Dr 
Zaborowski. 
 In November 2005, I conducted a serious of interviews in Brussels, both in the CFSP 
and the EC bodies with the aim to inquire about EUJUST Themis and Lex. Some of the 
officials interviewed wished to remain unnamed, with most restricting referring to their names 
while citing certain opinions. I list those who consented to be mentioned in an unpublished 
annex. In the Council Secretariat, I conducted formal semi-structured interviews with: 
- Steven Everts, Javier Solana’s advisor and speech writer; 
- Michael Matthiessen, at the time of Themis’s conception the director of DGE 9 
in the Council Secretariat; 
- Michael Swann from DGE VI dealing with the region of the South Caucasus 
among others; 
- Paulo Barroso Simoes from DGE VI dealing with the region of the South 
Caucasus among others. 
In the DGE 9 of the Council Secretariat, I conducted a focus group and interviewed following 
individuals: 
- Sandra Paesen, a desk officer for Themis; 
- Jonas Jonsson, the first political advisor to Themis and political advisor to  
Stephen White, the Lex HoM; 
- Hannu Taimisto, a seconded official and expert on rule of law issues; 
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- Stephen White, the Lex HoM; 
- Justin Davis, a Council Secretariat official that took part in the fact-finding 
mission leading to EUJUST Lex; 
- Dorota Eggert, an administrator. 
In the EC Relex, I conducted interviews with: 
- Richard Tibbels, at that time the desk officer for Georgia; 
- Patrick Dupont, an EC representative to CIVCOM; 
- Angela Liberatore, scientific officer in the Directorate-General 
- Rene Leray, at that time a deputy to the EC representative to PSC. 
I further interviewed member state diplomats, in particular Polish representatives to CIVCOM 
Przemyslaw Florczyk and Malgorzata Kosiura Kazmierska as well as other diplomats.  
 In April 2006, I returned to Brussels to conduct extended interviews mostly 
concerning EUJUST Lex. I talked again to Stephen White, Jonas Jonsson, the DGE 9-based 
Lex experts on training, as well as the EC desk officer for Iraq and a number of member state 
diplomats.  
The finishing stage of the doctoral research overlapped with the beginning of my 
postdoctoral project, particularly vis-a-vis EUBAM. In June 2007, I conducted a number of 
interviews in Odesa with the members of EUBAM. In October 2007 in Brussels I spoke with 
a number of CFSP and EC officials concerning EUBAM and from November 2007 until end 
of April 2008 I am a stagier in the EC Delegation in Kyiv which provides an opportunity for 
participant observation research. This ongoing project has offered insights for the concluding 
doctoral research but I should refrain from listing the names of the persons interviewed as this 
has not been negotiated yet. 
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